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Summary 
 
This thesis investigates the development of ontology as a philosophical 
discipline in the German philosophical tradition. It starts from what can be 
considered the invention of ontology and proceeds to the way it was received 
in the philosophy of Hegel. It is separated into two parts. The first part argues 
that what can be called the ‘traditional’ form of ontology is developed by 
Christian Wolff in his 1730 monograph Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, and it 
traces both the history of the name (or concept) ‘ontology’, as well as the 
history of the conception which led to Wolff’s formulation of it. The history of 
the name tracks the use of the concept ‘ontology’ from its first occurrence in 
1606 up to Wolff. The history of the conception tracks the conceptions of 
various philosophical disciplines, found in thinkers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, 
and Spinoza, that ultimately give rise to Wolff’s conception of ontology as a 
science of an entity qua entity. The second part traces the development of this 
Wolffian conception through the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. 
The aim of this thesis is to argue that Wolff’s philosophy should be seen as the 
original formulation of the philosophical discipline of ontology and that the 
Wolffian conception of ontology is the one shared by subsequent German 
thinkers up to, and including, Hegel. I refer to this shared understanding of 
what ontology is as ‘the German ontological tradition’. The title of the thesis, 
The Possibility of Ontology, refers to the way in which this traditional 
understanding of what ontology is, is treated throughout the German 
ontological tradition. Specifically, Kant argues that the traditional conception 
is effectively impossible, while in Hegel one can find arguments that are 
intended to show that some aspects of this traditional discipline are in fact 
possible. Besides focusing on a fairly under-researched topic of the early 
history of ontology as a philosophical discipline, this thesis attempts to utilise 
its historical findings in order to provide novel ways in which the systems of 
the thinkers such as Kant and Hegel can be understood. There is a serious 
disregard for, or underplaying of, the Wolffian influence on the philosophical 
thought of Kant and Hegel, and it is my aim to contribute to the rectification of 
this situation by demonstrating the frequently overlooked dialogue these 
thinkers had with Wolff’s conception of ontology. 
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Introduction 
In his 2012 monograph, The Twenty-five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic 
Reconstruction, Eckart Förster takes to heart two claims from the history of 
German metaphysics. The first claim comes from Kant’s Metaphysical 
Foundations of the Doctrine of Right and states that prior to the Critique of Pure 
Reason (or more precisely, prior to the “development of critical philosophy”) 
there was no philosophy at all. The second claim can be found in Hegel’s 
lecture from Spring of 1806 and says that “the history of philosophy has come 
to an end.”1 This, Förster continues, suggests that the history of philosophy 
lasts for merely 25 years. Förster then proceeds with an attempt to show that 
there is some truth in the idea underpinning these two claims, which, in their 
combination, assign a short time span to philosophy in the history of human 
thinking. 
 
My aim here is similar, but instead of the lifespan of philosophy I want 
to focus on ontology. If one is to look into its history, one can see that there 
were only 101 years of ontology. This science, or philosophical discipline, can 
be considered as coming into being with Christian Wolff’s publication of 
Ontologia sive philosophia prima in 1730, and ending with Hegel’s death in 1831. 
 
I understand that the statements of this sort legitimately make the 
reader nervous and raise a torrent of questions. Is this name, ontology, not still 
to be found widely employed today? Are there no current philosophical 
practices that are referred to by such name? Has there been no ontology since 
Hegel, or before Wolff? Is it not the case that ontology is no longer only a 
philosophical discipline but also appears in various other sciences, humanistic 
or otherwise? In one sense, the answer to all of these questions is: ‘yes’. But in 
order to properly understand what is contained in the claim that there were 
only 101 years of ontology we need to ask the question of what ontology is or, 
more precisely, what ontology originally was. 
                                                        
1 Kant 6:12; Hegel Werke in zwanzig Bänden 20:461; both quoted from Förster 2012, p. ix. 
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If one is allowed to take etymology as one’s guide, the very name of 
ontology suggests that it is a discourse or science concerned with beings or 
with entities. But what kind of discourse or science on that topic is ontology? 
Does it proceed a priori or a posteriori? Is it a theoretical or a practical science? 
Is it a philosophical, natural-scientific, or a culinary discourse? The name on 
its own cannot reveal this. But what else can a mere name suggest regarding 
the nature of this discipline? A science that bears the name ‘ontology’ would 
concern itself with entities or beings (ta onta, from to on – a being, an entity), 
rather than concerning itself with what it is for something ‘to be’ (einai, with a 
possible neologism einology), or with questions such as ‘what is existence?’ or 
‘what exists?’ If scientific disciplines generally ask the question what is, 
ontology would, in that case, ask the question: ‘what is an entity’? More than 
this, however, etymology does not reveal. 
 
If at this point one remains keen to continue the search into what 
ontology is or what it is supposed to be, and further specifies that one’s interest 
lies in the philosophical discipline of ontology, one should look into the history 
of philosophical practices undertaken under the same name. What then 
quickly becomes clear is that there are two, up to a point parallel, histories of 
ontology. To be more precise, in investigating the history of ontology one can 
find both a history of the concept or the name ‘ontology’ and the history of a 
certain philosophical practice or conception of ontology. When one connects 
these two historical threads in a specific manner one reaches the 
aforementioned, startling conclusion: there have only been 101 years of 
ontology, as originally conceived, in the philosophical canon.  
 
The manner of connecting the two histories is far from trivial. The 
history of the name is longer than these 101 years. It does not stretch much 
further into the past than the aforementioned Ontologia by Wolff, but it still 
predates the year 1730 when the text was published (Wolff himself refers to the 
earlier instances of the name). Moreover, the name is still actively used today, 
designating certain philosophical (and increasingly non-philosophical) 
disciplines and methods. Regardless of this, the history of the name is more or 
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less a straightforward, yet important, historical question. The history of the 
name concerns itself with questions such as: ‘when did the term appear for the 
first time and why?’ The question of the conception, or of the practices 
designated by the name, is more philosophically interesting and much more 
complicated. Such a question, if one wishes to avoid anachronistic readings of 
the philosophical tradition, has to start with the investigation into the history 
of the name, focusing on the earliest appearances of the name. Furthermore, 
the practices designated by that name then have to be identified and analysed 
so that it could be possible to reach a point at which a certain practice in the 
history of philosophy can be presented as the gold-standard of what ontology 
is supposed to be, or at least how it is supposed to be understood in the 
practice of philosophico-historical reflection. This gold-standard is then to be 
compared with similar or kindred practices cropping up throughout 
philosophical history as well as in the philosophical present, whether they are 
themselves designated by the name ontology or not. Ideally, a standard 
proposed by such an undertaking, by which the earlier and later practices are 
to be evaluated, should not be an arbitrary standard. I said that this standard, 
the one that can legitimately be appealed to as a case of what ontology 
originally was, is to be found in the Latin philosophy of Christian Wolff. 
 
It is true that the name ontology, as mentioned above, precedes Wolff 
by more than a century. It is also true that the philosophical undertaking, 
which he named ‘ontology’ and described as a “science of the entity qua 
entity”, is not radically original. The characteristics of the philosophical 
science developed by Wolff can be found present in philosophical systems and 
practices long before Wolff, and keep appearing in philosophy since Wolff. 
But the significance of Wolff that has to be acknowledged lies in the fact that 
Wolff was the one to take a certain term, ontology, from the general set of 
philosophical lexemes available at his point in history and then solidify and 
popularise it as a technical term in philosophy, particularly in metaphysics. By 
doing this, Wolff moves the name of ontology from the philosophical periphery 
where it was previously located to the philosophical mainstream, or even to 
the very core of philosophy. 
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In that sense, Wolff does to ontology what Plato does to eidos and idea, 
or what Aristotle does to ousia or hylē (by which a non-metaphysical word for 
forest, woodland, or lumber becomes immortalised in metaphysical discourse 
as matter). These terms, form, substance, and matter were not themselves coined 
by Plato and Aristotle. One could see them being used by various earlier 
thinkers, and they survive as parts of general philosophical terminology today, 
even if what they stand for or are used for differs from the original intent. And 
yet, despite the fact that the more metaphysical students of Socrates were not 
the first ones to come up with these terms, have not been the last ones to use 
them, and have not made their own understandings of them into an 
indisputable or immutable doctrine, there is still something legitimately 
belonging to Plato and Aristotle when these terms appear today. Whenever 
they are used today, they remain of this Platonic/Aristotelian heritage, and 
should ultimately be informed by it.2  
 
The terms inherited from Plato and Aristotle have been widely 
discussed and their meanings and mutations have been documented in 
countless histories and commentaries. But what I had trouble finding was such 
a body of work for the discipline of ontology. I therefore present this historical 
inquiry motivated by a simple question of what ontology was when it was 
originally conceived. And when one asks the question about the origins of 
ontology in this way the aforementioned 101 years of its existence become 
apparent. It is with Wolff’s Ontologia that a certain name and a certain 
conception come together and, more importantly, become the part of the 
mainstream philosophical tradition. This is why Wolff’s formulation of what 
ontology is, is to be seen as the ‘original’ or ‘traditional’ formulation. If there 
were not for Wolff’s input it is questionable whether the name ‘ontology’ 
would survive to this day, and it is questionable what shape German 
philosophy would take in the 18th and 19th centuries. But ‘traditional’ 
conceptions or formulations need ‘traditions’ to keep them alive. In this thesis 
I argue that there certainly existed a tradition of this kind, i.e. the one that, by 
                                                        
2 Even in the case, as argued in Kosman 2014, when this heritage has to be 
purposefully ignored in order to understand a new employment of the concept, as it is 
the case with the ousia – substance relation and the Early Moderns. 
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the name ‘ontology’, understood and designated precisely this discipline 
devised by Wolff. Perhaps out of a lack of imagination I refer to this tradition 
as ‘the German ontological tradition’ and the two most important members I 
discuss are Kant and Hegel.  
 
But what characterizes this tradition, besides the shared understanding 
of what the name ‘ontology’ stands for, is the fact that it is also a tradition that 
asks whether ontology the way it was conceived by Wolff is possible. This 
question is what gives my thesis its name. As we shall see, Kant raises the 
question of the possibility of ontology and he answers it in the negative. Hegel, 
on the other hand, attempts to preserve some key aspects of Wolffian ontology 
arguing, to put it simply, that some key aspects of Kant’s rejection of it are 
mistaken. However, with Hegel’s rehabilitation the history of this ‘original’ or 
‘traditional’ conception of ontology ends. While arguing for the preservation 
of some of its aspects against Kant’s rejection of it, Hegel ultimately does not 
see much use in either the name ontology or the way it was conceived by 
Wolff. Due to this, the Wolffian conception of ontology falls into temporary 
oblivion, while the name gets subsequently assigned to various different kinds 
of philosophical disciplines. Due to this, I mark the year of Hegel’s death as 
the, perhaps symbolic, end of the traditional conception of ontology. If we see 
Wolff’s Ontologia as a place where ontology is formulated for the first time, and 
the death of Hegel as a point at which the last thinker who understood it in 
this ways died, we arrive to the meaning of the claim that there has only been 
101 years of ontology, at least of ontology in the way in which it was originally 
conceived. 
 
My aim is to provide a story of ontology that is both historically and 
philosophically informative. As I mentioned earlier there has been very little 
research within English-speaking scholarship regarding the history of 
ontology as such. Out of the consulted literature, the two papers I managed to 
find that specifically deal with the early history of ontology were by Peter 
Øhrstrøm et al., which were delivered as part of a conference on Computer 
Science, rather than philosophy. In addition, there is another paper that 
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focuses on this history by J. F. Mora.3 Specifically speaking, that seems to be it. 
While there are other works that are informative regarding this history they 
mostly deal with it tangentially, while focusing on other topics.4 
 
But besides this historical research it is my aim, by focusing on the 
discussions of the possibility of ontology within the German ontological 
tradition, to see whether reading canonical thinkers such as Kant and Hegel 
from the perspective of this tradition, can reveal something new and 
interesting about the nature of their philosophical systems. It seems to me that 
today no one denies the influence Wolff (or Wolffianism) had, if not on both 
Kant and Hegel, at least on Kant. It is well known that Kant lectured on 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, which is rightfully seen as a version of Wolffian 
metaphysics, even though in his writing he rejects it as dogmatism. The 2014 
publication of Kant’s copy of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica is a witness to the 
awareness and interest the scholarship has in the Wolffian or ‘dogmatic’ 
tradition. However, while there is plenty research on Humean, Leibnizian, 
Spinozist, Aristotelian, Sceptic, Cartesian and other influences on Kant and 
Hegel, it is extremely difficult to find anyone discussing Wolff’s influence. Due 
to the fact that we all seem to agree that Wolff certainly was significantly 
influential, at least on Kant, I find this lack of research surprising. While 
focusing on Kant’s awakening from dogmatic slumber, we fail to investigate 
what that long sleep looked like. One consequence of this is an interesting 
situation in which there are plenty of debates about whether Kant or Hegel are 
metaphysical or not, ontological or not, etc., without considering what these 
terms originally meant to Kant and Hegel. Of course, Kant and Hegel come to 
their own conceptions of what metaphysics is supposed to be and how 
ontology is to be properly conceived, but, by ignoring the Wolffian tradition 
                                                        
3 Another very useful paper is Vollrath’s Die Gliederung der Metaphysik in eine 
metaphysica generalis und eine metaphysica specialis, but as one can see it is written 
in German, rather than English. 
4 An excellent source is, for example, Beck’s Early German Philosophy: Kant and His 
Predecessors, but due to the vastness of material this book covers it is not surprising 
that it does not spend much time on the early history of ontology. Gilson’s Being and 
Some Philosophers is another very helpful example of this kind of literature. 
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they belong to, we risk losing sight of the fact that their conceptions of 
metaphysics and ontology are also to be seen as responses to the earlier, 
Wolffian conceptions. One notable exception to the lack of research into the 
Wolffian influence on both Kant and Hegel is certainly the work of Karin de 
Boer, who carefully examines the meaning behind the word ‘ontology’ that 
was at the disposal of the two thinkers, and also convincingly argues that 
interpretations of Kant and Hegel’s philosophy benefit greatly by being 
informed about their concern regarding the possibility of Wolffian ontology. 
Although this thesis reaches slightly different conclusions from de Boer 
regarding how we should interpret Hegel’s philosophy in light of his responses 
to Wolff and Kant, I am significantly indebted to her work for orienting me in 
my own research regarding the early history of ontology and the influence of 
this history on the systems of Kant and Hegel. 
 
  The thesis is separated into two parts. The first part is concerned with 
the history of the formulation of the science of ontology in its ‘traditional’ or 
‘original’ form in the philosophy of Wolff. It traces, as I have previously 
mentioned, both the history of the concept or the name, and the history of the 
conception, of ontology. The history of the name is traced through various little-
known figures of the philosophical past, such as Lorhard, Goclenius, and 
Clauberg, since there is an argument to be made that this is the trajectory that 
puts the term ‘ontology’ at Wolff’s disposal. The history of the conception has 
to do with the nature of Wolff’s science. Since Wolff understands ontology as a 
part of metaphysics, specifically the science of an entity qua entity, I provide a 
very general trajectory of a science of this kind, which ultimately leads to 
Wolff’s formulation. Since the formulation of a “science of an entity qua 
entity”, also called ‘primary philosophy’, first appears in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
this serves as my starting point. I then proceed to investigate how this 
Aristotelian ‘primary philosophy’ develops through the centuries, how it 
relates to metaphysics and theology, and how and why it appears in the shape 
it does in the philosophy of Wolff, under the name ‘ontology’. 
 
The second part concerns the trajectory Wolffian ontology takes after 
Wolff. It investigates the tradition of this ‘traditional’ conception of 
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metaphysics. It starts with investigating Kant’s arguments for the rejection of 
ontology and its replacement with the transcendental analytic, as well as the 
nature of Kant’s ‘legitimized’ sense of ontology. This is followed by the 
investigation of Hegel’s relation to ontology. I first attempt to show that when 
Hegel uses the term or refers to ontology he indeed has in mind Wolff’s (or 
Wolffian) ontology. Secondly, I argue that Hegel attempts to rehabilitate a 
certain key aspect of Wolffian ontology, the ability of thought to grasp things 
as they are in themselves, through his critique of Kant’s rejection of it.  
 
Before starting the thesis I need to say something regarding the method 
I have been using throughout. This concerns the way I have traced the 
conceptions of ontology prior, but also subsequent to Wolff. What I have done 
is relied on certain, what I call, morphological correlates in order to 
demonstrate the connections between various texts. What do I mean by that? 
One difficulty of this thesis is that it navigates across 4 different languages. 
Wolff formulates what ontology is in his Latin works, specifically in Ontologia. 
It is seen as a science which investigates “ens quatenus ens est” or, as I often 
refer to it, “ens qua ens”. This, I have translated as “an entity qua entity.” The 
potential difficulty is that I also claim that this formula is a valid way of 
translating the Aristotelian investigation of to on hē(i) on, which is sometimes 
translated as the “science of being qua being”. What I have done, however, is 
reserved the term ‘being’ (or ‘Being’) for Greek einai, Latin esse, and German 
Sein. What I am doing, therefore, is assuming the direct translatability between 
these four, as well as between the Greek to on, Latin ens, German das Seiende, 
and English the entity. For clarity and ease of reference consider the following 
table: 
 
Greek Latin German English 
einai esse Sein Being 
to on ens das Seiende the entity 
 
While there might be historico-linguistic reasons that make this 
equivalence between the terms not as straightforward as I have presented 
them, I do not believe that the way I have made use of such equivalences is 
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problematic. As I show at various points at the thesis, these terms were seen as 
translations for the earlier terms, especially when shifting from Greek to Latin. 
Some difficulties might be encountered when we reach German and English. 
For example, ‘ens qua ens’ or ‘to on hei on’ might be more familiar to the reader 
as ‘being qua being’. I have, however, avoided to use ‘being’ in order to 
translate to on or ens in order to clearly differentiate it from einai, esse, and 
especially Sein. There is a difference present already in Aristotle regarding the 
question ‘ti to on’ and ‘tis he einai’. Moreover, there is a sharp differentiation 
in Aquinas between ens and the esse of something and, once we reach Hegel, 
the category of Sein is significantly different from anything that would have 
been designated by ens either in Wolff’s philosophy or before. Another 
possible difficulty is that in German the term Wesen could stand for both the 
terms ‘entity’ and ‘essence’, but it seems to me that the context in which Wesen 
appears makes it clear to what meaning of the two it might refer. Similarly, 
starting with Kant, but already present in Wolff’s German texts, although the 
term ‘das Seiende’ can be found appearing as a correlate of ens, the preferred 
term used tends to be das Ding. Although a distinction between ens and res 
existed in mediaeval philosophy, this does not seem strictly adhered to in 
German translations where das Ding tends to be used as a more natural 
equivalent for ens rather than ‘das Seiende’. Hence Kant’s Ding an sich stands 
as a term for Wolff’s ens per se, exemplifying the dogmatic aspect of the 
Wolffian ens that Kant tries to go beyond, while for Hegel, the category of das 
Ding shows itself to be the closest correlate to Wolff’s ens. But the term das 
Seiende still appears in the German ontological tradition, even though das Ding 
tends to be preferred and as such I do not find this shift problematic. The 
consistent use of ‘das Seiende’ for ens does not, as far as I am aware, come into 
practice until Heidegger’s formulation of the ontological difference. However, 
the nuances between these terms and their translations will become clearer 
throughout the thesis, which is now ready to begin. 
Part 1 :   
 
The History of Ontology 
Chapter One: History of the Name 
1. Lorhard and Goclenius 
 
The earliest record of the term 'ontology' known of today can be found 
in Jacob Lorhard's (or Lorhardius') book Ogdoas Scholastica published in 1606.1 
The work, which was likely intended as a textbook for teaching2 is delineated 
into eight [ὀγδοάς] “typicam artium”, which include Latin and Greek 
grammar, logic, rhetoric, astronomy, ethics, physics, and, most important for 
the purposes of this chapter, “Metaphysices, seu Ontologiæ.” For each ars 
there is a particular chapter which attempts to present it through the formal 
separation of its elements by distinguishing the fundamental concept of each 
art into opposed pairs, using a form of a tree diagram where possible. For 
example, the section on Logic, which is understood as the “art of good 
employment of reason” (and not seen as belonging to Metaphysics/Ontology) 
is separated into Theme and Argument; Theme is further separated into 
Simple and Connected; Argument is separated into Declarative, 
Demonstrative, Broadening, and Illustrative. This process continues for almost 
40 more pages and then the whole procedure is repeated for rhetoric, etc.3  
 
With regards to ontology, Lorhard provides neither a definition of, nor 
a reason for, the inclusion of this neologism in his book. In fact, in the whole 
work, which spans over 400 pages, the term itself appears only three times. It 
can be found, as mentioned above, in the front matter of the book 
(“Metaphysices, seu Ontologiæ”), followed by an occurrence at the beginning 
of the section on metaphysics/ontology (“METAPHYSICAE SEU ONTOLO-
giæ [sic] Diagraphe”), and finally at the very end of that section and the book 
itself (“FINIS ONTOLOGIÆ”). The first entry of the metaphysics/ontology 
chapter is “Metaphysica” which Lorhard understands as:  
 
                                                        
1 Øhrstrøm et al. 2005, p. 428. 
2 Ibid, p. 429. 
3 Lorhard 1606, pars 3. All translations from Latin are mine unless otherwise specified. 
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knowledge of the intelligible by which it is intelligible since it 
is intelligible by man with [the help of] the natural light of 
reasoning without conception of anything material.4  
 
After the definition of metaphysics is provided, Lorhard informs the 
reader that there are only two parts of metaphysics: Universalis and 
Particularis.5 Interesting for the present purposes is the fact that, at this point at 
which metaphysics is defined and divided, unlike in the section title right 
above it, metaphysics is not equated with ontology –  but neither is it 
distinguished from it. The term Ontologia simply falls out of the picture until 
the very last line of the book. But where does it go? If one is to look at this 
separation from a more modern perspective, by which I mean by having in 
mind the separation of metaphysics into Metaphysica Generalis or Ontologia and 
into Metaphysica Specialis, still well known today (but non-existent in 1606), one 
would then expect the name Ontologia to be joined with what is here called 
Metaphysica Universalis. This, however, is not the case, at least not explicitly. 
What Lorhard specifies is that Metaphysica Universalis consists of the 
Intelligibles [Intelligibilium] as well as Entities [Entium], where an Intelligible “is 
called everything which is perceived by the intellect and can be 
comprehended,” while Entities are “anything positive, possessing essence.” 
The explicit naming of the universal part of metaphysics (or the metaphysics 
                                                        
4 Metaphysic[a] quae est ‘ἐπιστήμη τοῦ νοητοῦ ᾑ νοητόν’ quatenus ab homine naturali 
rationis lumine sine ullo materiae conceptu est intelligibile. Translation Øhrstrøm, et al., 
2005, p. 429.  Ἐπιστήμη, translated as “knowledge”, is here to be understood in the 
sense of Latin word scientia, rather than our contemporary term ‘knowledge’, as noted 
in Øhrstrøm et al. 2007, p. 377. It might be possible to argue that this definition appeals 
to what I will shortly call the apriority of metaphysics or metaphysical method. This is, 
for example, in contrast to Aristotle for whom the absence of matter in metaphysics 
implies the need of this science to discuss entities independent of (or independently 
from) matter, but Lorhard’s phrasing seems to potentially point towards something 
else: a need for a methodological apriority. By this I mean that he attempts to claim that 
metaphysics is to be undertaken in an a priori fashion, rather than attempting, at this 
point, to designate the object of metaphysical science. 
5 “Metaphysicae (…) partes sunt dua; Altera…” The inclusion of the term alter suggest 
exclusive disjunction, hence there being only two parts. 
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of universals) as ontology is, however, missing from the text. In fact, the two 
prior uses of the term (front page and the title) suggest the equivalence 
between the very terms Metaphysica and Ontologia, and, as mentioned before, 
the term Ontologia appears once again, this time without mentioning 
metaphysics, in the closing line of the section. This suggests that Lorhard did 
not intend to use the term to name just one of the two parts of metaphysics, or 
to posit and name some new, separate part of metaphysics or a new 
philosophical discipline altogether. The reason why he does use it, however, 
remains uncertain. 
 
One might argue that it is still possible to make a case that Lorhard 
intended Ontologia to be used as a novel name for Metaphysica Universalis, 
therefore foreshadowing the separation often attributed to Wolff, even though 
Lorhard fails to do so explicitly. After Wolff, as will be discussed later, 
Metaphysica Generalis or ontology is understood, loosely speaking, as the 
science of entities. In Lorhard’s text, Metaphysica Universalis, similarly to 
Wolffian Metaphysica Generalis, is posited as a part of metaphysics explicitly 
tasked with dealing with Entities, as well as the Intelligibles. If one is, however, 
to follow Lorhard’s schema further, it quickly becomes clear that this case is 
difficult to make. Firstly, the other part of metaphysics, Metaphysica 
Particularis, also deals with entities or, more precisely, it “deals specifically with 
the non-complex entity”6 and is composed of the part on Substance and a part 
on Accidents. Moreover, as Lorhard’s separation continues under the heading 
of Metaphysica Universalis, Intelligibles are distributed into Nothing 
(understood as “simply not [being] something”) and Something (“Whatever is 
simply not nothing”). The section on Something is further differentiated into 
the Negative and the Positive, the latter of which is divided into Essence and 
Entity [Ens]. Hence, Metaphysica Universalis cannot be exhaustively understood 
as the science of entities. This is because a) entities themselves are understood 
as “anything positive” while the science in question also deals with the 
negative, with non-entities; and b) because Metaphysica Particularis is also 
supposed to treat of a kind of entity (the non-complex kind). In short, the later, 
Wolffian conception of Metaphysica Generalis conceives of it as the science of 
                                                        
6 “…agit de Ente incomplexo in specie.” 
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entities qua entities, while Lorhard distributes the investigation of entities 
across universal and particular metaphysics. 
 
Hence it seems that some key questions still remain unsolved: why 
does Lorhard coin and use the term Ontologia? What is that term supposed to 
designate and what is its relation to Metaphysica? What is its role within the 
text of Ogdoas Scholastica? In order to attempt to provide some indication of 
Lorhard’s possible motivations for coining and employing the term in this text 
it might be beneficial to look at his other works. His earlier work, Liber de 
adeptione from 1597, contains the following definition of metaphysics: 
 
Metaphysics, which considers all things in general, as far as 
they are ὄντα and as far as they are of the highest genera and 
principles without being supported by hypotheses based on 
the senses.7 
 
This short definition, visibly different from the definition of 
metaphysics found in the Ogdoas, might provide some hints towards a loose 
hypothesis about Lorhard’s motivation for including the term Ontologia in the 
text he publishes 9 years later. First of all, from a philological perspective, what 
the Liber de adeptione definition suggests is: a) that Lorhard seems to have 
preferred the Greek term ὄντα, rather than the Latin equivalent entia at some 
point; and b) that he probably did not have the term Ontologia at his disposal in 
1597. He might have devised the neologism Ontologia due to a preference for 
the Greek, rather than Latin term for entity.8 Since it is problematic to 
speculate about a thinker’s preference and since the Greek term ὄντα does not 
appear in Ogdoas Scholastica while Ens and Entia seem to be used without 
                                                        
7 Metaphysica, quae res omnes communiter considerat, quatenus sunt ὄντα, quatenus summa 
genera & principia, nullis sensibilibus hypothesibus subnixa. Lorhard 1597, quoted from 
Øhrstrøm et al. 2005, p. 428. Translation slightly modified. 
8 The troubles of translating Greek philosophical terms into Latin, and the complains 
about how ugly the new terms sound belongs a tradition much older than the 16th 
Century as can be seen, for example, from Seneca’s comments on translating οὐσία 
with essentia, are discussed in Kosman 2014, q.v. 
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reservation, I would not put much emphasis on this possibility. The most 
likely reason why Lorhard decides to form a neologism from Greek, rather 
than Latin, is due to a common practice of observing the derivational purity in 
coining neologisms (since –logia is a Greek suffix, the principle of derivational 
purity does not allow the stem to be Latinate). Moreover, using Greek names 
for all disciplines in the Ogdoas demonstrates stylistic consistency, since all the 
names for the eight artia are Greek-derivatives.9  
 
What does the difference in the definition of metaphysics between the 
Liber de adeptione and Ogdoas Scholastica suggest from a philosophical, rather 
than philological, perspective? In the Liber, Lorhard claims that metaphysics 
investigates ὄντα, but there is no reference to the Intelligibles. In Ogdoas, 
metaphysics is defined through the appeal to the Intelligibles, but without the 
reference to ὄντα. The reason for this shift is unknown to me, but it is possible 
that Lorhard decides, between the writing of the two books, that it is more 
important to understand metaphysics by appealing to the Intelligibles than by 
appealing to entities. This might be due to the case that Lorhard seems to be 
suggesting, in the Ogdoas, that the Intelligibles form a wider class than entities. 
The first-order Intelligibles in Ogdoas are Nihil and Aliquid. Nihil does not 
separate further, while Aliquid separates into Positivum and Negativum. 
Negativum further separates into Vera et Ficta (Truths and Fictions). Ficta, 
however, are considered Entia, although rationis. In this case, the study of 
negative Intelligibles, that is, aliquid negativum, is, ultimately, the study of 
entities, although entia rationis, rather than entia realis. On the other hand, 
there are two areas, according to Lorhard’s schema, which can be seen as 
investigations into Intelligibles that are not investigations into entities, not 
even rationis. These are the investigations into Nothing, and into Essence (the 
latter falling under the subset of aliquid positivum, alongside ens). On the other 
hand, while Nothing does not separate further, each part in the separation of 
                                                        
9 A potential neologism ent(i)ology would be a result of a Latin-Greek combination. 
Moreover, there is a curious practice on the title page where the Greek genitive (-es) is 
used instead of the Latin genitive (-ae), e.g. “Diagraphen Typicam Artium (…) 
Metaphysices.” In the actual chapter on metaphysics, however, the Latin genitive is 
used (“METAPHYSICAE (…) Diagraphe). 
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Essence is explained by referencing how essence relates to entities, suggesting 
that, as far as essence is concerned, there might not be a real (although there 
might be a valid nominal) distinction between the science of the Intelligible 
and the science of entities.10 But the original question remains: why does 
Lorhard, after changing the definition of metaphysics so as to not include an 
explicit reference to ὄντα, suddenly introduce the term Ontologia as a synonym 
for Metaphysica?  
 
A potential answer could be that this new name, introduced in the 
Ogdoas, was not introduced to replace, but rather to expand or further specify 
the object of metaphysics. The motivation for introducing the name ‘ontology’ 
in the Ogdoas could therefore be seen as being motivated by Lorhard’s desire to 
specify that metaphysics is, fundamentally and ultimately, a science of entities, 
even though the new 1606 definition of metaphysics, unlike the 1597 one, does 
not in itself refer to entities.11 To summarise this point, in 1606 Lorhard defines 
metaphysics as the science of what is intelligible and does not mention entities 
in that definition. However, his further analysis of metaphysics discloses that 
metaphysics is about entities, as well as intelligibles. Furthermore, the only 
intelligibles that are not themselves entities are “nothing” and “essence”; and 
even essence is in fact inseparable from entities, so strictly speaking the only 
intelligible that is not an entity is “nothing”. This means that metaphysics, 
though not explicitly defined as such, is in fact (with the exception of 
“nothing”) the science of entities and the alternative name for it, ontology, is 
here to remind us of that. 
 
                                                        
10 Since essence is itself described as “[that] by which [an] entity is that what it is,” [per 
quod Ens est id quod est]. 
11 I do not believe this is in tension with my previous claim that the new definition of 
metaphysics emphasises the apriority, i.e. the method of metaphysics, rather than the 
object of metaphysics. On the contrary, the change of definition suggests that Lorhard 
puts more of a direct emphasis on the method, while the neologism Ontologia, 
identified with Metaphysica, is here to suggest to the student that the object of our 
investigation is, ultimately, ὄντα as it has been in the Liber. 
 25 
Whether this desire to explicate the kind of things metaphysics deals 
with was the main motivator for Lorhard’s positing of the name Ontologia is 
difficult to claim with authority. At this period of history, as I shall discuss in a 
later chapter, there was a desire to specify precisely what Metaphysics is 
supposed to be and precisely what it is supposed to investigate, in order to 
disambiguate Aristotle’s view on the subject and bring it in line with a specific, 
Christian, meaning of ‘theology’, unknown to Aristotle. However, whether 
Lorhard coins the term ontology in order to argue for a specific understanding 
of metaphysics against a different one is unclear to me. Another puzzling thing 
is the fact that in his second, expanded edition of Ogdoas Scholastica from 1613 
entitled Theatrum Philosophicum,12 Lorhard takes away the identification of 
Metaphysics and Ontology from the front cover of the book, leaving only 
‘metaphysics’. What is more confusing, however, is the fact that the section on 
metaphysics remains unchanged. Metaphysics is still identified with ontology 
in the title, and the section still ends with “FINIS ONTOLOGIÆ”. The 
occurrences of the term are reduced from three instances to two, but no other 
change is present.13 
 
  This aporia might be a good place to leave Lorhard for now and see 
what happens with the concept ‘ontology’ further on. As I mentioned above, I 
will return to the discussion of the philosophical significance of the appearance 
of that name in pre-Wolffian, German metaphysics in a later chapter. But this 
chapter is primarily concerned with the name ‘ontology’, and I would like to 
see what happens with that name after Lorhard. 
 
The second important thinker in the history of the name ‘ontology’ is 
Rudolf Göckel (or Goclenius), although his contribution to the naming of the 
new discipline is very humble. The term appears, as a hapax legomenon, in his 
                                                        
12 The change of title is probably due to the fact that Lorhard adds Hebrew grammar, 
arithmetic, mathematics and music among the artes he investigates and hence treats 
more than 8 topics. 
13 In the interest of historical precision it is important to say that Theatrum is 
published posthumously in 1613, four years after Lorhard’s death, making it difficult to 
say which editorial decisions were his. 
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Lexicon Philosophicum of 1613, in a margin to the article on Abstraction, in the 
discussion of abstractio materiae according to Alexander of Hales, in which it is 
stated: “ὅντολογία, philosophia de ente,” and nothing else. The term appears at 
no other place in the text, there is no further discussion of it within the article 
in which it appears, nor can there be found a separate entry on it, or even on 
metaphysics itself.14 As Mora suggests, it seems that there is no careful plan 
behind Goclenius’ introduction of the term into his text. In fact, the mention of 
the term seems to be a purely casual and inconsequential remark.15 This raises 
the question of why even mention Goclenius in this path towards the concept 
of ontology, since he was neither the first person to use the term, nor did he 
say anything significantly more or different from Lorhard. The reason for 
Goclenius’ inclusion is twofold, on the one hand regarding the history of the 
conception, on the other the history of the name ontology.  
 
Starting with Goclenius’ contribution to the history of the conception 
of ontology one can say that it is subtle and indirect, but still worth 
                                                        
14 Goclenius 1613, p. 16, quoted from Mora 1963, p. 38, q.v. In this otherwise excellent 
paper on the history of ontology, Mora, while correcting a common misconception 
that the term first appears in Clauberg’s work, mistakenly claims that this is the first 
occurrence of the term ontology in the history of philosophy (the same error is present 
in Vollrath's 1962 article). Notice how Goclenius writes the word Ontologia in Greek 
script, interestingly with the spiritus asper (rough breathing), which suggests that the 
transliteration and pronunciation into English would be hontology, in line with 
ἱστορία – history. The presence of the accents on both the first and the last syllable is 
also confusing, suggesting an enclitic synthesis. One way to solve both the strangeness 
with the spiritus and with the double accentuation is to see it as a combination of the 
nominative masculine definite article (ὁ) and the noun (ὀντολογία), but one would 
expect this noun to be feminine and I am unfamiliar of ἡ + ὀ > ὁ crasis appearing 
anywhere else. The most likely explanation is that this is a typographical error by 
Mora, since the actual breathing sign present in the original work by Goclenius is 
illegible. 
15 Mora 1963, p. 39. More significance to the use of the term is given by Bardout (2002, 
p. 132) who connects it to the practice of mathematical abstraction, the place at which 
the apostilis appears, which he describes as ontological since “it allows for access to 
being and the transcendentals.” 
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mentioning, since it concerns the connection between ontology and first 
philosophy. I have already pointed out that the Lexicon contains no article on 
ontology or on metaphysics; however, one article that can be found within it is 
the article on Philosophy. This article contains many definitions, the most 
important one for the present purposes being the fourth one: philosophy, 
Goclenius writes, can be understood per excellentiam as prima philosophia.16 
 
As will be discussed later on, this philosophical primacy is one of the 
main characteristics (along with the aforementioned methodological apriority 
and some others) of Wolff’s conception of ontology. One could even say that it 
is more than an aspect, since the title of Wolff’s Philosophia prima sive ontologia, 
even identifies, rather than simply connects the two.17 Philosophy itself, for 
Goclenius, is to be properly understood as first philosophy. 
 
But what is this first philosophy? For this it is helpful to consult 
Goclenius’ earlier work, Isagoge. It contains, unfortunately, no reference to 
ontology, but in it Goclenius clarifies what he understands by philosophia 
prima. It is nothing other than what is “vulgarly” called metaphysics.18 In the 
Isagoge, Goclenius writes the following: 
 
1. There are two liberal disciplines [that are] the most general: 
Logic, and Metaphysics, which is called wisdom…  
3. Metaphysics or first philosophy is <the> knowledge of 
those <things>, that are the highest causes and first 
principles…  
9. First philosophy <is the> science of the entity qua entity, 
that is, <of> what is altogether.19 
                                                        
16 Goclenius 1613, quoted from Mora, 1963, p. 39. 
17 See Curley’s note on translating seu/sive in Spinoza, Ethics, xix. 
18 What is even expressed in the very title of the work: Isagoge in peripateticorum et 
Schoalsticorum primam philosophiam quae vulgo dicitur Metaphysica. 
19 1. Duae sunt communissimae disciplinae liberales: Logica, & Metaphysica, quae dicitur 
sapientia… 3. Metaphysica seu prima philosophia cognitio communis est eorum, quae sunt 
 28 
 
Through the series of identifications we arrive at the following 
inference: metaphysics is properly to be called first philosophy; first philosophy is, 
among other things, the science of the entity qua entity; the philosophy of the 
entity is, in a text that discards the concept of metaphysics, called ontology. 
What seems safe to assume, therefore, is that by the time of the Lexicon, there 
is at least a partial (although not explicit) identification, for Goclenius, 
between ontology and first philosophy. As mentioned above, this 
identification will later be crucial for Wolff’s own account of how ontology is 
to be understood as a philosophical discipline. One should notice, however, 
the ambiguous nature of first philosophy expressed in point 3, where first 
philosophy, unlike in point 9, is understood as the knowledge of the highest 
causes and first principles. This ambiguity between the object of first philosophy 
— whether this object is constituted by the investigation of ens qua ens, or by 
the investigation into the first causes and principles — arises from various 
attempts at interpreting Aristotle’s work on the subject, and is present 
throughout the whole history of (post-Aristotelian) metaphysics. It is also 
integral to the history of the conception of ontology since it gives rise to a need 
to posit a specific science of ens qua ens in contrast to the science of the first 
principles of all entities. I will return to this discussion in a later chapter, but 
now it is necessary to mention the second contribution of Goclenius to the 
history of ontology, specifically, to the history of the name. 
 
As I mentioned above, Goclenius does not say much about ontology, 
using the name only once, in a marginal note. It could be pointed out that, 
unlike Lorhard, Goclenius does provide something resembling a definition of 
ontology, even if it is only three words long. On the other hand, the 
significance of Goclenius in the history of the name lies in the fact that he was 
read far more widely than Lorhard. Even though very few sources on this topic 
are available today it seems safe to assume that Goclenius, a professor of logic, 
ethics, and mathematics in Marburg, hears the name ontology from Lorhard, 
and incorporates it in his work, although casually, due to possible discussions 
                                                                                                                                                      
altissimis causas & prima principia… 9. Prima philosophia scientia de Ente qua ens, hoc est, 
universaliter sumto. Goclenius 1612, quoted from Mora 1963, p. 38. Translation mine.  
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with Lorhard during Lorhard’s short tenure at Marburg as a professor of 
theology.20 This being so, Goclenius can be seen as a bridging figure between 
Lorhard’s coining of the term, and its subsequent development leading to 
Wolff. Unlike Lorhard, whose works never became very famous, Goclenius 
was relatively well known, earning titles such as ‘the Marburg Plato’, ‘the 
Christian Aristotle’, ‘the teacher of Germany’, and ‘the light of Europe’.21 From 
this it seems safe to assume that the name ontology survives through his 
modest inclusion of Lorhard’s term into his Lexicon. He, along with Suarez and 
Fonseca on the Catholic side, and Timpler on the German Protestant side, 
forms the crux of Early Modern Scholasticism,22 which, from the perspective 
of the history of ontology, culminates in Wolff.  
 
The name ontology in this way, starting with Lorhard, and being 
bridged by Goclenius, re-emerges through a third significant figure of this 
history: Johannes Clauberg – another representative of Early Modern 
Scholasticism, although with Cartesian tendencies. 
2. Clauberg 
 
There are various reasons for the importance of including Clauberg in 
this trajectory of the history of ontology. Firstly, he is one of the first thinkers 
to provide a detailed elaboration of how the term ontology is supposed to be 
employed, and to argue that the term should designate a specific philosophical 
discipline, rather than simply being a synonym, or an elaborative term for 
metaphysics.23 Secondly, and important for the purposes of the next chapter, it 
                                                        
20 Øhrstrøm et al. 2007, pp. 375–6. 
21 Øhrstrøm et al. 2005, p. 431. 
22 Bardout 2002, p. 129. 
23 Clauberg is not the first, after Goclenius, to use the term Ontologia, neither is he an 
inventor of the term Ontosophia. In Elementa he himself credits Calovius for the former 
term, and Carmuel Lobkowitz for the latter (see Mora 1963, p. 42). On the other hand, 
as Bardout (2002, p. 129) puts it: “While he did not himself invent the term “ontology,” 
he nonetheless contributed decisively to metaphysics’ orientation towards this area, 
and even published the first true treatise on ontology.” Among his other influences 
are the first formulation of a theory now known as occasionalism.  
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is clear that Wolff himself has read Clauberg and refers to Clauberg’s 
Metaphysica de Ente in his Ontologia.24 
 
The first of Clauberg’s works relevant for the content of this chapter 
was Elementa philosophiae sive ontosophia, scientia prima, de iis quae Deo 
creaturisque seu modo communiter attribuntur25 of 1647. From the very title of the 
work it can be seen that the kind of philosophy Clauberg is interested is a) to 
be called ontosophy (interestingly, not ontology); b) the first science; c) an 
investigation of “those things” (i.e. predicates) which can be applied to both 
God and Creatures, i.e. to all entities qua entities. The interest in this kind of 
predicates, called transcendentals, and the idea that metaphysics is to be 
understood as the science of entities qua entities, Clauberg inherits from 
Suárez and his work Disputationes metaphysicae from 1597.26 The novelty of 
Clauberg with respect to Suárez, and in part with respect to Lorhard and 
Goclenius, lies in the fact that he explicitly calls for a new name to be given to 
this discipline which investigates entities qua entities. Metaphysica will no 
longer suffice; this discipline is to be called Ontosophia.27 Elementa will 
                                                        
24 See, for example, Wolff, Ontologia, Prolegomena §1; pars. I, sect. 2, cap. 3, §169. 
25 The Elements of Philosophy, or Ontosophia, First Science, concerning those things that can 
be attributed both to God and Creatures. 
26 Bardout 2002, p. 131. After their appearance, Suárez’ Disputationes became the main 
textbook of Scholastic metaphysics (for later adoption of Suárez into Protestant 
Scholasticism and more general Protestant Philosophy see Beck 1969, p. 73; §VII, et 
passim), since it was the first work which systematically presented Christian 
metaphysics, and that from purely philosophical perspective, i.e. without including 
theological aspects within the metaphysical discussion (i.e. those based on 
Revelation). Suarez’ philosophy also serves as a basic metaphysics for the Jesuit order, 
in contrast to, for example Thomism of the Dominicans, or Scotism of the 
Franciscans. Descartes’ philosophical education, undertaken by the Jesuits, leaves 
him heavily dependent on Suarezian terminology and fundamental ideas (for more 
on philosophy of monastic orders and their impact on Early modern metaphysics see 
Heidegger 1988, pp. 79–81). 
27 The need for the specification of the name is only implicit in Lorhard and 
Goclenius’ uses (or rather utterances) of Ontologia, unlike with Clauberg who 
consciously posits the new name. Regardless of his apparent preference for ontosophia, 
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subsequently be republished in various editions, undergoing profound 
changes.28 In 1660 it is published as Ontosophia nova, quae vulgo Metaphysica 
and in 1664 as Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius Ontosophia. Finally, it is included 
in the posthumous 1691 edition of Clauberg’s works called Opera Omnia 
Philosophica. According to Beck De Ente becomes a standard Scholastic 
textbook of the time, although the term Ontosophia does not survive, except in 
mention, Wolff’s preference for Ontologia.29 
 
What is ontosophy supposed to be? In the Elementa Clauberg calls it 
scientia prima or a prima philosophia and defines it as scientia quae speculator Ens, 
prout Ens.30 In Elementa, he also states that Metaphysics was called “the first, 
supreme, trans-natural philosophy; divine, catholic, universal science,” and 
that it has been the most properly named Ontosophy or Ontology, even before 
him, by Caramuel Lobkowitz and Calovius.31 In Metaphysica de Ente of 1664 one 
finds the following account: 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Clauberg does not distinguish between Ontosophia and Ontologia and uses them 
interchangeably. 
28 Bardout 2002, p. 131. Most of the changes regard adding Cartesian metaphysical 
ideas to the text as Clauberg becomes more in favour of Cartesianism. Elementa of 1647 
is, however, Clauberg’s pre-Cartesian work (see Strazzoni 2015, p. 71). 
29 Beck 1969, p. 185. It is a bit problematic to discern whether Beck intends to claim that 
the De Ente version itself became the standard textbook. The reason for that is that 
Beck dates De Ente to 1647, when Elementa was published. The similar confusion arises 
in Mora (1963, p. 43) who dates De Ente to 1656. I am following the timeline of 
Clauberg’s works given in Vollrath (1962, p. 265) which is also partially supported and 
not contradicted by the account of Bardout (2002, p. 131). The only reference to the 
term Ontosophia after Wolff I am familiar with comes from Baumgarten's Metaphysica 
(§4), where he lists it among various names for Ontologia.  
30 Quoted from Mora 1963, p. 42. 
31 Metaphyisicam dixere primam, supremam, transnaturalem, philosophiam, divinam, 
catholicam, universalem scientiam: novissimè Ontosophiam Caramuel Lobkowitz, 
Ontologicam post alios Abr. Calovius, aptissimè uterque, nominaverunt. Quoted from Mora 
1963, p. 42. Translation mine. 
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§1. There is a certain science that investigates the entity 
insomuch as it is an entity [ens quatenus ens est], that is, the 
entity understood as having a certain common nature or a 
degree of nature which is, in its own way, in both corporeal 
and incorporeal things [rebus Corporeis & Incorporeis], in 
God and in Creatures, and in each and every singular entity.
  
§2. This science is commonly [vulgò] called Metaphysics, but 
more properly Ontology or catholic science, eine allgemeine 
wissenschaft [sic], and universal philosophy.32 
 
Firstly, it is important to notice that Clauberg defines ontology based 
on its scientific object, i.e. the entity qua entity. As such, ontology is seen as 
investigating the nature common to God, creatures, and whatever else is. 
Secondly, this form of philosophy is universal, not just as philosophy, but as 
scientia. Thirdly, this description, as Bardout points out,33 corresponds to 
Aristotle’s understanding of metaphysics (or more correctly of first philosophy) 
in Metaphysics Γ.34 Importantly, Clauberg’s understanding of what ontology is, 
or what metaphysics is, since ontology is its proper name, appears to stand 
firmly on one side of Aristotle’s ambiguity regarding the nature of first 
philosophy / metaphysics. If one recalls what was previously said in the 
discussion of Goclenius, Goclenius retains the Aristotelian ambiguity of what 
Metaphysics is by identifying first philosophy with both the knowledge of first 
                                                        
32 Clauberg, De Ente, §§1, 2. Original emphasis. Translation slightly modified from 
Bardout 2002, p. 131 and Gilson 1952, p. 112. I am uncertain whether these sections 
appear in earlier or later works since I was only able to consult De Ente and Opera 
Omnia which seem to contain identical texts. All quotes from De Ente are from the 
1664 copy and from Opera Omnia from the 1691 copy. References to other works by 
Clauberg are taken from secondary sources. 
33 Bardout 2002, p. 131. 
34 “There is a science which investigates being as being [τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν] and the attributes 
which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the 
so-called special sciences; for none of these others deals generally with being as 
being.” Aristotle, Metaphysics 4, 1.1003a21-25. 
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causes and principles (theology) and with the science of the entity qua entity.35 
One could already see Goclenius’ objection to the ‘common’ name metaphysics, 
and preference for the term first philosophy over it, as an attempt to rescue the 
conception of metaphysics from Aristotle’s ambiguity by focusing on only one 
of the two senses of first philosophy / metaphysics. However, what seems to be 
happening in the very opening of Clauberg’s text is an additional shift. 
Clauberg is here identifying first philosophy with the science of the entity qua 
entity and, due to that, names this science Ontosophia / Ontologia. 
 
An additional account provided in favour of understanding 
metaphysics properly under the name Ontosophy / Ontology can also be found 
slightly earlier in the text: 
 
Since the science which is about God calls itself Theosophy or 
Theology [θεοσοφία vel θεολογία], it would seem fitting to call 
Ontosophy or Ontology [Ontosophia vel Ontologia] that science 
which does not deal with this and that entity, as distinct from 
the others owing to its special name or properties, but with 
the entity in general.36 
                                                        
35 In the Scholastic context, first philosophy/metaphysics was also sometimes 
considered to be properly called theology, not only because it concerned itself with 
first causes and principles, but also because it was considered properly conceived 
when it was seen as a science of God and Intelligences, i.e. incorporeal entities such as 
angels and human souls, rather than as a science of ens qua ens. This is the case, for 
example, for Pererius and Suárez, although the latter also acknowledges the ens qua 
ens approach as properly belonging to metaphysics (see Vollrath 1962, p. 267). 
36 “Sed circa ens in genere versatur.” Clauberg, De Ente, Prolegomena §4. Translation 
modified from Gilson 1952, p. 112. Interestingly, Clauberg uses the Greek script to write 
Theology and Theosophy, however, shifts to Latin for Ontosophy and Ontology. 
Commenting on the paragraph Gilson (1952, p. 112) writes: “This text can be seen as the 
birth certificate of ontology as a science conceived after the pattern of theology, yet 
radically distinct from it, since being qua being is held there indifferent to all its 
conceivable determinations.” I must admit that I find this claim confusing. It is 
unclear what kind of theology Gilson refers to which serves as a pattern for ontology, 
or what he understands by conceiving something “after the pattern” of theology. 
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For Clauberg, this supports the claim that the justification for naming 
this science ‘ontology’ seems to be grounded in the object investigated by this 
science. As can be seen from earlier quotations, the focus on this object, the 
entity qua entity, implies a certain universality of this discipline as a science, 
and a certain primacy of this discipline with respect to other philosophical 
disciplines. The question now arises as to how or why such an object 
constitutes this primacy and universality and how such primacy and 
universality are supposed to be understood. 
 
To understand the notion of primacy it is good to explicate the idea 
behind the notion that was on the mind of the thinkers of that time. The idea 
of primacy comes, naturally, from Aristotle and, as it is to be expected, it is 
present in Aristotle’s work in two senses. These two senses can be explicated 
by appealing to the two separate ‘orders’ posited by Aristotle – the order of 
nature and the order of knowing.37 
 
The primacy in the order of nature (1) is what defines, for Aristotle, the 
discipline of πρώτη φιλοσοφία [prote philosophia] or first/primary philosophy, 
later named metaphysics. Among the multiplicity of philosophical disciplines, 
this one is first or primary since it treats of the first things in the order of 
                                                                                                                                                      
What seems clear is that Gilson here does not refer to theology as knowledge/science by 
Revelation, or as Aristotelian science of the first causes and principles. What he seems to 
refer to is theology as a study of the nature of God and intelligences, but also of that 
which is common to them as well as Creatures, the science of ens commune, or, if I 
understand him correctly, as what Heidegger calls onto-theology. On the other hand, I 
am unsure why this is to be seen as a conception of discipline after the pattern of 
theology since it sounds more similar to Aristotle’s second conception of first 
philosophy as a science of entity qua entity, and more akin to what Aquinas has called 
philosophical, rather than theological order of inquiry, of which I will speak in a later 
chapter. The only ‘pattern’ that I can here identify is the one of naming a discipline 
with regards to its object, in this case God (theology) or entity qua entity (ontology). 
37 These can be found posited in Physics 1, 1.194a10-21 and Metaphysics 7, 3.1029b1-12, 
although not as explicitly as I have done so here. Rather, Aristotle discusses them 
using a more Aristotelian syntax. 
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nature. What Aristotle means by ‘treating of the first things in order of nature’ 
is ambiguous as well and forms the crux of what I have been earlier referring 
to as the ‘Aristotelian ambiguity’. One meaning of this “treating of the first 
things” present in Aristotle stands for an investigation into first causes and 
principles (1a).38 This ultimately shows itself to be investigation into what is 
known as the ‘god of Aristotle’ and Aristotle will himself name this discipline 
‘theology’.39 
 
The second sense of treating the first things in the order of nature (1b) 
for Aristotle signifies the science of an entity qua entity, τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν [to on he(i) 
on], which shows itself to be the science of substance, or οὐσία [ousia], or of the 
formal cause of everything. In the period surrounding Clauberg, this sense of 
first philosophy develops into the specific discipline of ontology, due to 
attempts to resolve the ambiguity and relegate the former sense (1a) to 
Revealed theology, or theology as a religious discipline, and the latter sense 
(1b) to philosophy as, one could say, a ‘secular’ discipline.40 
 
In the unresolved form, both senses of primary philosophy were united 
in the post-Aristotelian term metaphysics. So united, the discipline of 
metaphysics also contained a third sense of primacy which can also be found 
in Aristotle. This is the sense connected to the ambiguity of the preposition 
meta and designates a discipline whose object falls ‘beyond’ the object of 
physics (1c). In Aristotle, although the term meta-physics is never used, this 
means that first philosophy deals with the world beyond the world of motion 
(which constitutes the domain of physics) and deals with the formal cause of 
all entities, especially the ones free from material causation. It deals with the 
                                                        
38 For example Metaphysics 1, 1.982a3, et passim. 
39 Aristotle, Metaphysics 6, 1.1026a19. Later, of course, one can witness a complete or 
partial identification of the god of Aristotle with the God of Abraham.  
40 Inclusion of God as one of the objects investigated by ontology is not a problem for 
such an endeavor. The presence or absence of God, I would argue, has always been 
and remains, a metaphysical question, independent of Revelation, for which 
Revelation claims specific kind of access to itself. In Clauberg’s period, the distancing 
of ontology from theology refers more properly to the distancing from Revelation or 
from metaphysics derived for the purposes of explaining the Revealed. 
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world of pure actuality, ἐνέργεια [energeia].41 In the Middle ages, this sense 
becomes more connected to the science of the Intelligences, i.e. of entities 
independent of matter (primarily Angels and Souls), while in the early 
modernity it is connected with the investigation of the world in some sense 
‘beyond’ extension.42 
 
These were the three senses of the idea of primacy in reference to the 
order of nature. Allowing for a slightly anachronistic categorisation they can 
be called: 1a) theological, 1b) ontological, and 1c) the super-natural sense. This 
leads to the sense of primacy in the order of knowing (2). For Aristotle, first 
philosophy is the first in the order of nature, or more precisely, it treats of the 
first things in the order of nature. On the other hand, it falls last in the order of 
knowing. This is so because it concerns itself with things more knowable in 
themselves, but less familiar to us. In this sense (2), the second ambiguity of meta 
comes to fore. In the order of knowing, understood as both the didactic order 
and the order of progression of a scientific method, metaphysics comes, i.e. is 
to be studied, after physics. This, however, according to Aristotle, does not 
provide Physics with the claim to primacy proper, regardless of its didactic and 
systematic primacy, since the proper conception of primacy rests with the 
primacy of nature.43 A similar conception of primacy in the order of 
knowledge can be found present in Descartes, if one is to read the term first in 
the Meditations on First Philosophy as referring to the discovery of the Cogito 
                                                        
41 As one can see, this sense (1c) is in a way a combination of (1a) and (1b) since the 
entities qua entities are to be investigated through the formal cause, and actuality 
which is identified with substance (1b), while this way of being is exemplified in the 
way of being of Aristotelian god (1a) who is the prime example of substantiality and 
the first (final) cause of everything. 
42 Mostly due to Boyle and Descartes’ identification of the term φύσις / natura with 
extension. See Beck, 1969, p. 162. In this sense, Cartesian God and res cogitans are meta-
physical or super-natural since they belong to the non-extended world, the world 
‘beyond’ extension. 
43 Aristotle contemplates the possibility of Physics being the primary philosophy and 
says the condition for that would be the non-existence of the world beyond motion. 
Since this condition does not hold, he claims, physics cannot be first philosophy. See 
Aristotle, Metaphysics 6, 1.1026a27-30. 
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through the method of doubt, from which subsequent philosophising is later 
to be developed. In this case, what is first in the order of knowing, the Cogito, is 
itself second in the order of nature, since the primacy of the natural order lies 
with God, while the two res, cogitans and extensa, exemplify a form of quasi-
substantiality, due to their independence from everything but God. 
 
What becomes important during the historical period in which the 
term ‘ontology’ itself appears, is the development of a different idea of the 
priority in the order of knowing. Under this conception, the priority of the 
order of knowledge is conceived on the model of the hierarchical epistemic 
dependency in which ‘lower’ knowledge is unattainable without prior 
attainment of the ‘higher’ knowledge.44 This idea, combined with the idea of 
the primacy of the object of metaphysics in the order of nature (understood in 
the sense 1b), leads to what can be called the “double primacy of metaphysics” 
in which the highest knowledge that can be gained is also the first knowledge 
to be sought after. The order of nature and the order of knowing are combined 
and as the ‘higher’ structures of nature ground the ‘lower’ ones, so the ‘higher’ 
structures of knowledge, ground the ‘lower’ ones.45 This can be called the 
                                                        
44 This is not completely novel. The idea itself is Platonic in nature. 
45 An example of the double primacy can be found in E2P10s of Spinoza’s Ethics: the 
proper order of philosophy proceeds from God to the particulars, since God is prior to 
everything in both knowledge and in nature.  In fact the idea of double primacy is 
fundamental to the structure of the Ethics. See E1A4, E1P15, and the definition of 
Substance (E1D3). The precise way in which this grounding operates on the ‘lower 
levels’ depends on the thinker. For example, in Spinoza it is explained through the 
parallelism of attributes derived from the single substance, while, for example, in 
Leibniz it depends on the pre-established harmony. These two principles are usually 
seen as solutions to the quandaries regarding the relation between the mind and the 
body, but they could, in my view, also be read as principles underpinning the relation 
between the order of nature and the structure of science explicating that order. 
Similar idea of double primacy can be found in Descartes’ conception of the tree of 
knowledge (Principles of Philosophy, preface to the French Edition of 1647, quoted from 
Descartes Meditations, xviii), although, as I have mentioned previously, his 
metaphysics does not explicate the proper double primacy since the first knowledge is 
not of God. On the other hand, the proper relation between God and the Cogito is 
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systematic unity of thought and being and it seems to be a principle implicitly 
or explicitly operating across the thought of the early ontologists.46 
 
The significance of this new double primacy of metaphysics, on which 
the systematic unity of thought and being is based, lies in the fact that such a 
position is impossible for Aristotle. Aristotle himself cannot start from the 
highest parts of nature, be that God, or ousia, or the Immobile, since his 
method requires beginning from what is more familiar “to us”. And the 
familiar is hylo-morphic, spatio-temporal, and in motion. The idea of double 
primacy holds that one can, and indeed should, start a scientific inquiry from 
the highest principles, where the first principles in the order of nature become 
the methodologically first concerns within the order of knowing. 
 
It is not the case, of course, that this idea appears without any historical 
precedent. For example, it can be seen in Plato’s insistence that prior to 
knowing the individual cases of something one must first familiarise oneself 
with the higher, purer form of it. With Plato, however, it can be said that the 
order of knowledge follows the order of nature more closely than for Aristotle 
since for Plato the investigation of phenomena through which the noumena 
are reached is not treated, in itself, as epistēmē, Sophia, scientia, Wissenschaft or 
however we want to call it. Plato, unlike Aristotle, does not see the process of 
proceeding from the shadows towards the knowledge of the Forms (or at least 
the initial proceeding towards them) as a scientific or philosophical activity, 
but as a didactic development of one’s character towards the beginning of 
philosophy and of philosophising. The question which now arises is the 
                                                                                                                                                      
difficult to pinpoint since the Cogito is circularly dependent on God’s existence and 
benevolence.  
46 The terms ‘unity’, ‘thought’, and ‘being’ are to be loosely understood here. The 
phrase ‘unity of thought and being’ is commonly used in discussions of German 
Idealism, and the nature of Hegel’s Logic in particular. Here I have a similar 
conception in mind, but I would want to qualify it with the adjective systematic in 
order to avoid confusion with the much earlier, Ancient conception of the isomorphism 
of thought and being, which lacks a comparable conception of a system. 
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following: how does Clauberg argue for the possibility of this double primacy 
of metaphysics, which the discipline of ontology now exemplifies? 
 
The answer is: through his conception of what an entity is. From the 
way entities are conceived, ontology, the science of entities qua entities, will 
reach the double primacy in the sense of dealing with the most universal 
nature of all things (including both God and Creatures) and as being the most 
universal science grounding all the others. What is, in that case, Clauberg’s 
conception of an entity?  
 
The ens, or entity, the subject matter of ontology, can for Clauberg, 
echoing Aristotle, be considered in three senses. These are: 1) what can be 
thought [intelligibile]; 2) something [aliquid]; 3) the thing or a substance 
[substantia].47 Clauberg presents this trichotomy in the section 4 of his 
Ontosophia in the following way: 
 
First of all, three senses of “entity” are to be distinguished. It 
can denote everything that can be conceived (for which 
reason some call it “[the] Intelligible”) and this cannot be 
opposed to anything; or it can designate what is truly 
something, even if no one thinks it, and the opposite of which 
is nothing. Or it can signify a thing that exists by itself, such 
as substance, the opposite of which is ordinarily taken to be 
accidents.48 
2.  1 .  The Intelligible 
 
It is important to take note that this first sense of entity shows that the 
subject matter of ontology does not concern itself with existing things, or 
existence itself. The only condition for anything to be counted as an entity is 
for it to be thinkable. In fact, for Clauberg this means not only that non-existing 
                                                        
47 Mora 1963, p. 43. 
48 Clauberg, Ontosophia, §4. Translation modified from Bardout 2002, p. 131. 
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‘Thinkables’ or ‘Intelligibles’ are to be counted as entities, but that the ideas 
such as ‘nothing’ are to be considered to be entities as well: 
 
An entity is everything which, in whatever manner it may be, 
can be thought and spoken of. Alles was nur gedacht und gesagt 
werden kan [sic]. Thus I say ‘Nothing’ and when I speak of it I 
thus think it, and when I think it, it is thus in my 
understanding.49 
 
As Bardout puts it, this makes the concept of an entity “equivalent to 
the intelligible as such, or whatever can be thought, including a chimera or 
nothing. It is therefore characterised as the possible, pure and simple – the not 
self-contradictory.”50 Furthermore, according to Bardout, ens in this first sense 
is reducible to the pure object, understood as the necessary correlate of every 
thought. From this, Clauberg continues to claim that there is no significant 
difference between ens as a pure object, object of knowledge, object of actually 
occurring thought, or an object of a proposition: 
 
This ‘to be’ [Hoc esse] which is attributed to it [i.e. to the 
entity], in so far as it is the object of the understanding and is 
known in itself, is called the objective being [Esse objectivum] or 
the being-known of the Entity [esse cognitum Entis]. 
Everything else – that is, whatever can be thought and 
                                                        
49 Clauberg, Ontosophia, §6. Translation modified from Bardout 2002, p. 131. 
50 Bardout, loc. cit. This is different from some earlier conceptions of ens, such as the 
one proposed by Aquinas in De Ente et Essentia for whom ens encompasses whatever 
can be the subject of an affirmative proposition “even though this [might] posit 
nothing in reality” (Aquinas, De Ente, Cap. 1). In this case, Nothing could not, 
traditionally, be a subject of affirmative proposition since one cannot say that Nothing 
is (true). The chimera Bardout mentions is not to be understood, as it sometimes is, as 
a ‘self-contradictory term’. It refers to mythical creatures, fictions, or creatures which 
are not self-contradictory but for which we know they do not or cannot actually exist. 
In Ontosophia §12, Clauberg argues that the concept of Entity is the most known of all 
concepts (“notissimus”) since it can be found contained even in the ideas such as 
“Cerberus and other fictions”, Nothing, and Chimera.  
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spoken of – is easily included within this alone, to the extent 
that ‘to be’ [esse], being thought and being spoken of... do not 
differ much at all.51 
 
This concept of ens understood as thinkability serves as the starting 
point of metaphysics for Clauberg and brings him closer to what I have called 
the ‘double primacy of metaphysics’. The double primacy requires of 
metaphysics that it treat of an object which is universal and that it place the 
discipline treating this object, whether one calls it ontology or metaphysics, as 
the first scientific discipline which precedes and, in some sense, grounds other 
scientific disciplines. For Clauberg, the name for this discipline will be 
ontology or ontosophy. It will be universal in its subject matter and it will 
come first in the methodological order. For Clauberg, this will be possible due 
to the way the object of ontology, the entity qua entity, is conceived, which is 
primarily understood to be thinkability in the sense described above. 
 
It is easy to see how Clauberg derives the universality of the object of 
ontology from his conception of thinkability. If the object of ontology is all that 
is possible, in the sense of not being self-contradictory, the only region this 
discipline does not treat of is the one composed of all that is self-contradictory. 
Putting aside, for the moment, the possibility of dialetheism or (post-)Hegelian 
dialectics, such position would satisfy the majority of current and historic 
philosophical appetites as treating of everything that is worth being treated of. 
Furthermore, Clauberg claims that all that is possible in this way is also 
thinkable. This allows him a further claim that a discipline that treats of such a 
universal object is not beyond the reach of the thinker attempting to engage in 
it. If one can think, one can think on the level of universal abstraction and 
requires nothing more but the ability to think in order to do so. To think about 
ens qua ens is to think universally since the concept of entity conceived in 
Clauberg’s manner “pertains indifferently and univocally to everything, to 
God and creatures.”52 This forms the ground for Clauberg’s adopting a 
position that aligns with the first leg of the ‘double primacy of metaphysics’, 
                                                        
51 Clauberg, Ontosophia, §16. Translation modified from Bardout 2002, p. 132 
52 Bardout 2002, p. 132. 
 42 
the condition of universality, or the primacy in the Aristotelian order of 
nature. Consider the following two passages:  
 
§10. The concept of entity seen in this way is the first or the 
most general and the highest, since no one is able to 
apprehend a genus above it. For that by which we apprehend 
is, by that very quality, already intelligible, and consequently 
Entity in the first sense. But if one does not descend from the 
universals, instead you begin to count from the particulars in 
an ascending logical order, the concept of Entity will be the 
last. 
 
§11. The concept of entity is the simplest, because to this most 
general thought something is always added in all thoughts 
which we possess that concern all things whatsoever 
(certainly we are talking about [thoughts such as] a thing or a 
something). Anyhow, no concept is given in our soul, which 
would be finer or more delicate or would include less. Entity 
is like the first and the thinnest string, to which different and 
different thicker <ones> must be gradually added, in order 
that we weave a whole philosophical web, which we 
construct while we descend from the general to the 
particular, and we conceive in our mind this and that Entity, 
just as [we conceive] God, Star, Soul, Body, etc.53 
 
The two passages reinforce the idea that the concept of entity, the 
subject matter of ontology, is the most universal concept available to our 
thought and hence, due to Clauberg’s earlier identifications, the most 
universal concept possible. The question remains, however, about Clauberg’s 
position on the second leg of the ‘double primacy’, i.e. the methodological 
primacy of ontology, or the possibility of starting one’s scientific or 
philosophical system with the ‘entity qua entity’. In §10 of Ontologia, Clauberg 
states that if one looks at Entity from the position of a philosophical method 
                                                        
53 Clauberg, Ontosophia. 
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that is based in abstraction from the particulars the concept of entity comes 
last. This suggests that Clauberg does not adhere to the double primacy, if he 
is here stating that the entity is, in that sense, the last in the philosophical 
order. On the other hand, Clauberg seems to be only referring to the order of 
proceeding from the particulars, rather than endorsing it for his philosophical 
method. In fact, in §11 Clauberg provides an analogy of how ontology is 
supposed to proceed. He compares it to the weaving of the philosophical from 
the finest thread (entity) thereby illustrating the process of descending from 
the most general to the particular, rather than vice versa. This suggests that 
Clauberg proposes an inversion of the established Aristotelian order of inquiry 
that proceeds from the particulars towards universals in its investigation of the 
entity qua entity. Since, for Clauberg, Entity is all that is thinkable and is, as 
such, present to our mind in any operation of thought, there is no need to 
reach it through the process of logical abstraction. The concept of Entity is 
always given to the thinker, allowing for the positing of the methodological 
primacy, as well as natural primacy, of ontology. 
 
Certain claims by Clauberg, however, complicate the idea behind this 
deductive picture. Specifically I am referring to his apparent endorsement of 
Descartes’ method. As discussed earlier, Descartes’ philosophia prima does not 
exemplify the double primacy of metaphysics in the sense I have been 
conceiving of it. Descartes’ method starts from the investigation of the 
particular thinking mind and subsequently establishes from it the res cogitans, 
one of the two most universal quasi-substances, subsequently establishing 
God as the only true substance. Descartes, specifically in his allegory of the 
Tree of Sciences, does posit metaphysics as the First Science, upon which 
physics and other sciences are ultimately to be based upon, but his 
investigation into metaphysics does not start with God or substance, the only 
true universal in nature, but from the particular thinking mind. 
Problematically for the purposes of establishing my sense of double primacy 
in Clauberg, consider his following statement: 
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§5 Let us give priority to some aspects of Entity in its first and 
second senses and begin universal philosophy with the 
thinkable entity [ab Ente cogitabili], just as first philosophy,† as 
it begins with the particular, looks first at the thinking mind 
[Mente cogitante].  
 
† First philosophy – so called not because of the universality 
of the object it treats, but because of the fact that someone 
who wants to philosophize seriously must begin from it; 
namely from the knowledge of one’s mind and of God, etc. 
This first philosophy is contained in Descartes six 
Meditations. First part of the Principles <of Philosophy> 
exhibits it to the highest degree.54 
 
 This seems to raise certain problems with the narrative I have so far 
been presenting. I have argued that Descartes’ method does not exemplify the 
double primacy of metaphysics. I have also suggested that ontosophy, if 
understood as first philosophy, exemplifies the double primacy of 
metaphysics. On top of that, I agree with Clauberg that Descartes’ first 
philosophy can be said to take its name not from the universality of its object, 
but from it being understood as first philosophical discourse one must adopt 
prior to building a system. This is precisely why Descartes’ method lacks the 
double primacy. It does, indeed, posit a hierarchy of dependence in a scientific 
procedure; however, it does not start with the most universal object. The 
problem now arising comes from the possibility that Clauberg’s approach, if 
he is aligning himself with Descartes, might also not exemplify this double 
primacy. 
 
 Recall my earlier account that, in the Elementa of 1647, Clauberg 
characterises ontosophy as the science of ens qua ens, but also as a “divine, 
catholic, universal science,” and as “first philosophy.” This 1647 account 
suggests that the universality and primacy of ontosophy is based on the object 
of its research, i.e. on the ens qua ens. This being the case, first philosophy 
                                                        
54 Clauberg, Ontosophia. Translation extended and modified from Bardout 2002, p. 132. 
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draws its primacy from the nature of the object treated by this science. This 
results in the double primacy of ontosophy: both the primacy in nature and 
knowledge depend on the universality of the object of the science. On the 
other hand, if the term ‘first philosophy’ is to be understood as encapsulated in 
Descartes’ method then this account which connects the double primacy of 
ontosophy with the universality of its object cannot hold, since such primacy, 
as I argue, does not occur in Descartes’ system. I have also mentioned above 
that Clauberg slowly turns towards a more Cartesian way of thinking 
throughout the years. This suggests that by the 1664, and the edition of 
Clauberg’s work I quote above, Clauberg changes his mind with regards to 
what constitutes the primacy of ontosophy. Its universality is still based on the 
universality of its object, but if the approach to this object is to be more 
Cartesian, then Ontosophia would not start with what is the most universal, i.e. 
ens qua ens, but with a particular thinking mind and its ability to doubt. 
 
There are, fortunately for the purposes of my narrative, several reasons 
one can point to in order to show that this is not the case. Firstly, calling 
something ‘first philosophy’ not due to the universality of its object, but due to 
the necessity of beginning with such a discipline does not of itself prevent the 
establishment of the double primacy. In fact, the primacy of knowledge 
requires such a position. In §5 quoted above, Clauberg distinguishes between 
‘universal philosophy’ (primacy in the order of nature), which he attributes to 
his own discipline, and the ‘first philosophy’ (order of knowledge), which he 
attributes to Descartes. Secondly, Clauberg’s denial that the primacy of first 
philosophy is grounded in the universality of its object of study does not entail 
that Clauberg therefore adopts Descartes’ starting point, if by that one is to 
understand identifying first philosophy with the Method of Doubt or with the 
Cogito. In fact, what Clauberg is here doing is drawing an analogy between his 
conception of the philosophical starting point and the methodological primacy 
exemplified in the Cartesian conception of first philosophy. It is made clear, in 
§5, that Clauberg does not intend to start, as Descartes did, by investigating a 
particular thinking mind (“Mente cogitante”), but by investigating a thinkable 
entity (“Ente cogitabili”). Since there is no ‘unthinkable entity’, and Clauberg 
does not specify any particular thinkable entity he aims to begin with (God, 
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Soul, etc.) it seems safe to interpret this section as stating that universal 
philosophy beings with the entity qua entity. The aim of introducing this 
analogy between the universal philosophy and Descartes’ first philosophy is to 
illustrate that Clauberg’s starting point is meant to exemplify the primacy of 
knowledge in a way similar to Descartes, i.e. “the fact that someone who wants 
to philosophize seriously must begin from it,” rather than to point out 
Clauberg’s intention to start, like Descartes, “from the knowledge of one’s 
mind and of God, etc.” In fact, far from adopting Descartes’ starting point, this 
claim by Clauberg should be seen as his attempt to rehabilitate Descartes’ 
approach in the face of the Scholastic approach to philosophy, by attempting 
to show that Descartes is fundamentally attempting to do what Clauberg is 
doing, rather than vice versa.55  
 
Finally, there is a more general point to be made which points to the 
connection between the universality of the ens qua ens and its suitability to 
provide a ground for Clauberg’s systematic primacy in the order of knowledge. 
One characteristic of the systems constructed to proceed from a particular 
towards the universal rests on the idea of the opposition between the things 
more familiar ‘to us’ and the things more familiar ‘by nature’. The approaches 
of this kind, such as that of Aristotle, believe that what is more familiar to us, 
and therefore first in one’s metaphysical investigations is the particular, which 
therefore serves as the starting point for philosophising.56 Clauberg, on the 
other hand, explicitly states that ens qua ens is what is most familiar or known 
to us (notissimus),57 enabling him to conceive of ontosophy as the first in the 
order of knowledge, just as Descartes conceived of the first philosophy: as the 
philosophical activity coming before and grounding any subsequent one, this 
time, however, with a more universal object. This, therefore, constitutes the 
double primacy of ontosophy: the first philosophical step, which serves as the 
                                                        
55 For more on Clauberg’s rehabilitation of Descartes see Strazzoni 2015. 
56 Aristotle, Physics 1, 1.194a10-21. The similar intuition is present in Descartes: the 
familiarity of the Cogito is expressed through its indubitability, unrivalled even by the 
familiarity of God or embodiment. It could also be pointed out that Descaertes even 
starts with everyday particular, such as towers, wax, and passersby. 
57 See footnote 50. 
 47 
necessary precursor to any further philosophising, is the investigation of that 
which is the most universal in nature, or the entity qua entity. 
2.  2.  Further senses of entity 
 
Having said a lot in the above section about Clauberg’s conception of 
the entity in the primary sense, or the sense of the Intelligible, this account 
would be incomplete without mentioning the other two senses: the entity 
understood as a something, and as a substance. Understood as the Intelligible, 
the entity remains the most important sense regarding the concerns of this 
historical narrative of ontology, since it is the one grounding the double 
primacy of metaphysics I have spoken about. Nevertheless, the other two 
senses provide a fruitful insight into what ontology is (or was) supposed to be 
and what it was not supposed to be. These two more determinate, i.e. less 
universal, senses of entity will therefore paint a more determinate picture of 
what the science investigating them is intended to look like. 
 
Starting with Something, or aliquid, Clauberg says the following: 
 
§18 If what we think about does not involve any impossibility 
in our thought, (…) such that we might judge it to be in the 
nature of things or at least that it can be, we thus not only 
attribute to it objective being [esse objectivum], but also real being 
[esse reale], and we call it not only νοητὸν, “intelligible,” but 
also ἐτὸν, properly Something, τί, ichts/etwas.58 
 
The question presenting itself now concerns the difference between 
Entity in the first and second sense. Clauberg says that to treat “what we think 
about” not merely as the “intelligible” (first sense of entity), but also as 
“properly Something”, should not involve any impossibility in our thought. 
However, it seems that this condition was already there for treating anything 
as merely ‘intelligible’. What, in that case, constitutes the difference between 
the first and the second sense? 
                                                        
58 Clauberg, Ontosophia. Translation modified from Bardout 2002, p. 133. 
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The solution seems to lie in the qualification presented: when talking 
about the ‘properly Something’ it is possible to judge it to be, or at least judge 
it to be able to be, in the nature of things. This, as Clauberg explains in §21, 
does not mean that the thing in question, in order to be ‘properly Something’, 
needs to exist: “To posit a reality, it is enough if something [quid] can be, even 
if it does not really exist… (it is enough if it does not involve a contradiction).”59 
In fact, similar to the first sense, “reality is determined by the conditions for 
thought: what is real is what can be positively thought, what is the content of a 
concept… Clauberg’s ontology thus completely disassociates what is “real” 
from what exists.”60 A way to gain an understanding of what Clauberg 
proposes is to see what the second sense of Entity excludes. Recall that in the 
first sense of Entity what is included is everything thinkable simpliciter. This 
includes “Cerberus and other fictions, and Nothing itself…”61 Entity in the first 
sense knows not of its opposite. In fact, “it is not possible for anything to be 
opposed to Entity or to the Intelligible, of which we are in presence of, not even 
by fictions of the mind.”62 Something, on the other hand, is understood as “the 
opposite of Nothing.”63 In the second sense of Entity, therefore, the first duality 
or opposition arises for Clauberg: the opposition between Something and 
Nothing.  
 
As mentioned before, Something and Nothing can both be attributed 
“objective being”, esse objectivum; however, Nothing is what lacks esse reale. To 
be Nothing, one must judge it impossible to be in the nature of things. This 
seems to refer to what could be called ‘oxymoronic entities’, such as ‘wooden 
iron’ or ‘a man with horse’s essence’. In fact, in the note to §18 which is 
supposed to clarify the idea of the “impossibility in our thought”, Clauberg 
points out that all impossibility arises from something composed “by the mind 
                                                        
59 Translation modified from Bardout 2002, p. 133. Bardout mistakenly references this 
paragraph as §12, rather than as §21. Cf. Aquinas’ second sense of ens in De Ente, Cap. 1. 
60 Bardout 2002, p. 133. 
61 Clauberg, Ontosophia §12. 
62 Ibid, §9. 
63 Ibid, §§4, 24. 
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and in the mind”, while simple concepts can never exemplify impossibility, 
suggesting that Nothing is constituted by the set of composite entities with 
contradictory natures. What the second sense of Entity allows, therefore, is the 
differentiation between Something and Nothing, i.e. between thoughts 
expressing entities (since they are all entities in the first sense) with consistent 
and inconsistent natures. Such an opposition is not present under the first 
sense, since the opposition to the first sense of entity cannot be conceived and 
if it cannot be conceived it cannot be. Based on this, Clauberg further discusses 
the uses of ‘Nothing’ and ‘non Ens’ in common speech arguing that, although it 
might seem so, they never refer to a Nothing in the primary sense, but in the 
secondary sense from which they ground the ideas of contradiction, privation, 
and negation.64 
 
The final of the three senses of Entity Clauberg considers is ‘substance’. 
In a vein similar to Something, the sense of Something is invoked in order to 
distinguish between a thing [res] and its accidents and modes.  
 
§42 The third meaning of entity is also, in the most proper 
sense called a Thing or… real Entity (ens reale). We have this 
meaning in mind when we distinguish thing from mode of a 
thing… a thing such as the human soul, from its attributes, 
such as the faculty of understanding.65 
 
Similarly to the way in which the Something and Nothing distinction of 
the second sense was used to ground the differentiation between those entities 
which are ‘really something’ and those which are not, which are fictions or 
entities of reason, the third sense of entity is posited in order to ground the 
distinction between what is essential for a particular entity and what is 
accidental. In that way, the nothing of the second sense of Entity is transformed 
from ‘that which cannot be judged as possibly belonging to any nature’ into 
‘that which does not necessarily belong to a particular nature.’ It might be 
important to note that Clauberg’s conception of substance is different from 
                                                        
64 Cf. Clauberg, Ontosophia §24 note to Non ens, and §§31, 34, 36. 
65 Translation modified from Bardout 2002, p. 133. 
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that of Aristotle. Substance is not seen as the primary sense of entity, i.e. entity 
in its most general conception in the order of nature.66 In fact, Clauberg’s 
understanding of Substance is straightforwardly Cartesian: 
 
§44 Substance, or that which exists in such a way that it does 
not need a subject in which to exist, is usually opposed to 
Accident, which is that which exists in something else as in a 
subject or whose being is to “be in” [cujus esse est inesse]. 
3.  The Early History of Ontology 
 
 More can be said, at this point, about Clauberg’s notions of Something, 
Nothing, Substance, etc. It will, however, not be necessary for the course of 
this narrative on the history of ontology. The imporant point I wanted to stress 
is Clauberg’s adoption of what I have called the double primacy of 
metaphysics. From the way he has described his starting point I have argued 
that he has started a system which starts from what he conceives to be the 
most universal in nature (Entity as the intelligible) and proceeds from the 
universal towards the particular. Starting in such a way, as well as claiming 
that this procedure is required in order to ground any subsequent 
philosophical and scientific discipline is what constitutes Clauberg’s appeal to 
the double primacy of metaphysics, or of the discipline he names ontosophia or 
ontologia. From here the next step is Wolff, but before proceeding to his 
philosophy I will finish with a summary provided by Bardout: 
 
The rest of Clauberg’s Ontosophia proceeds in a more 
traditional fashion, as a manual devoted to presenting the 
definitions of the principal concepts of metaphysics and to 
describing the principal properties of beings…  
 
Through its variety of topics, Clauberg’s Ontosophia presents 
itself, under the guise of a general metaphysics or universal 
                                                        
66 For a historical account of the historical change of the conception of Substance or 
οὐσία from Aristotelian to the Early Modern understanding see Kosman 2014. 
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science that studies and describes the most general aspects of 
being, as a prolegomenon to all the sciences that 
subsequently treat of particular kinds of being. It thus 
presumes for its subject a primacy with respect to physics, 
medicine, or ethics.67 
 
                                                        
67 Bardout 2002, p. 134. 
Chapter Two: Wolff’s  Ontology 
1. The Name from Clauberg to Wolff 
Wolff occupies an important place within the history of the name 
‘ontology’ since it is due to him that the term becomes ‘fixed’ within the 
general philosophical lexicon. As discussed before, he is not the first one to use 
the name ontology, and he is not the first to use it as a technical term 
describing a certain foundational philosophical discipline.1 Wolff is very aware 
of this and himself provides multiple references to, for example, Clauberg 
whose work on the topic preceded Wolff’s and it is very likely that it is due to 
Wolff that the term ontologia is the one to survive rather than Clauberg’s 
preferred ontosophia.2 The significance of Wolff, in this historical trajectory, is 
not in his originality, but in his ability to popularise the term which he finds in 
use prior to him. This phenomenon in itself is neither novel, nor outlandish. 
One simply has to recall the fixing of the Ancient Greek words ὕλη and εἶδος 
(literally ‘forest; woodland’ and ‘that which is seen; form; shape’) by Plato and 
Aristotle, and Dasein by Heidegger in order to see other instances of previously 
used terms being transformed to a new philosophical meaning.3  
                                                        
1 Another appearances of the term Ontologia/Ontosophia, besides the ones I focused on 
in the previous chapter, can be found, for example, in Micraelius’ 1653 Lexicon, 
Calovius’ Metaphysica divina of 1636, and Caramuel de Lobkowitz’ Rationalis et Realis 
Philosophia of 1642. For a short account of the differing conceptions in these works see 
Mora 1963, pp. 40-3. Mora (ibid. p. 46) points out that the first one to properly 
introduce “ontology” as a technical term was Jean Le Clerk in his Ontologia sive de ente 
in genere of 1722 (8 years before Wolff’s Ontologia). On the other hand, Mora suggests 
that this work did not influence Wolff, with whose conception “the early history of 
ontology ends”, but that Wolff was rather influenced by Clauberg and Leibniz. 
2 The last use of the term ontosophia, according to Mora (ibid. p. 44) appears in Étienne 
Chauvin’s Lexicon Philosophicum of 1713. Mora does not point out that it can also be 
found in Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, §4, although this cannot truly constitute a ‘use’ of 
a term, since it is mentioned only in passing as one of the synonyms for ontology. 
3 In contrast to Ontologia the three mentioned terms carry an additional complication 
of also being used as ordinary language terms in their respective languages. Since the 
term Ontologia never had an ordinary language counterpart, emerging as a purely 
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Regarding the history of the name with respect to Goclenius and 
Clauberg it would be interesting to see what Wolff has to say about the two 
thinkers. In fact, in his Ontologia, Wolff refers rather positively to both authors. 
Specifically, he refers to Goclenius’ Lexicon at multiple places in the text, as 
well as Clauberg’s Metaphysica de Ente which I have spoken of earlier, and his 
Physica Contracta which I have not spoken of.4 Somewhat unfortunately, 
however, Wolff does not refer to their conceptions of ontology/ontosophy or 
their relation to the term itself.5 Wolff refers to the two thinkers mostly in 
discussion of specific topics of ontology, such as causation, possibility, or 
essence. Additionally, although probably not surprisingly, Wolff refers to the 
full title of Clauberg’s Metaphysica de Ente sive Ontosophia only once, preferring 
to refer to the text as Metaphysica de Ente which he often quotes. The name 
‘ontosophia’ itself is not discussed. Regarding Clauberg, Wolff sometimes 
refers to him as “excellent”, a “strenuous propagator of Cartesian philosophy”, 
and “the best interpreter of Descartes.”6 Perhaps interestingly, the aim of most 
of the sections in which Wolff refers to the two thinkers tends to be to 
demonstrate the continuity of Wolff’s definitions of ontological concepts 
through the same or similar concepts found in preceding traditions, be they 
Aristotelianism, Cartesianism, or Scholasticism.7 Unfortunately, as already 
                                                                                                                                                      
technical term, achieving a unified conception is much easier. As is the case with 
every term, however, this unity does not last indefinitely. 
4 For Goclenius see, for example WO, §§485, 502, 567, 760, et passim; for Clauberg: WO, 
§§7, 103, et passim. 
5 Clauberg is, however, listed among the people “who have improved First 
Philosophy” (WO, §7). At this point in the text, however, the term ‘First Philosophy’ is 
used as a generic term for metaphysics, lacking any particular determination, 
Wolffian or otherwise. As such, First Philosophy is here attributed to the Scholastics 
(who engaged in it badly) and to the subsequent thinkers who have ‘improved it’, such 
as Descartes, Clauberg, and Leibniz, by engaging with it using “scientific and also 
philosophical method”. 
6 WO, §§169, 865, 761. 
7 Wolff here aims at something more than mere agreement. He believes that if one is 
to use proper philosophical method, which he holds himself as the first clear 
developer of, one might “disagree with the words used by another, even though he 
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mentioned, none of these references to Clauberg or Goclenius concerns the 
name ontology, or Wolff’s preference for that term in contrast to ontosophy. 
The only reason Wolff gives for his decision to name first philosophy ontology 
is “because this part [of philosophy] treats of the entity in general, whereby it 
has obtained its name from the object, with which it is concerned.”8 
 
The history of the name, in the way it is conceived of in this thesis ends 
with Wolff. After him the term is established as belonging to overall 
philosophical terminology and is free to be mutated and re-conceptualised by 
subsequent thinkers. As such, the history of the conception of ontology is far 
from over. In that case, where is Wolff in the history of the conception?  
 
Besides ‘fixing’ and popularising the term, Wolff popularises a certain 
conception of metaphysics, or even of scientific knowledge in general, in 
which ontology, as conceived by Wolff, plays a crucial part. Generally 
speaking, I refer to the idea of the separation of sciences, especially but not 
exclusively of metaphysics, into an arboreal hierarchical system in which 
sciences ‘further down the line’ presuppose (in a certain way) the ‘higher’ 
sciences. In Wolff’s system specifically this takes the form of the still well 
known (although rarely utilised) division between Metaphysica Specialis and 
Metaphysica Generalis, the latter of which is also known as Ontologia. 
 
Such a conception of a system, or of a structure of human knowledge, is 
itself not completely new. One can find similar conceptions of a system in 
Descartes’s conception of the Tree of the Sciences, or in the works by Francis 
Bacon, or in Scholastic Aristotelianism (none of these use the term ontology, 
but tend to present science or human knowledge in a general, systematic 
                                                                                                                                                      
does not disagree in regard to the subject matter (…) and vice versa…” (DP, §158). This 
is because what Wolff sees himself doing, by properly employing the philosophical 
method, is changing the words “of vague signification” inherited from the previous 
traditions to words “of fixed signification,” (ibid.). For more details about Wolff’s 
eagerness to conform to established usage of terms and how this plays into his wider 
systematic concerns see Fugate and Hymers in BM, Introduction, p. 19. 
8 WO, §1n. 
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structure). Once again, therefore, the greatest significance of Wolff lies in the 
popularity of his ideas rather than their exceptional originality.  
 
In fact, one can trace the influence of Wolff to the conceptual division 
of Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopaedia. The main division of human 
knowledge in the Encyclopaedia is taken from Francis Bacon’s The Advancement 
of Learning and separates all knowledge into three categories: Memory/History, 
Reason/Philosophy, Imagination/Poetry. The philosophy section is separated 
in a broadly Wolffian manner with, most importantly, the main category of the 
section being “General Metaphysics, or Ontology, or the Science of an Entity 
in General…”9 
 
The incredible popularity which Wolff’s conception of Philosophy 
achieved in Europe in his time has been documented elsewhere.10 A helpful 
remark regarding this popularity for the purposes of my project can be found 
in Gilson:  
 
When today we make use of the term "ontology," what it 
means to us is just the same as "metaphysics." Not so in the 
philosophy of Wolff, who needed a new word to designate a 
                                                        
9 Similarly to Wolff, and controversially for the time, the Science of God in the 
Encyclopaedia is put on a parallel level to Ontology, and subjugated to Philosophy. 
Unlike in the case of Wolff, encyclopaedic notion of Natural Theology is not 
subjugated to Ontology and there are differences in the division of some other 
sciences. The inclusion of ontology on the fundamental level of philosophical 
knowledge is, I believe, Wolffian in influence. Wolff does feature in the Encyclopaedia, 
although primarily in the section on Cosmology. Mora (1963, p. 46) also points out that 
there is “a curious, and rather neglected, reference to Ontology in the article 
“Ontologie” of the Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des Arts et des 
Métiers, t. XI, N-PAR (Neufchastel, 1765)” which presents the term in a way “rather 
uncritical of Wolff’s Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia…” 
10 For the early popularity of Wolff’s work in Germany see Beck, 1696 p. 258. For the 
spread of Wolffianism to France and Prussia and the popularity of his philosophy 
among women, which has resulted in a “veritable lycanthropy” see Beck 1969, p. 260 & 
260n28. For its spread to Scandinavia via Jens Kraft, see Øhrstrøm et al. 2005, p. 432. 
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new thing… Nothing can now give us an idea of the authority 
which his doctrine enjoyed throughout the schools of 
Europe, and especially in Germany. To innumerable 
professors and students of philosophy, metaphysics was 
Wolff and what Wolff had said was metaphysics.11 
 
Wolff’s works are generally separated into his German works written 
during his position in Halle and his Latin works written after his banishment 
from Halle to Marburg by Frederick William I and the censure of his 
metaphysical works in Prussia.12 Since my main interest in Wolff’s philosophy 
in this work regards his conception of ontology I will focus on the set of Latin 
works, since this is where the term really gains prominence. The key work to 
refer to is, of course, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia of 1730, but also Discursus 
Praeliminaris of 1728, an introductory work attached to his Latin Logic whose 
aim is to provide a short and concise introduction to the nature and structure 
of Wolff’s overall system. 
2. The Division of Metaphysics and the Position of Ontology 
The belief that Wolff is the one who divided metaphysics into Generalis 
and Specialis, the former of which being called ontology and treating of entities 
in general, while latter is subdivided into specialised disciplines dealing with 
particular metaphysical objects, is today fairly commonplace. Interestingly, to 
follow the terminology I have been using so far, although the conception of the 
separation of metaphysics into Generalis and Specialis is present in Wolff’s 
work, the terms Metaphysica Generalis/Specialis are not.13 While Wolff does talk 
about ‘special’ disciplines of metaphysics in his Latin works, which he 
separates from ontology, the often-invoked, clearly posited Wolffian division 
                                                        
11 Gilson, 1952, p. 119. 
12 For reasons and a colourful description of Wolff’s banishment, including the 
punishment involved with breaking the censure on teaching of his metaphysics see 
Schönfeld, 2002, pp. 546-7. 
13 And, according to Vollrath (1962, p. 262), they cannot be found either in Wolff’s 
German works, or in his Latin Logic, or in Discurus Praeliminaris or in the Prolegomena 
to Ontologia. 
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of metaphysics into Generalis and Specialis does not appear in these works, but 
is a later convention.14  
 
As Vollrath points out, Wolff was the first to make the 
Generalis/Specialis division, which becomes standard by the time of 
Baumgarten and is, as such, utilised by Baumgarten.15 To use my terminology, 
Vollrath is here referring to Wolff using the division in conception, not in the 
name. This can be seen from the fact that he supports his claim by referring to 
§2 of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, which states: “To metaphysics belong 
ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology.” In the text of the 
Metaphysica, however, Baumgarten, similarly to Wolff, does not use the terms 
Metaphysica Generalis and Specialis, and the closest he comes to that is by 
defining ontology as ‘metaphysica universalis’. The literal separation of 
metaphysics into Generalis and Specialis, which is held to epitomise pre-
Kantian metaphysics and its most famous proponents, is therefore not to be 
found in either Wolff or Baumgarten. 
 
 However, to risk repeating myself, while Wolff and Baumgarten do not 
tend to designate the separation of metaphysics using the terms the 
subsequent tradition has assigned to them, the tradition is faithful to the 
                                                        
14 Caygill prudently and correctly ascribes it “to the tradition of Wolff and 
Baumgarten” (CoPR, Introduction, p. xv). The closest terminology I could find in 
Wolff is in his explanation of the definition of Natural Theology which he explains is 
defined not by expressly mentioning “attributes and operations of God”, but by 
conceiving of it “in general terms by which it is deduced as a special definition from 
the general definition of philosophy.” DP, 57n. 
15 Vollrath 1962, pp. 259-60. I have already spoken about the fact that the division of 
metaphysics into universal and particular already appears in Lorhard and how it was 
different from what is usually accepted as Wolff’s division. It is not the case that Wolff 
was the first one to attempt to divide metaphysics as a science. In fact, such an attempt 
lies at a core of any medieval interpretation of Aristotle and is connected to what I 
have called the Aristotelian ambiguity of metaphysics. What Vollrath seems to refer 
here is the fact that the specific manner of dividing metaphysics that became 
synonymous with 18th Century German (or, for Kant, dogmatic) metaphysics originates 
from Wolff. For this, see also de Boer, 2011, p. 53. 
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conception of the separation present in their works. They both subscribe to a 
form of general metaphysics, which precedes the disciplines of special 
metaphysics. Metaphysics conceived in this general manner is conceived as a 
science of an entity in general which intends to ground subsequent 
(metaphysical) sciences and, besides being a science of universal predicates of 
an entity qua entity, general metaphysics is simultaneously seen as “the science 
that contains first (or primary) principles of human cognition.”16  
 
In this chapter I will focus on elucidating Wolff’s conception of this 
‘general metaphysics’ or ontology. Beyond general elucidation, my aim here is 
to show that Wolff’s ontology exemplifies what I have called ‘the double 
primacy of metaphysics’. However, in order to spell out what this means and 
how it manifests itself in Wolff, and to explicate, the historical or traditional 
meaning of the term ‘ontology’, it will be necessary to explain Wolff’s 
conception in more detail. Besides showing what ontology itself is for Wolff, I 
will need to show how ontology relates to the special metaphysical sciences. 
Wolff was, for better or for worse, aiming to construct a comprehensive system 
of sciences, and as such the architectonic connection between the grounding 
discipline of ontology and the subsequent disciplines needs to be explained. 
But this cannot be the starting point, since Wolff’s division of metaphysics is 
dependent on his understanding of what philosophy is, what philosophical 
cognition is, and of what constitutes the scientific manner of philosophising. 
And since the beginning is usually a good place to start from, I will start from 
Wolff’s Discursus Praeliminaris and his division of cognition. 
2.  1 .  The division of knowing 
Wolff divides cognition [cognitio] into three separate kinds: historical, 
philosophical, and mathematical. Historical cognition can be found in an act 
of merely knowing a certain fact, or as Wolff puts it, it is a “cognition of that 
                                                        
16 Metaphysica est scientia prima cognitionis humanae principia continens. See Vollrath, 
1962, p. 259. 
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which is and occurs either in the material world or in immaterial substance…”17 
Some examples Wolff provides of this kind of cognition are: knowing that the 
sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening, that buds blossom in spring, 
etc. In fact, reading the Discursus one can quickly notice how general and 
widely-encompassing Wolff’s definitions tend to be. There is, for Wolff, no 
difference in kind between knowing that I am feeling slightly chilly and that 
the surrounding layer of Jupiter is made of liquid metallic hydrogen with some 
helium. Both, as examples of knowledge of facts, fall under historical 
cognition.18 
 
Philosophical cognition, on the other hand, is understood as “the 
cognition of the reason of that which is or occurs.”19  In order for us to cognize 
something philosophically, we first need to cognize it historically. Historical 
cognition tells us what is and occurs, i.e. what is actual, and hence what is 
                                                        
17 DP, §3. Emphasis mine. I have consistently modified Blackwell’s translation of 
cognitio (when referring to the 3 kinds of cognition) from knowledge to cognition. The 
reason for this is not a mere desire for etymological proximity. Rather than that, it 
seems to me that Wolff’s division is better understood if one looks at it as a separation 
of the kinds of activities of knowing or gaining knowledge, instead of as a separation of 
states of having knowledge. Etymology might help, however, since the cognition comes 
to English directly from cognitio, a noun-form of cognoscere which designates activity, 
meaning ‘to become acquainted with’; ‘to inquire’; ‘to learn’. 
18 Although the former would probably fall under the “common” or even “vulgar 
historical knowledge” since Wolff further separates historical cognition into these two 
kinds. See DP, §12. On the other hand, there is something more to say about Wolff’s 
ideas on the indubitability of the immediate sensory experiences, but that would be 
irrelevant for this point, since regardless of their ability they both count as examples 
of historical cognition since they exemplify a knowledge that a certain fact obtains, or 
that certain state or thing is or occurs. 
19 DP, §7 translation modified. Emphasis mine. Also as Beck (1969, p. 262) puts it: the 
goal of philosophy is “the knowledge of why things must be as they are – why they are 
possible if they are possible, and why they are actual if they are actual,” although I am 
getting slightly ahead of myself by quoting this. 
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possible, since what is actual is possible. These things are then to be cognized 
philosophically, i.e. one needs to understand why these things are or occur.20 
  
From the mutual relation between these kinds of cognition it is clear 
that for Wolff the difference in the type of cognition is not determined by the 
content of one’s cognition, but the nature of it, or the way in which a certain 
fact is understood. For example, I might know that the motion of the universe 
requires a Prime Mover since I have read this in Aristotle’s Physics, and who 
am I to disagree with the Philosopher? Assuming that Aristotle is correct, this 
cosmological knowledge of mine is hereby not an example of my philosophical 
cognition of the origin and the condition of motion in the universe. Instead, 
my understanding of the universe is historical. I have merely used Aristotle as 
a source of my cognition of the brute fact about the reason for the motion in 
the universe. In order to gain philosophical cognition of the said motion, I need 
to understand the sequence of arguments (Aristotle’s or someone else’s) that 
resulted in the proposition that the motion requires a First Mover. The best 
way to reach such a state of understanding the why of the fact, rather than the 
mere what of the fact, is to form a “habit of demonstrating propositions, i.e. the 
habit of inferring conclusions by legitimate sequence from certain and 
immutable principles.”21 For Wolff, this means to engage in science. Wolff 
writes: 
 
He who knows and understands the propositions of 
philosophy but cannot demonstrate them has historical 
cognition of philosophy. For he who knows and understands 
the propositions of philosophy knows what is taught in 
philosophy. Hence, since he knows a fact, he has historical 
cognition (§3). But since he cannot demonstrate the truth of 
these propositions, he lacks science (§30). Hence, he who is 
void of philosophy (§29) has only historical cognition of 
                                                        
20 Another point that illustrates the generality of Wolff’s definitions: “He is a greater 
philosopher who can give the reason of more things, and he is a lesser philosopher 
who knows the reason of fewer things.” DP, §47. 
21 DP, §30. 
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philosophy. Thus he cannot be called a philosopher (§46), 
unless you speak inconsistently, which has no place in 
philosophy.22 
 
At this point one must again remember that what is described 
here is not a state of knowing of a fact, be that a fact of how or a fact of 
why, but a way of understanding or cognizing a fact. If Aristotle has 
already proven the requirement of the Prime Mover for the motion of 
the universe to a sufficiently scientific standard it is not enough for me 
to simply know or be able to recount his proof. The mere recounting 
of the proof would provide me with what Wolff refers to as “the 
historical knowledge of the philosophical knowledge of another 
man.”23 I am certainly allowed to utilise Aristotle’s proof. There is no 
need for a philosopher to start proving everything ab ovo. But in order 
for me to be able to claim philosophical cognition of the status of 
motion in the universe I am required to understand the validity of the 
proof for such a state of affairs and be able to demonstrate its 
conclusion myself from the shared premises. 
 
Wolff’s distinction between historical and philosophical cognition, at 
least regarding the way in which the possession of philosophical cognition of a 
subject matter is concerned, is analogous to the distinction between knowing, 
or using, mathematical theorems and proving them. The definition of 
philosophical cognition itself, i.e. the cognition of the reason of that which is or 
occurs, does not, in and of itself, necessarily invoke mathematics or 
mathematical thinking. But once it is, as Wolff intends it to be, formulated as a 
scientific philosophical cognition, i.e. the habit of inferring conclusions by 
legitimate sequence from certain and immutable principles, the distinction 
reveals itself to be akin to the aforementioned distinction in mathematical 
thinking. I have a historical knowledge of the Pythagorean theorem. I can state 
what it is, I can write it down, and I can use it to solve certain low-level 
geometrical problems or measure distances in physical space. I can, therefore, 
                                                        
22 DP, §50. Translation modified. 
23 DP, §8. 
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provide someone with the Pythagorean theorem, but I cannot provide a reason 
for the Pythagorean theorem. Specifically, I cannot infer it by legitimate 
sequence from certain and immutable principles such as, for example, 
Euclidean axioms. Hence I lack the philosophical cognition of the Pythagorean 
theorem.24  
 
This analogy with mathematics is not accidental. Wolff is adamant that 
in order for philosophical cognition to be scientific it has to follow the 
demonstrative method, the best examples of which, according to Wolff, have 
been historically found in mathematics.25 According to Beck (1969, p. 190) this 
idea comes from the influence of von Tschirnhaus’ mathematical 
methodologies which is the model on which Wolff bases his syllogistic logic, 
and to which all proofs are intended to conform.26 
 
This leads me to Wolff’s third kind of cognition, mathematical 
cognition. For Wolff mathematical cognition is the cognition of the quantity of 
things27 and as such differs from both philosophical and historical cognition: 
“[for] history rests in the bare knowledge of the fact (§3). In philosophy we 
discover the reason of things which are or can be (§6). And in mathematics we 
determine the quantities which are present in things.”28 In a fashion analogous 
to philosophical cognition, there can be historical knowledge of mathematical 
truths, which I have illustrated above. The difference between philosophical 
and mathematical cognition of a truth, however, does not concern the object or 
phenomenon they treat of, but the way that object is treated. What an object 
                                                        
24 And if I attempt to prove this theorem by merely appealing “to Euclid and universal 
agreement of mathematicians” I would be universally laughed at. See DP, §156n. 
25 “If philosophers would imitate the mathematicians by handling, with an accurate 
method, what has already been discovered, they would continually progress further 
and acquire many new truths.” DP, §38n. 
26 Beck (1969, p. 262) also notes that, pace Descartes and von Tschirnhaus, Wolff 
considers the definition and the syllogism as essential to mathematics, rather than, 
pace Kant, intuition and construction. On Wolff’s early and changing relation 
regarding syllogism in mathematics and philosophy see Corr 1970, pp. 135-7. 
27 DP, §14. 
28 DP, §17. 
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determines is a scientific discipline, such as philosophy or mathematics. If one 
is to read Wolff expecting this distinction in cognition to map to the 
knowledge of different objects or knowledge through different disciplines 
(history, philosophy, mathematics), one will find oneself with a history that is 
not historical, mathematics that is not mathematical, and philosophy that is 
not philosophical. This can be seen in Wolff’s example that is supposed to 
“clearly illustrate the difference”: 
 
He who knows that the heat of the midday sun sometimes 
increases and sometimes decreases has historical knowledge. 
He who knows that a greater degree of heat depends on a 
greater density of the rays striking a plane and on a less 
oblique angle of incidence has philosophical knowledge. And 
he who can determine the density of the rays and the size of 
the angle, and hence the degree of heat, has mathematical 
knowledge.29  
 
If I am reading Wolff correctly, this curiously suggests that the scientific 
understanding of the Pythagorean theorem as such, that I have described 
above, i.e. my ability to derive it from firm and immutable principles does not 
result in a mathematical cognition of the theorem, but in a philosophical one. 
This is because mathematical cognition concerns quantities, while philosophical 
concerns reasons. In that way, if I can prove the Pythagorean theorem from 
Euclidean axioms, i.e. I can demonstrate why this relation holds, I have a 
philosophical understanding of the theorem. If I know that my computer 
screen is a 13’’ screen because I have read so on the box it came in I have a 
historical knowledge of quantity. If I can derive that information by deriving 
the length of the diagonal of the screen from the length of the catheti, my 
cognition is to count as mathematical, since I “can determine” the length of the 
diagonal (and probably the size of the angles, if I so wanted). 
 
This shows that what Wolff has in mind in his separation of cognition 
into three fundamental kinds does not of itself constitute a separation into 
                                                        
29 DP, §17n. 
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scientific disciplines. Division of kinds of cognition, likewise, is not based on 
the treatment of different kinds of objects (e.g. historical facts VS 
mathematical objects VS synthetic a priori judgments). On the other hand, it 
can be seen from Ontologia §7, that philosophy (or at this place more 
specifically metaphysics) and mathematics as sciences, not as kinds of 
cognition, differ on the basis of the object they treat.30 Since the division of 
cognition distinguishes different possible ways of cognizing phenomena, 
rather than disciplines, Wolff is able to a) allow for the mutually enhancing 
combinations of different kinds of cognition (as he shows in his example); and 
b) allow for scientific disciplines to be mutually informative. The latter point is 
enabled by not restricting kinds of cognition to a discipline. This means that 
philosophy, a scientific discipline that most closely correlates with 
philosophical cognition, can use mathematical discoveries even if we define 
mathematics as a science of mathematical objects such as numbers, functions, 
sets, and imaginary planes. Since kinds of cognitions transcend disciplinary 
boundaries and are univocally applied across the sciences, this opens a 
possibility of connecting sciences in a mutually supportive network, or the 
system.31  
 
That being so, kinds of cognition are separate from the sciences they 
might resemble. In relation to this, Hettche, for example, points to Wolff’s 
distinction between ‘common’ or ‘vulgar’ knowledge which he sees as the 
‘natural way of thinking’ and ‘scientific knowledge’.32 However, he then claims 
that three types of cognition (which he refers to as three types of knowledge) 
                                                        
30 “[W]hat metaphysical concepts correspond to, does not fall in the same way as 
mathematical under the senses and imagination and also is not as easy to put to 
proof.” Interestingly, for Wolff a scientific object is characterised by objects to which 
concepts of a specific science correspond to, but the criteria of such a division does 
not seem to be very strict. See DP, §145: “Philosophical terms [termini philosophici] are 
the names given to thing which are discerned by the philosopher, but not by the 
common man.” 
31 Indeed, as I will discuss subsequently, Wolff frequently attempts to point out from 
which other discipline a certain discipline has to “borrow its principles” in order to 
provide a legitimate demonstration of something (see, e.g., DP, §38n). 
32 Hettche, 2016, §3. 
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fall under the scientific one. And while I do agree with the former point, I do 
not agree with the latter one. Wolff does distinguish between “common” 
[cognitio communis] and “vulgar”[cognitio vulgi] cognition, making the former 
“the lowest grade of human knowledge”.33 However, Wolff claims that both 
instances are instances of historical cognition, meaning that they, as a genus, 
cannot be opposed to historical cognition if historical cognition is understood, 
according to Hettche, as a species of scientific knowledge.34 So if scientific 
knowledge is separate from Wolff’s three kinds of cognition, what is it that 
makes something into a science? 
2.  2.  Demonstrative,  philosophical,  and mathematical  method 
Philosophical cognition, as I have mentioned above, is understood as 
“the cognition of the reason of that which is or occurs.”35 In order for a science to 
be formed on the basis of this kind of cognition it will have to be a science that 
will provide the reason for that which is or occurs by following a scientific 
method or by “inferring conclusions by legitimate sequence from certain and 
immutable principles.”36 
 
In and of itself this description of the scientific method does not tell us 
much since it does not specify what is meant by ‘legitimate sequence’ or what 
‘certain and immutable principles’ are. I have mentioned in the last section 
that Wolff models the conception of this method on mathematics, which Wolff 
understood as proceeding in a syllogistically deductive manner. Indeed, Wolff 
claims that: “If philosophers would imitate the mathematicians by handling, 
with an accurate method, what has already been discovered, they would 
                                                        
33 DP, §§22, 23. 
34 He does proceed to state that: “each category [of cognition] is again sub-divided into 
particular scientific disciplines”. I agree with this to the extent that categories of 
cognition are separate from their disciplines, but not to the extent that they perfectly 
map to these disciplines, i.e. are exclusive to them. 
35 DP, §7. 
36 DP, §30. 
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continually progress further and acquire many new truths.”37 Later on in the 
text of the Discursus he goes even further: 
 
The rules of philosophical method are the same as the rules 
of mathematical method… The identity of philosophical and 
mathematical method will be a surprise only to him who 
does not know the common source from which the rules of 
both mathematics and philosophy are derived. We have 
deduced the rules of philosophical method from the notion 
of certitude (…) [a]nd if one searches for the reason for 
mathematical method, he will find that it is the certitude of 
knowledge which every mathematician seeks in his own 
field… Therefore, since the rules of both philosophical and 
mathematical cognition are based upon the same reason, it is 
no wonder these rules are the same.38 
 
This statement of identity raises the question of what then constitutes 
this mathematical method and how philosophy is to imitate such a method. 
One thing this identity in method does not mean, however, is that philosophy 
is to ‘do’ exactly what mathematics ‘does’ or that philosophical reasoning is to 
become a case of mathematical cognition. As Wolff says, the identity of 
method has its ground in the shared characteristic of philosophical and 
mathematical cognition (and cognition in general): the desire for certitude. Be 
that as it may, mathematical cognition concerns quantities of things, 
                                                        
37 DP, §38n. 
38 DP,§§139, 139n. Translation modified. A similar idea can be seen resurging in 
Lambert’s 1761 Abhandlug zum Criterium Veritatis, §21 (apud Watkins 2009). Lambert 
there argues that “Ancient mathematicians realised that one must distinguish 
between propositions that one admits without proof and those for the acceptance of 
which the proof is needed. The truth of the latter, they saw, could only be clear if 
deduced from the former. A way of doing so gave them a concept of method that was 
for a long time called the mathematical method, but it can be called the natural 
method, because it is the soul’s true way of thinking and can be utilized in every 
science.” Wolff would certainly agree that the mathematical method is a formalisation 
of the soul’s true way of thinking and that it could be utilized in every science. 
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philosophical cognition concerns reasons why the things are the way they are. 
So the mathematical method in philosophy cannot merely consist in ‘doing 
whatever mathematicians do’. In discussing Wolff’s preference for 
mathematical method, Corr characterises mathematical method thus: 
“Mathematics [understood as a discipline] moves steadily forward because of 
its strict, procedural standards of clarity and certitude. Each step in a 
mathematical chain of arguments is subjected to rigid scrutiny to assure its 
absolute accuracy and necessity. Since nothing less is accepted, the whole 
series of demonstrations takes on the indubitable character of its smallest 
step.”39 This is what it means for Wolff to emulate mathematical ‘method’. It 
does not mean, to provide a caricature, to reduce all judgments to points on a 
function.  
 
From an earlier part of the passage quoted above we can see that when 
Wolff talks about identifying philosophical and mathematical method, he 
conceives of what a ‘method’ is very loosely. This way of conceiving of a 
method, similarly to his division of kinds of cognition, is not bound to any 
particular object or field of study. Hence we find out that the rules of the 
philosophical method, which are identified with the rules of the mathematical 
method, are the following: a) only use accurately defined terms; b) admit as 
true only that which was sufficiently demonstrated; c) accurately determine 
the subject and predicate of every proposition; d) order everything so that 
“those things come first through which later things are understood and 
established.” 
 
After this identification has been established, and after Wolff has 
shown what it consists of, he proceeds to show that philosophico-
mathematical method is, in fact, neither properly speaking philosophical, nor 
mathematical, but that there is only one, univocally applied method of science: 
 
Even if mathematics did not exist, or if it were not sufficiently 
developed to offer certain knowledge to its devotees, there 
still would be no other philosophical method than the one 
                                                        
39 Corr 1970, p. 134. 
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which we have established… Therefore, it is vain and useless 
to apply every discrepancy in mathematical method to 
philosophy, for philosophy does not borrow its method from 
mathematics; rather, both philosophy and mathematics 
derive their methods from true logic.40 
 
Once characterised in this way the identification of philosophical 
method with the mathematical one does not seem very significant (or strictly 
speaking methodological). We find out that the separation of the method of 
science into mathematical and philosophical is merely accidental. It just so 
happens to be the case that mathematicians historically aligned their method 
closer to this true logic. But the characteristics of the true logic itself do not 
seem to be very specific. Such characterisations, to be rigorous, accurate, rigid, 
etc., are, in my view, characters of style rather than method.41 
 
However, one characteristic of this method is probably more important 
than the others, and that is the idea that the true method orders everything so 
that “those things come first through which later things are understood and 
established.” This feature comes to characterise the scientific method as such, 
to which philosophical and mathematical cognition need to conform to in 
order to establish philosophy, mathematics, or any other branch of knowing as 
                                                        
40 DP, §139n. See my note on Lambert, above. Corr (1970, p. 135) further points out that 
in his 1703 dissertation, entitled De philosophia practica universalis, mathematica methodo 
conscripta, Wolff was guided by the idea “philosophy must become the twin of 
mathematics to the last detail,” and says that Wolff’s “slavish adherence to 
mathematical form” was later “abandoned under the stimulus of Leibniz.” It seems 
that Wolff did at one point attempt to “apply every discrepancy” of mathematics to 
philosophy. Corr also further notes how in the years starting with the publication of 
the Latin Logic, the subtitle of Wolff’s dissertation changes to methodo scientifica 
pertracta. 
41 By which I am not referring to Wolff’s conception of the philosophical style. 
Blackwell (DP, Introduction, p. X) puts it correctly: “Philosophy attains to complete 
certitude insofar as it shares in the values of mathematical method.” Interestingly, 
Kant uses similar terms during the rare moments of praising Wolff’s method. 
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a science.42 
 
Let us take the example of philosophy. Wolff argues that philosophy is 
a science. Since philosophy is a science, the things which it treats should be 
inferred by legitimate sequence from certain and immutable principles.43 
From this Wolff concludes that “those parts of philosophy which provide 
principles for the other parts should come first; and those parts which borrow 
principles should come later.”44 Since this characteristic follows merely from 
the fact that philosophy is (or should be) a science, this suggests that any 
science, in Wolff’s view, ought to be a hierarchical system with certain 
principles having priority and other principles being accessible through 
derivation from these prior principles. This means that certain disciplines 
cannot reach a scientific status before they have been shown to be legitimately 
derived from prior disciplines, or as Wolff puts it they “cannot be developed 
according to the demonstrative method.”45 This means that Wolff’s division of 
metaphysics arises as a consequence of the way he understood the scientific 
method itself:  
 
Philosophical method is the order which the philosopher 
ought to use in treating dogmas… Philosophy should be 
ordered so that those things come first through which later 
things are understood and demonstrated… Therefore, the 
supreme law of philosophical method is that those things must 
come first through which later things are understood and 
established… This is the same order which must be observed 
in ordering the parts of philosophy. Therefore, one and the same 
                                                        
42 Hence Wolff will sometimes refer to this as a scientific method or as philosophical 
method, mathematical method, or demonstrative method. There does not seem to be 
significant difference between these, once it is understood that they depend on this 
order of derivation. 
43 From the DP, §30 definition of science. 
44 DP, §86. 
45 DP, §73n. 
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order is used throughout the whole of philosophy… This is 
the main point of philosophical method.46 
 
Now that the philosophical method has been establish and I have 
shown how, in Wolff’s view, it follows from the very understanding of what a 
scientific method is, it is time to proceed to the division of metaphysics and see 
that part of philosophy which is supposed to be the first in the philosophical 
order.  
2.  3 .  Science,  experiments,  and special  metaphysics 
 
Philosophical cognition provides one with an insight into “the reason of 
that which is or occurs”. Philosophical method is the process of the derivation 
of these reasons in a strict, hierarchical way by a legitimate sequence from 
certain and immutable principles. Philosophy, as a discipline, however, is 
something more specific: it is “the science of the possibles insofar as they can 
be.”47 This does not merely mean that philosophy is in the business of showing 
what is possible. Since philosophical cognition concerns the question of the 
reason of facts, philosophy must also “demonstrate why the possibles could 
actually occur,”48 and if there are many possibles only some of which occur 
and others do not, philosophy must provide the reason of why some occur and 
others do not.49  
 
This shows that philosophy is concerned with possibility and actuality, 
however, with an emphasis on possibility. The reason for this goes back to the 
separation of the kinds of cognition. Historical cognition is rooted in actuality. 
It consists in cognising something as a brute fact. As such, historical cognition 
provides one with an understanding of what is actual and, since it is actual it 
shows that it is possible. However, it is the job of philosophical cognition to 
answer the why of the fact that something is actual and possible. This is 
                                                        
46 DP, §§133-134n. Emphasis mine. 
47 DP, §29. 
48 DP, §31. 
49 DP, §32. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, 1P11d2. 
 71 
achieved through the scientific (hierarchical, syllogistic) investigation into the 
relation of possibilities, or more specifically, conditions of predication: 
 
[W]hatever is predicated of an entity belongs to it only under 
a certain condition. It makes no difference whether this 
condition is sought for in the definition or somewhere else. 
Now he who is acquainted with philosophy knows the reason 
why a thing is or occurs (§7). Therefore, he perceives the 
condition under which something is predicated of an entity, 
and consequently, he does not attribute the predicate to the 
entity unless he sees that the condition is present.50 
 
This tells us that the aim of philosophy is to determine the conditions 
of predication, i.e. under which circumstances something can be predicated of 
something. This is primarily an investigation into the possibility of 
predication, since actual predication needs to be preceded by the 
establishment of the presence of the condition of predication. Furthermore, 
what makes something actual is existence, and existence is itself a complement 
of possibility.51As such, it is considered to be something added to possibility, 
therefore requiring the possibility of the thing, of which it is predicated, to be 
established beforehand. 
 
In the previous section we have seen that Wolff’s conception of method 
requires a hierarchical separation of sciences. This separation will be 
undertaken according to the order of possibilities and the order of actuality. By 
the order of possibility I mean the order in which sciences ‘borrow’ principles 
from one another. By the order of actualities I mean whether the science in 
question is supposed to treat of an actually existing entity and if yes, of which. 
 
Philosophy is thereby separated into three parts. First, practical 
philosophy is the part of philosophy treating of “the use of the appetitive 
                                                        
50 DP, §41. 
51 WO, §174. 
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faculty in choosing good and avoiding evil.”52 Second, there is metaphysics, 
which is the common name for ontology, general (or transcendental) 
cosmology, and pneumatics (which is itself the common name for psychology, 
as well as natural theology).53 Third, there is physics, which “gives the reason 
of those things which can occur through bodies,” and which is further 
separated into general physics (the science of things that pertain to all bodies 
or to diverse species of bodies), cosmology (which treats of the totality of 
bodies in the world and teaches how the world is composed from them), and 
many other more specific sciences, such as the science of atmospheric 
phenomena, minerals, fluids, etc.54 
 
Wolff considers these three as “primary disciplines, which embrace all 
the others.”55 Out of the three, metaphysics holds demonstrative primacy, 
meaning that the principles it discovers will be used, or ‘borrowed’, in the 
other two disciplines. This is because “practical philosophy, as well as the rest 
of philosophy, must use in its demonstrations the universal notions which are 
developed in ontology,” and likewise, practical philosophy “borrows principles 
from ontology, psychology, and natural theology, which are parts of 
metaphysics.”56 Physics is similarly dependent on metaphysics: 
 
If everything is to be demonstrated accurately in physics, 
then principles must be borrowed from metaphysics. Physics 
explains those things which are possible through bodies.... If 
these things are to be treated demonstratively, then the 
notions of body, matter, nature, motion, the elements, and 
other such general notions must be known… Now these 
notions are explained in general cosmology and in ontology… 
                                                        
52 DP, §62. 
53 DP, §§78-79. 
54 DP, §§75-85; 107. It might be interesting to point out that Wolff treats physics as a 
part of philosophy, but not of metaphysics. He does not see it as a separate science as, 
one could argue, he treats mathematics. 
55 DP, §106. 
56 DP, §92. 
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Indeed almost every notion developed in ontology is used in 
physics, for every demonstration from cause to effect in 
physics depends upon ontological principles.57 
There is, however, something more to be said about physics, which 
demonstrates the relation of Wolff’s system to actuality and what can be called 
his empirical or experimental ‘bent’: 
 
Physics gives the reason of those things which can occur 
through bodies… [General cosmology shows] that we cannot 
arrive at the ultimate reasons [rationes ultimas], but must be 
satisfied with reasons which are derived from proximate 
causes. Therefore, principles must be derived from 
experience, which can provide the reason of the things which 
occur. Since such principles are not always evident by 
observation, they must be brought to light by experiments.58 
 
This inability to arrive at the ultimate reasons of physical phenomena 
through derivations from General cosmology suggests that it is impossible, or 
at least scientifically impractical, to attempt to derive everything through 
syllogistic deduction from absolutely first principles. It also suggests, 
conversely, that experimentation, i.e. empirical investigation into reasons for a 
fact, can be informative for philosophical cognition of the fact and be 
undertaken scientifically. The reason for this is that knowledge of actual 
existence is a result of historical cognition. If philosophy is the ‘science of the 
possibles’ it will not concern itself with existence and actuality in the sense of 
investigating what actually is or occurs. The only way it will concern itself with 
existence and actuality is to the point of defining what existence is, or what 
actuality is. When dealing with sciences directly concerned with certain 
                                                        
57 DP, §94. 
58 DP, §107. 
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existing phenomena, especially in physics, experimentation, rather than 
deduction, is to play a crucial role.59 
 
It is important to note that Wolff here does not have in mind something 
resembling Kant’s qualitative distinction between understanding and 
sensibility, resulting in a Wolffian version of Kant’s empty thoughts and blind 
intuitions. There is no equivalently sharp distinction in Wolff. Possible 
concepts provided by metaphysics, which are themselves accessible through a 
priori demonstrations, are considered as presuppositions in more specialised 
sciences and are as such predicated of entities treated in more specialised 
sciences. If I am correct regarding Wolff, he does not rule out the possibility of 
deriving an actual existent from the a priori syllogistic relation of essences and 
possibilities. What he seems to be saying, however, is that this procedure is 
impractical. Regarding the previous quotation about experimental physics, 
Wolff warns that if experimental physics is to be undertaken, what was treated 
in it must again be treated in ‘dogmatic physics’, which is the “science of those 
things which are possible through bodies,” in order to “carefully and wisely 
acquire the complete certitude which we seek in philosophy.”60 Furthermore, 
when talking about practical philosophy Wolff claims that “there are general 
principles upon which every theory and practice of practical philosophy 
depend,” and he attempts to prove this claim by simply pointing out that there 
are such principles.61 However, he does say that there is an a priori proof of this, 
although it would be too difficult to provide it in the preliminary discourse 
since “such a proof presupposes things from ontology and psychology which 
are not known by the common man.”62 
 
                                                        
59 Wolff does suggest extending experimentation “to all the other parts of 
philosophy”, although the examples he gives refer only to ‘teleology’ and ‘moral and 
political philosophy’. See DP, §107n. 
60 DP, §110n. Today this would probably be understood as experimental physics and 
for Wolff it is likely to be more linked to syllogistic deduction than experiments. 
61 DP, §69. 
62 DP, §69n. 
 75 
Even if it is not ultimately possible for Wolff to derive the existence of 
an actual entity from a priori metaphysical principles (except in the case of 
God) Wolff’s inclusion of experimentation does not split the ground of 
scientific certainty into two heterogeneous methods. What it does is to 
perform two other functions. Firstly, since there is no sharp distinction 
between actuality and possibility (such as in Kantian sensibility and 
understanding) there is no need for a kind of Transcendental Deduction. To 
be actual is simply a state of possessing an additional predicate over and above 
those that make the thing what it is, that is, those that constitute its possibility. 
The sciences of possible predicates provide us with discoveries which are to be 
used in experimental sciences. Through experimental sciences, however, one 
can ‘glimpse’ the necessary structures or conditions of predication 
discoverable a priori in metaphysics, which then have to ground experimental 
findings in order to reach complete certainty. For Wolff, therefore, due to the 
lack of any qualitative distinction between what Kant will call understanding 
and sensibility there is no fear regarding the validity of our fundamental 
concepts (such as Kantian categories) if they are deduced legitimately, i.e. in a 
hierarchical syllogistic manner. Furthermore, there should be no fear of 
empirical nominalism towards universal concepts, i.e. of these concepts simply 
being Humean ‘habits’ of our thinking, since any experimental discovery 
should ultimately conform to the metaphysical discovery from which it 
borrows principles. Secondly, empirical observations are allowed to provide 
content for metaphysics and as such guide metaphysical investigations. This 
does not mean, however, that the metaphysical investigations derive their 
certainty from the empirical ones. What experimentation does is provide 
metaphysics with new content that needs to be explained. If we recall the 
distinction between historical and philosophical cognition, the empirical 
investigation can show that a certain branch of metaphysics needs an 
additional principle in order to fully explain an empirical discovery, but the 
final proof and explanation of the discovered phenomenon rests with the 
metaphysical inquiry into the order of possibility. If the experiment and 
observation ultimately cannot conform to the metaphysical structure, the 
problem is probably with the experiment.63 In fact, Wolff points out that 
                                                        
63 This allows Wolff to be less concerned than Kant with the possibility of a priori 
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experimentation provides an “intermediary level of knowledge between 
history and philosophy” which serves as “the proper preparation for the science 
of physics.”64 Remember that ‘science’ is a derivation from certain and 
immutable principles by a legitimate method. It seems unlikely that an 
‘intermediary’ stage of anything would provide one with certainty and 
immutability. 
 
This relates to what I have referred to as the ‘order of actuality’. Wolff 
does not provide a priori derivations of actually existing entities from the order 
of possibility (except in the case of God). Historical cognition of such entities, 
however, provides content for the science of possibility to inquire into; to 
investigate the reason why some entities are actual. Hence physics and 
practical philosophy become relevant as explanations of actuality. They 
depend on metaphysics in the order of possibility in order to reach ultimate 
certainty. However, we are more familiar with the objects of physics and 
practical philosophy than of metaphysics, since they feature prominently in 
our historical cognition.65 They are both at the same level of actuality, in the 
sense just referred to: they are the sciences which concern the phenomena we 
encounter in everyday life. Furthermore, they are at the same level of 
                                                                                                                                                      
concepts being ‘impure’. Furthermore, this license to use empirical observations and 
experiments to inform metaphysical investigations can be used to address a 
deficiency Hegel might see in Wolff’s system, namely that there is no immanent 
principles of derivation of metaphysical categories from one another. There is a valid 
way in which Wolff can reach a category B from a category A, but there does not seem 
to be a reason implicit in the category A itself which would make such a transition 
necessary. For this criticism see Hegel’s introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit 
and his concerns with the geometrical method. 
64 DP, §107. Emphasis mine. 
65 For this reason Wolff does not have to concern himself with Cartesian doubt. Actual 
entities are simply given and, as given, provide content for the investigation into their 
possibility. For example, the object of practical philosophy is either man qua man, or 
man qua citizen (DP, §63). Wolff is not worried about the possible, illusory society of 
coats and hats roaming the streets. 
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possibility since they do not borrow any principles from each other and as 
such they can both be treated “immediately after metaphysics.”66  
 
In the similar manner, questions about the actuality or existence within 
metaphysics will be relegated to what has become known as special 
metaphysics. These special metaphysical disciplines will treat of entities 
‘closer’ to the level of actuality, of those more familiar to us, or similarly, of 
entities understood through a more specific determination.67 The three 
‘special’ metaphysical disciplines, unlike the kinds of cognition, but similarly 
to non-metaphysical disciplines, are determined on the basis of the objects 
they treat. These objects are “the proper objects of philosophy”68 and are based 
on the three most abstract genera of an entity which we know to exist: God, 
human souls, and bodies or material things.69 The three sciences are, 
consequently, natural theology (“Science of those things which are known to 
be possible through God”), psychology (“The science of those things which are 
possible through human souls”), and general or transcendental cosmology 
(“Science of the world in general… The general understanding of the world 
which explains those things which are common to the existing world and any 
other possible world.”).70 
                                                        
66 DP, §§105-6. That is, if one is following a properly demonstrative method. 
Interestingly, regardless of this Wolff suggests treating of physics after practical 
philosophy, due to their relation to teleology. See DP, §106n. 
67 This is Baumgarten’s understanding of Wolff’s difference between actuality and 
possibility. For Baumgarten, an individually existing entity, or a “singular” is an entity 
understood in its “complete determination” meaning as the “collection of all 
determinations compossible in an entity,” (BM, §148). Since existence, for Wolff and 
Baumgarten, is a complement of essence of or possibility, an actually existing thing is 
the one which is completely determined with its essential predicates plus existence. 
Only in God, however, is existence an essential compossible, rather than an 
accidental, meaning that in every other entity the cause of existence will be something 
external to its essence. For a development of Baumgarten’s ‘complete determination’ 
from Wolff’s ‘complement of possibility’ see Gilson, 1952, p. 126. 
68 DP, §56n. 
69 DP, §§56-56n. 
70 DP, §§57-8, 78. 
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It is important to note that for Wolff these three sciences are based on 
the three genera of entities. This means that when considering an entity in 
abstracto it can be treated under one of the three general determinations. 
Furthermore, at the same place Wolff points out that these genera are here 
because we simply “know that they exist” and we do not know of any others 
which do exist.71 He does say, however, that there can be a derivation of them 
from prior principles, i.e. that these abstract genera of an entity are at the 
moment allowed here on the basis of our confused knowledge of them, but 
that there is a possibility and the desirability for discovering their certitude72, 
i.e. demonstrating them from more abstract principles.  In fact, the three 
disciplines themselves are not architectonically placed on the same level of 
possibility. The most abstract and indeterminate is general cosmology which 
borrows no principles from the other two, followed by psychology and 
ultimately, by natural theology. All three are, however, dependent on the 
‘higher’ discipline which investigates an entity qua entity, i.e. an entity at its 
lowest level of determination. This is first philosophy or ontology.73 
3. Philosophy and Ontology 
There are some things which are common to all entities [enti 
omni communia] and which are predicated both of souls and 
of natural and artificial bodies. That part of philosophy 
which treats of an entity in general [de ente in genere] and of 
the general affections of entities is called Ontology, or First 
philosophy.  Thus, ontology, or first philosophy is defined as 
the science of an entity in general, or insofar as it is an entity 
[scientia entis in genere, seu quatenus ens est].74 
 
                                                        
71 He, however, does not exclude the possibility of another, yet unknown genus of the 
same level of determination. 
72 DP, §56n. As one can see, these claims are drawn from the Discursus Praeliminaris 
which does not follow the proper demonstrative method, but is somewhat of a 
student’s guide to logic and metaphysics. 
73 DP, §99. 
74 DP, §73. Translation modified. Original emphasis. 
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From this we can find out that there is a science called first philosophy 
or ontology. It treats of general affections of entities qua entities, rather than 
entities understood as constituting a certain proper object of metaphysics 
(God, Souls, Universe), or as constituting a certain other realm of phenomena 
(e.g. moral or natural). In fact, this more abstract level of treating entities is 
presupposed by all other sciences since the object of ontology (i.e. an entity qua 
entity) is predicated of both psychology and general cosmology.75 They 
‘borrow principles from it’ in the sense that the objects of this first philosophy 
are predicates universally applicable to all specific metaphysical or scientific 
objects. Let us examine these characteristics in more detail. 
 
I have discussed earlier how for Wolff ontology is a part of 
metaphysics. Even today, this is not very surprising. There are several 
characteristics of Wolff’s ontology, however, which differ from the way 
ontology may be sometimes understood today. Firstly, for Wolff, ontology 
does not deal with a set of existing entities, either in a fundamental or in a 
specialised sense. Rather, it deals with a set of possible predicates, logically 
interconnected, applicable to any possible entity and presupposed in any 
possible scientific discipline. As such, it neither deals with existing entities 
through cataloguing them, nor concerns itself primarily with existence, 
besides defining what it is. As Wolff puts it: “The concept of an entity in 
general involves minimal existence, save the non-repugnancy of the existent, 
or, what is the same, the possibility of the existent.”76 Moreover, unlike 
Heidegger’s conception, ontology is not a science of Being [Seinswissenschaft]. 
What it deals with are the universal predicates of entities [die Seienden] in 
general. In contrast to how Heidegger conceives of the aim of Ontology in 
Being and Time, the task of Wolff’s ontology is not “to explain Being itself [die 
Explikation des Seins selbst] and to make the Being of entities stand out in full 
relief.” Moreover, and contra Heidegger’s conception, Wolff’s ontology is 
                                                        
75 Natural theology is curiously omitted here, although we have seen in the previous 
section that Wolff does consider it dependent not only on ontology, but also on 
psychology and general cosmology. 
76 WO §134n. For Wolff, repugnancy refers to something being self-contradictory. 
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“some definite philosophical discipline standing in interconnection with the 
others.”77  
 
In Ontologia, Wolff also addresses some uses of the term ontology prior 
to his. He informs the reader that “hardly is another name today more 
despised than the name of Ontology,” and that “after the sterile investigation 
of the Scholastics [this] very useful and fundamental part of philosophy has 
been left in contempt.”78 Unfortunately, Wolff does not specify any thinkers 
who have referred to ontology in this way, only stating that this was the fate of 
“Scholastic ontology” once Descartes excluded indistinct and obscure 
concepts from philosophy.79 Furthermore, he defends ontology from the 
charge of being a ‘lexicon of barbaric philosophy’, by which he means a text or 
an endeavour that simply explains or clarifies (ancient) philosophical terms. 
This label, Wolff claims, “brought ontology even more in contempt.”80 
Unfortunately, he does not refer to anyone who used this label, implying that 
it came about due to the fact that ontology uses highly abstract concepts whose 
names usually derive not from everyday terms, but from Latin expressions of 
which people are in general ignorant.81 
 
This general overview of the treatment of the term ‘ontology’ provides 
us with an insight more interesting than the one about the status the term 
enjoyed in 1730. What Wolff seems to be attempting to achieve with this 
overview is to identify ontology with first philosophy. The claims in which he 
refers to ontology falling into contempt are always preceded by the same 
description being applied to first philosophy. Wolff tends to characterise 
                                                        
77 See BT49/SZ27. This might not be very surprising since in the same paragraph 
Heidegger notes that “the method of ontology remains questionable in the highest 
degree as long as we merely consult those ontologies which have come down to us 
historically… Since the term “ontology” is used in this investigation in a sense which 
is formally broad, any attempt to clarify the method of ontology by tracing its history 
is automatically ruled out.” 
78 WO, §1n. 
79 WO, §7. 
80 WO, Preface, §§25-26n. 
81 WO, §26. 
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ontology and first philosophy in the same way. They were both prominent in 
Scholastic philosophy where they were badly utilized, both are necessary for a 
properly scientific philosophy, and both have fallen in disrepute after 
Descartes. Wolff does not explicitly claim that the Scholastics and the 
Cartesians used both terms interchangeably. What he is attempting to do 
instead is to identify the two, or more precisely, to identify first philosophy 
with ontology and show that the thinkers preceding him implicitly shared his 
identification without realising they were doing so, which caused them to run 
into mistakes.  
 
 Wolff’s identification of first philosophy and ontology, and the way he 
conceives of this primacy, might sound strange to a lot of philosophers today 
for various reasons. For example, Wolff’s identification of the two and the 
understanding of what such identification implies does not leave space for 
‘regional ontologies’ (e.g. an ontology of something). There is only one science 
of ontology, which deals with predicates common to all entities “either 
absolutely or under a specific condition” since it is “the science of the entity in 
general, or insofar as it is an entity.”82 Furthermore, the idea of the primacy of 
ontology of the kind noted above cannot be encountered very often in the 
philosophy of today. For Wolff, all other sciences are dependent on ontology 
in a sense that they borrow principles from it. This dependence is very strict, 
since “without ontology, philosophy cannot be developed according to the 
demonstrative method”83 or reach the certainty it aspires to. This is even 
                                                        
82 WO, §§1, 8. Wolff does differentiate between ‘natural ontology’ and ‘artificial 
ontology’, however, these are not two separate ontologies which treat of different 
regions of being or kinds of entities. In fact, ‘natural ontology’ is the name for 
“commonplace and confused ontological notions” while ‘artificial ontology’ is “a clear 
elaboration” of the natural ontology. What Wolff’s calls ‘artificial’ we would call 
‘formal’ since for him this distinction is analogous to his distinction between ‘natural 
logic’ which is our innate ability to reason and ‘artificial logic’ which is a scientific 
formalization of our innate ability (see WO §§21-24). In that vein, natural ontology is 
simply a phenomenon of ontological notions being used in everyday speech and 
artificial ontology is their systematization. 
83 DP, §73, WO, §6. 
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inclusive of mathematics which “owes all of its certainty to First Philosophy, 
from which it takes its first principles.”84  
 
What might be at the heart of a possible perplexity regarding Wolff’s 
identification of ontology with first philosophy today is the fact that the term 
ontology enjoys a wide usage, while the term and concerns about first 
philosophy might be deemed too archaic for civilised discourse. In Wolff’s 
time, however, the situation was the exact opposite. The significance of Wolff’s 
identification of first philosophy and ontology, seen even in the title of the 
work, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, is not aimed to emphasise the claim that 
ontology is first philosophy, but that first philosophy is ontology. As Wolff puts 
it: “the present work (…) contains First Philosophy in a completely new 
form.”85 The term first philosophy is significantly older than ontology, 
originating from Aristotle as a name for what now is referred to as Metaphysics. 
The term kept appearing, being utilised, and being discussed after Aristotle, 
sometimes as a synonym for metaphysics, something as a designation of 
something more specific than the term metaphysics might designate. Due to 
this, even the clear statement that first philosophy is not a synonym for, but a 
part of metaphysics is significant.86  
 
Wolff’s aim is to show that the proper conception of first philosophy is 
qua ontology, i.e. as the science of an entity in general. This leads to a certain 
conception of the relation of the philosophical disciplines with which anyone 
in academic philosophy is familiar today, namely, that metaphysics is a generic 
name for a set of more determinate disciplines defined by their subject-matter, 
such as ontology, mereology, aetiology, etc., but excluding disciplines such as 
ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of science, etc. So while Wolff’s 
                                                        
84 WO, Preface. Interestingly, Wolff does not subsume mathematics under his schema 
of a philosophical system. It is neither metaphysics, physics, or practical philosophy 
and its object is different from the one of metaphysics. See WO, §7. 
85 WO, Preface. 
86 I will be discussing this use in the next chapter. An interesting example of the 
interchangeableness of these terms can be seen in Descartes whose Meditationes de 
prima philosophia are originally translated into French as Méditations Métaphysiques. 
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conception of ontology differs from the ones encountered today, his 
conception of metaphysics, i.e. as a philosophical discipline with various 
subdivisions, is not very different. Wolff’s identification of first philosophy 
with ontology is therefore an attempt at establishing the relation between first 
philosophy and metaphysics and providing a way for engaging with them 
scientifically. But the identification of the two that Wolff provides is not only a 
normative one.  Wolff’s point is not merely that first philosophy should be 
understood as ontology. Through his vague historical references to the usage 
of first philosophy and ontology prior to him, and constant attempt to show 
that certain concepts and relations he derives are in accord with previous 
thinkers such as Descartes or Aristotle, Wolff is trying to show that first 
philosophy has always already been ontology, even though the thinkers 
engaging in it did not clearly realise this. The lack of this realisation was what 
led them to mistakes in judgment and to the positing of confused concepts. 
 
To identify first philosophy with ontology in the way Wolff does is to 
claim that the fundamental and paradigmatic metaphysical discipline is to be 
understood as “the science of the entity in general, or insofar as it is an 
entity?”87 For Wolff, this means that such a science “must demonstrate that 
which belongs to all entities either absolutely or under a certain given 
condition.”88 By a ‘given condition’ Wolff does not have in mind conditions 
covered by other, more specialised sciences. We are not here demonstrating 
what belongs to an entity conceived as “God” or “a Soul” or “a Physical body”. 
That will belong to special metaphysics. Ontology is concerned with that 
which applies to all entities qua entities. The issue is, however, that for Wolff 
not all of these characteristics can be possessed by all entities at the same time. 
He explains that by ‘given condition’ he means predicates such as ‘similar’ and 
‘dissimilar’ which “are to be explicated in Ontology and the general principles 
of similarity and dissimilarity derived from that.”89 To recapitulate, ontology 
will investigate that which applies to all entities absolutely, i.e. that which 
                                                        
87 WO, §1. 
88 WO, §8. 
89 WO, §8n. 
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follows from the definition of an entity.90 Besides these absolute 
characteristics, ontology will also treat of those characteristics which, in 
themselves, can apply to any entity whatsoever, but are not compossible, i.e. 
cannot belong to the same entity at the same time. Such characteristics are, for 
example, similar/dissimilar, but also simple/composite, or 
material/immaterial. 
 
 As can be seen from the opening quotation in this section, these 
characteristics of entities are not merely nominal. They really belong to any 
possible entity. But besides being characteristics they are also concepts or 
predicates, meaning that they perform the double function of serving as 
characteristics of entities themselves and as the structures by which we think 
and make judgments about entities. De Boer stresses this point very strongly, 
arguing that Wolff considers these two approaches to the task of ontology, the 
investigation into properties of entities qua entities, and the investigation into 
the grounds of our cognition, as amounting to the same thing. According to de 
Boer, ontology understood as a discipline concerned with pure concepts to be 
discovered by analysis makes it possible for us to achieve knowledge of entities 
through the use of it.91 In fact, the full title of the Ontologia expresses this 
‘epistemic’ characteristic: ontology is a science that “contains the principles of 
all human cognition.”92 This includes, but also goes beyond the idea that 
ontology contains the principles necessary for any subsequent science as has 
been previously described. What it suggests is that there is no qualitative 
difference between a way in which a thought of an entity is structured and the 
way in which the entity is structured in reality. This allows the possibility of an 
a priori, deductive, and therefore, for Wolff, analytic inference of the necessary 
structure of reality. As Fugate and Hymers put it:  
 
Ontology is the most important science since it is the key to 
practical success in all further sciences, morality, and 
                                                        
90 WO, §303. 
91 De Boer, 2011, p. 53n10. 
92 Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis 
humanæ principia continentur. 
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religion. This is because ontology is nothing other than the 
clear and distinct representation of the most general 
principles in human knowledge, i.e. the very laws of thought 
regarding beings. Now, since these are at the same time the 
most general principles of the beings thereby thought, a 
science of such concepts provides us with a complete 
conceptual scheme under which empirical experience, if it is 
to become philosophical knowledge or science, must be 
carefully and methodically subsumed… Since ontology 
concerns the most universal principles of beings, these are 
also present in every act of thought about a being.93 
As we have learned from Wolff’s ideas about philosophical cognition 
and scientific method, ontology cannot simply be a list or a catalogue of the 
predicates that belong to an entity as such. It also needs to address the reasons 
why such predicates are to be attributed to any possible entity. This is to be 
achieved a priori through the process of analysis: 
 
It does not suffice to invoke absolute or relative predicates [of 
an entity], but one has to specify the reason why these 
predicates belong to an entity, so that we are convinced a 
priori, that they are attributed to it by right and can always be 
attributed to it… By their development it is to be shown what 
is contained within them, so that we judge [that] the 
predicate cannot be separated from the concept of the 
subject.94 
This derivation and grounding of the predicates is to be undertaken by 
employing the two fundamental principles of ontology. These are the 
Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The two 
principles can be linked to Wolff’s very understanding of what philosophy is. 
                                                        
93 Fugate & Hymers, Introduction to BM, pp. 17-18. 
94 WO, Preface. 
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For Wolff, philosophy is “the science of the possibles insofar as they can be.”95 
What is possible is determined by the principle of contradiction, since what is 
self-contradictory is impossible. For Wolff, therefore, “what is impossible is a 
non-entity,”96 that is to say, “existence is repugnant,” to it. 97 Wolff explains 
that this repugnancy of existence does not refer to entities which do not 
actually exist, such as “fruits of a future summer”, or those which do not exist 
anymore such as corn that was eaten. In such entities existence is not 
repugnant. Instead, repugnancy of existence refers to “true non-entities [such 
as a] two-sided square and silver iron” for which “the possibility of existence is 
removed.”98 To say that existence is repugnant to something, therefore, means 
that such a thing cannot possibility exist since its conception would violate the 
law of contradiction. This shows that the fundamental way in which Wolff 
conceives of possibility is as logical possibility, i.e. as the absence of internal (or 
essential) contradiction. So for Wolff things are possible if they do not contain 
any internal contradiction. However, since the task of philosophy is not merely 
to show which predicates necessarily belong to any possible entity, but also 
why, and since existence is not an essential predicate of any entity but God, the 
principle of sufficient reason needs to be invoked to explain both why certain 
entities, as mere possibles, contain some predicates rather than other, and why 
certain entities actually exist. These questions will be answered scientifically, 
i.e. through two ‘certain and immutable principles’: those of contradiction and 
sufficient reason. 
 
For Wolff, the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason are self-
evident upon reflection, or as he puts it “we experience [them] as the nature of 
our mind.”99 The former provides an explanation of the reason for the mere 
possibility of something. The latter is involved in explaining the question ‘why’ 
                                                        
95 DP, §29. 
96 WO, §138. 
97 WO, §137. 
98 WO, §137n. 
99 WO, §§ 27, 74. I have discussed at multiple points above why for Wolff, unlike for 
Kant, this does not mean that they might not exist as the real relations beyond the 
nature of our mind, hence I will not repeat myself at this point. 
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of particular existences. This does not mean, however, that the principle of 
sufficient reason concerns only the order of actually existing entities and the 
reason why they are actual. As Hettche points out, Wolff interprets the 
principle of sufficient reason as applying “either to the realm of possibility or 
to the realm of actual reality… [a]s a definition of a thing’s essential nature… 
[or] serves to furnish the causes, or grounds, for why a real individual comes 
into actuality.”100 This is because for Wolff the principle of sufficient reason is 
involved in the cognition of an essence of something: “Essence is that which is 
conceived of an entity in the first place, and in which is to be found the 
sufficient reason why all the rest either actually belongs to it or is able to 
belong to it.”101 When the principle of sufficient reason serves as a ground of 
that which is able to belong to an entity, or as a “ground of the possibility of 
another,” it is understood as the ‘principle of being’ or principio essendi; when 
understood as an explanation for the actual existence of an entity it is 
understood as the ‘principle of becoming’ or principio fiendi.102  
 
The important aspect to point out, however, is that the principle of 
sufficient reason is itself reducible to the principle of contradiction. As Beck 
writes: 
 
The principle of sufficient reason is itself a consequence of 
the principle of non-contradiction (Ontologia §§66, 70). So 
whatever exists, exists necessarily. For anything (but God) 
this is an extrinsic necessity, but also a logical necessity (since 
it comes from non-contradiction)… [Wolff] often writes as if a 
false judgment were self-contradictory or reducible to a self-
contradiction, i.e., as if judgments were all analytic.103   
 
That being the case, the two fundamental principles which ontology 
discovers, the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of contradiction, 
                                                        
100 Hettche, 2016, §6. 
101 WO, §168. Translation modified from Hettche, 2016, §6. 
102 See WO, §874. 
103 Beck 1969, pp. 266; 264. 
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are ultimately reducible to the principle of contradiction, which constitutes the 
first principle of ontology and is necessary for the rest of it and any other 
science. 
 
I have, however, stated multiple times that the object of ontology is ‘an 
entity in general’. The understanding of this formula will be connected to the 
two principles. I have mentioned above how a non-entity is understood as 
something to which existence is ‘repugnant’ because it involves internal 
contradictions. This means that one characteristic of an entity qua entity will 
be its lack of internal contradictions, i.e. the non-violation of the principle of 
contradiction. But I have also quoted Wolff saying that the job of philosophy 
of an entity in general is not simply to invoke absolute or relative predicates of 
an entity in general, but that one has to specify the reason why these 
predicates belong to it. And the principle of contradiction provides one such 
explanation or reason, although not a very exciting one. The requirement that 
an entity, first and foremost, must be non-contradictory counts as a sufficient 
reason why something is an entity. In that vein, Wolff writes: 
 
What can exist, and consequently, that to which existence is 
not repugnant, is called an entity.  
 
Therefore, a blossoming tree in a garden is an entity, which 
actually exists, and free from care, [about] what could exist: 
not any less is true [that] the tree still concealed in a seed is an 
entity, on account of that it grows from the seed united with 
the earth, and truly it prevails to exist. Similarly, an acute 
rectilinear triangle, which is traced on the paper, is an entity, 
which actually exists; equally, a triangle which can be traced, 
is an entity, on the account of that it can exist, when it is first 
drawn… The temperature of the stone can exist, and so it is 
an entity, not as actually existing, but because existence is not 
repugnant to it. The concept of an entity in general involves 
 89 
minimal existence, save the non-repugnancy of the existent, 
or, what is the same, possibility of the existent.104 
 
Hence an entity as such is defined through its possibility or non-
contradictory nature. Whatever is possible, in a sense of their essences not 
being contradictory, is an entity. 
 
Now, “that which is conceived of an entity in the first place, and in which is to 
be found the sufficient reason why all the rest either actually belongs to it or else may 
belong to it” is called an ‘essence’.105 Wolff claims this definition to be derived a 
priori.106 Essence, therefore, is what contains the sufficient reason for 
something, either as principio fiendi or essendi. From what has been mentioned 
before, we can see that these two versions of the principle of sufficient reason 
primarily depend on the principle of non-contradiction. If one is to conceive of 
something as an entity, but try to include a characteristic that is repugnant to 
another characteristic, the two characteristics could not belong to an entity 
either actually or possibly. In fact, for Wolff, the essences of things are 
absolutely necessary and he argues for it on the ground of their non-
repugnance: 
 
The essences of things are absolutely necessary. The essences of 
things are constituted by the non-repugnance of those things 
that are together in the same thing… Now, since it is 
impossible for the same thing to be and also not to be, it is 
likewise not possible for those same things that taken 
together are not mutually repugnant to each other – although 
they are not reciprocally determined per se, nor determined 
through any other – to be mutually repugnant to each other. 
This non-repugnance is therefore necessary and 
consequently the essences of things are necessary.107 
                                                        
104 WO, §§134-134n. 
105 WO, §169. Translation modified from Gilson 1952, p. 116. 
106 See WO, §169n. 
107 WO, §229. Translation from Fugate & Hymers, Introduction to BM, p. 119n. 
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In addition to the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason, 
definitions of entity, essence, and existence, Wolff’s Ontologia will attempt to 
provide an a priori proof of numerous other principles and formulate various 
definitions. These include the principle of the excluded middle, the notions of 
a singular and universal entity, quantity, quality, order, simple and composite 
entity, cause, existence, etc. These are understood as predicates predicable of 
any possible entity and utilised in any subsequent science. They are likewise 
real, not in the sense that ontology demonstrates that they do belong to any 
particular, existing entity, but in the sense that they apply necessarily, in a 
non-nominal sense, to any possibly existing entity. Historical cognition will 
provide us with the fact of there being entities at all which are then to be 
explained by these predicates. General cosmology can now begin. 
4. Wolff's  Conception of Ontology 
Ontology is first and foremost to be understood as a science. This 
means that it is a ‘habit’ of inferring conclusions from certain and immutable 
principles by a legitimate sequence. It is a philosophical science, which means 
that these conclusions will be explanations of the question why something is 
or can be. It is the first part of metaphysics; in fact it is both first philosophy 
and first science. It provides us with ‘certain and immutable principles’ that 
any other science is supposed to use. It treats of entities in general. For Wolff, 
this means that it attempts to discover necessary predicates predicable of any 
possibly existing entity. It is an a priori science and proceeds through the 
demonstrative method. The demonstrative method orders everything so “that 
those things must come first through which later things are understood and 
established.”108 This method proceeds through syllogistic inference and 
conceptual analysis grounded in the principles of contradiction. Ontology 
does not concern itself with listing a set of existing entities (fundamental or 
otherwise), but in fact, looks for necessary predicates of any possible entity. As 
such, it is fully concerned with possibility, rather than actuality. 
 
                                                        
108 DP, §134n. 
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Ontology exemplifies the double primacy of metaphysics. It contains, 
as its subtitle states, “principles of the whole human cognition.” As such, 
ontological principles ground any other possible scientific discipline whose 
principles depend on ontological principles from which these post-ontological 
principles derive their certainty. Moreover, since fundamental ontological 
principles, the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason, are clearly and 
distinctly accessible to us through reflection, there is nothing preventing 
philosophy from beginning by positing them. Philosophy can, and ideally 
should, begin with ontology. As such, ontology is first in the order of knowing. 
Moreover, these predicates exemplify actual characteristics of actually 
existing, mind-independent entities, the things-in-themselves. As such, 
ontology is first in the order of nature, since there are no possible 
characteristics of entities which would be more general than the ones found in 
ontology, or which would ground ontological characteristics of entities (unlike 
the case of, e.g., physical or psychological characteristics of entities). 
 
These are the characteristics of Wolff’s ontology and, due to everything 
said before regarding its history, the characteristics of what can be considered 
the original (or at least traditional) conception of ontology. To some, if not many, 
who consider themselves to be ontologists today, it might look unrecognisable 
in comparison with what they understand by this term. However, it was fairly 
familiar to the thinkers within German philosophy who succeeded Wolff. 
When they refer to ‘ontology’, this conception is what they have in mind.  
 
The name and the conception of ontology have hence come together 
and we are ready to step forward. But I first need to take a step back. 
Chapter Three: History of the conception 
1. The Prehistory of Ontology 
 
The previous chapter completed the history of the name ‘ontology’ by 
explaining the conception of a philosophical discipline so named at the point 
of its entry into the mainstream philosophical lexicon. Throughout the history 
of philosophy there have been various conceptions of philosophical 
disciplines that resembled or enabled the formulation of the discipline that 
becomes known as Ontologia by the time of Wolff. In this chapter, I intend to 
follow the history of the conception of ontology, i.e. the history of the 
philosophical, rather than philological changes, which led to ontology the way 
Wolff conceived of it.  
 
In the previous chapter I discussed how Wolff identified ontology with 
Primary Philosophy. While the latter term tended to be used around Wolff’s 
time as a synonym for metaphysics, the significance of Wolff regarding the use 
of this terminology lies in his identification of Primary Philosophy with the 
investigation into ‘an entity insofar it is an entity’ [ens quatenus ens est]. If a 
discipline is conceived in this manner, then it corresponds to the way Primary 
Philosophy was conceived by Aristotle, who was the first to formulate it as a 
science of an entity qua entity [to on hē(i) on].1 This proximity of the 
conceptions of Primary Philosophy of Wolff and Aristotle demands a 
comparison between their respective conceptions of Primary Philosophy, as 
well as an attempt to uncover in what way the historical reception of 
Aristotelian metaphysics has led to the way Primary Philosophy was 
conceptualised by Wolff. The latter question will be addressed through 
following what I have earlier deemed the ‘Aristotelian ambiguity’, which refers 
to the claim that the object, which according to Aristotle, Primary Philosophy 
                                                        
1 I translate both ens and to on as ‘entity’ due to their morphological equivalence as 
present active participle forms of esse and einai respectively. What an entity is and 
what it means to investigate it will be different for Wolff and Aristotle, however, I do 
not find that this impacts the way these terms are translated or referred to in English.  
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is supposed to investigate, is ambiguous, possibly even contradictory.   
 
Wolff’s philosophy, especially today when it is mostly invoked in 
contrast to Kant’s, tends to be referred to as the “Leibniz-Wolff tradition”. This 
categorisation arose very early on, indeed early enough to be disliked by both 
Wolff and Leibniz.2 Wolff himself claimed that he learned more from Aquinas 
than Leibniz and saw himself as someone who belonged to and was engaging 
in modifying the Suarezian philosophical tradition.3 Due to this, I will include 
a discussion of Aquinas’ philosophy in this chapter. Focusing for a moment on 
the philosophy of Aquinas will allow me further specify the trajectory the 
conception of Primary Philosophy took after Aristotle, on its way to Wolff. 
Moreover, it will allow me to explicate the idea of the ‘double primacy of 
metaphysics’ which I have been using, as well as provide some context to 
certain non-ontological, rationalist systems of metaphysics which arose 
around the times of Wolff’s conception of ontology.  
2. Aristotle’s Protē  Philosophia 
 
Let us recall that for Wolff the terms ‘Philosophia Prima’ and  ‘Ontologia’ 
referred to the highest branch of metaphysics. This presents any attempts at 
the comparison of the two thinkers with a glaring difficulty generated by the 
fact that the terms ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’ were completely unknown to 
Aristotle. As I have shown previously, we know of no appearance of the term 
Ontologia prior to Lorhard’s brief use in Ogdoas Scholastica of 1606. Moreover, 
Aristotle’s ignorance of the term ‘metaphysics’ forms such an unavoidable part 
of any introduction to Aristotle’s philosophy that it might not even be worth 
repeating here.4 These two observations, trite as they may be, still allow us to 
                                                        
2 Beck p. 257. 
3 Beck pp. 257, 259. 
4 One commonly shared story which might be interesting to question is that the name 
has its origins in Andronicus of Rhodes’ placement of the work in the library of 
Alexandria after the work on nature – meta ta physika. Owens (1963, p. 74) disputes this 
claim, but argues in favour of the idea that the prefix ‘meta’ signifies the fact that the 
philosophical work Metaphysics undertakes comes after the Physics in the doctrinal 
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draw attention to the need for caution when undertaking this sort of a 
historical comparison. Beyond the fact that the two thinkers do not use the 
same ‘Aristotelian’ terms (in this case due to the fact that some of these terms  
– such as metaphysics – were unknown to Aristotle while the others – such as 
substance – are Latin interpretations), another danger lies in the fact that for 
Wolff Primary Philosophy can be seen as a part of something called 
Metaphysics, whereas for Aristotle such a classification would be something 
rather alien. The terminology of his time allows the use of terms such as 
‘ontology’ or ‘metaphysics’ and further discussion of their relations, e.g. as 
parts of a whole. Moreover, Wolff’s use of the terms ontology and metaphysics, 
as well as his positing of the relations that hold between them, is underpinned 
by centuries of Aristotelian interpretation, and by the new conceptions of 
science and systematic approach to knowledge arising from Early Modern 
thought and Enlightenment. Aristotle’s texts were written with altogether 
different baggage behind them.  
 
One reason I see this as important to point out is to stress that the aim 
of this chapter is not to try to argue for or against the claim that Aristotle’s 
work can be considered ‘ontological’ or that it is ‘an ontology’. Since I have 
decided to investigate how Aristotle’s philosophy ultimately enables Wolff’s 
Ontologia to come about, how Wolff develops from Aristotle/Aristotelianism, 
the answer to the question whether Aristotle’s Primary Philosophy is ontology 
à la Wolff is a trivial ‘no’. I will, throughout this chapter, make the reader 
aware of the differences between the two systems, however my aim is not 
ultimately to show whether Aristotle is an ‘ontologist’ or whether his work 
could be called an ontology.5 For these reasons I will avoid referring to the 
terms ‘ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’ (except when referring to the text) in my 
                                                                                                                                                      
sequence, while also referring to its treatment of issues which lie beyond the physical 
order. This interpretation is shared by Aquinas in De Trinitate, pars 3, q.5, a. 1, co. 
5 It has not been uncommon to claim that there is an ‘ontological’ component in 
Aristotle’s philosophy, or that Aristotle is at heart an ‘ontologist’. These concepts were 
mostly posited as contrasting terms in order to distinguish what commentators have 
seen as the (Neo-)Platonic elements present in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in contrast to 
‘purely’ or ‘properly’ Aristotelian elements. See Owens, 1963, pp. 16, 51-66. 
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discussions of Aristotle and instead focus on what is present in his text: Protē 
Philosophia. 
 
The term Aristotle uses to describe the work undertaken in the 
Metaphysics is Protē Philosophia or Sophia – Primary Philosophy or Wisdom.6 A 
wise man, according to Aristotle, knows all things [epistasthai panta], although 
not each of them individually.7 What kind of philosophy can elevate one to the 
state of understanding everything? If there is such a philosophy it should truly 
be called Primary, if this honorific is to be based on the universality of 
understanding which it would provide to the one engaged in it. In order to 
achieve this goal, this Primary Philosophy will be the one which investigates 
an entity qua entity [to on hē(i) on]. More specifically, in Aristotle’s terms, 
Primary Philosophy will investigate an entity as an entity [theōrei to on hē(i) on] 
and the attributes [kai ta toutō(i) hyparchonta] which belong to it in itself [kath’ 
hauto].8 We can phrase this as an investigation into what anything is simply in 
virtue of the fact that it is. If conceived in this way, Primary Philosophy achieves 
the universality required for its primary status by not confining itself to any 
particular sense, or way of being, of an entity, beyond the most general one, 
the one belonging to an entity qua entity. This sets it apart from other sciences. 
In a certain way, all sciences investigate entities [ta onta], their causes and 
principles. However, unlike Primary Philosophy, they all mark off some 
particular kind of an entity, some genus, and confine their theorizing to one 
such class of entities.9 For example, the science of nature deals with things 
which are inseparable from matter but are not immovable, while some parts of 
                                                        
6 Metaphysics 1, 1.981b29; Ibid. 4, 2.1004a35.  
7 Metaphysics 1, 2.982a7-9. Arguing for a different point, Kosman (2013, p. ix) points out 
that the scholarship on Aristotle benefited from reading epistēmē as understanding 
rather than knowledge. If we adopt this practice the claim that the wise man has a 
general understanding of all things, while not having a technical, particular, or 
specialized knowledge of all possible topics becomes more intuitive than what might 
be seen as a strange state of knowing all things, but none of them individually. This 
should, however, not necessarily be seen as parallel to Wolff’s distinction between 
kinds of cognition. 
8 Metaphysics 4, 1.1003a20-1. 
9 Metaphysics 6, 1.1025b7-10. 
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mathematics, according to Aristotle, deal with things which are immovable, 
but embodied in matter.10 Primary Philosophy, on the other hand, investigates 
entities themselves, and what belongs to them qua entities. It will be free from 
the limitations of the species and genera under which entities can ultimately 
be categorized. 
 
…[T]he attributes of this [entity] in so far as it is an entity 
[he(i) on] (…)  it is the business of no other science [epistēmēs] 
than philosophy to investigate; for to physics [physikē(i)] one 
would assign the study of things not qua entity [ouch hē(i) 
onta], but rather qua sharing in movement; while dialectics 
and sophistry deal with the attributes of things that are, but 
not of things qua an entity, and not with an entity itself in so 
far as it is an entity.11 
 
At this initial and general point there seems to be little difference 
between the conception of Aristotle’s Protē Philosophia and Wolff’s Philosophia 
Prima. Both are conceived to be a science of an entity qua entity, different from 
any other science due to the object of their investigation: an entity in its most 
universal sense. For both, this exemplifies one sense of primary in “Primary” 
Philosophy. It is the science that treats of the nature of an object, which, while 
discussed in other sciences, is not by them understood as it is in itself, but as it 
is under a certain determination.  
 
There is another reason this science deserves to be called primary and 
this is also shared between Aristotle and Wolff. This concerns the fact that it 
comes ‘before’ other sciences in the order of nature, or that other sciences 
somehow depend on it. In the quotation I have provided above, Aristotle 
asserts that one difference between Primary Philosophy and other sciences is 
                                                        
10 Metaphysics 6, 1.1026a10. 
11 Metaphysics 11, 3.1061b4-9. Original emphasis. Modified. The term episteme which I 
have talked about as knowledge or understanding is now used in a way in which the 
word ‘science’ would be used today and this translation can be found in both Ross’ 
and Tredennick & Armstrong’s translation. 
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that the other sciences focus on a specific way of being of an entity, while 
Primary Philosophy, or Wisdom, investigates an entity qua entity. Shortly 
afterwards,12 Aristotle uses this observation to conclude that due to this, both 
mathematics and physics should be seen as “subdivisions” or “parts” [merē] of 
this “Primary Science” [tēn de prōtēn epistēmēn] which is called Wisdom. 
 
This claim is very similar to Wolff’s idea, at least to the extent that 
Primary Philosophy for both thinkers forms a kind of scientific primacy on 
which other sciences are dependent. Wolff’s idea, however, is not the same as 
Aristotle’s. Aristotle is not clear about how this part-whole relation between 
mathematics, physics, and Primary Philosophy is supposed to be understood. 
For Wolff, on the other hand, Physics and Mathematics (as sciences) could not 
be called ‘parts’ of his Primary Philosophy (or of Ontologia). For Wolff other 
sciences depend for their scientific grounding on the discoveries of Primary 
Philosophy but it would be wrong to look at them as forming some sort of a 
part-whole relationship. What they do is employ concepts and predicates 
ultimately provable only by Primary Philosophy. And this constitutes the 
second difference between Wolff and Aristotle on this topic. While for Wolff, 
Primary Philosophy investigates universal predicates of thought which apply to 
both to the way thought and reality operate, this position does not seem to be 
shared by Aristotle. In Wolff ens operates as the most universal predicate, as a 
genus, and the investigation into ens qua ens will reveal the structure of this 
predicate as well as any other possible predicates which can, or have to, be 
combined with ens according to the principles of sufficient reason, non-
contradiction, etc. For Aristotle, to on, and the investigation into its nature, will 
prove to be something different from the investigation of the emptiest of 
concepts and predicates. In order to gain a deeper understanding of how 
exactly the science of to on is supposed to proceed and how other sciences are 
to follow from it we need to focus on what could be considered to be Aristotle’s 
method. 
 
                                                        
12 Metaphysics 11, 4. 
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2.  1 .  Aristotelian method of equivocation 
 
 Two facts, on which Aristotle insists, will be familiar to any reader of 
Aristotle. The first is that for Aristotle ‘an entity’ is not and cannot be a genus.13 
The second is that “entity” (although not just “entity) is “said in many ways” – 
“to on legetai pollachōs.”14 Both claims have a significant impact on how Primary 
Philosophy is able to proceed in its investigation of an entity qua entity. 
 
 I will not go into details of Aristotle’s argument for to on not being a 
genus. Any interested reader is invited to consult the book 3 of the Metaphysics 
(along with innumerable secondary texts on the topic). For my purposes, 
however, the ‘correctness’ of Aristotle’s assertion that to on is not a genus is less 
important than the consequence of it for the procedure of Primary Philosophy: 
 
In so far as we know each thing by its definition [eidōn], and 
the genera are the principles of definitions, the genera must 
also be the principles of definable things. And if to get the 
knowledge of entities [kan ei esti tēn tōn ontōn labein epistēmēn] 
is to get the knowledge of the species according to which they 
are named, the genera are at least starting‐points of the 
species.15 
 
 If to on is not a genus then there cannot be a species according to which 
it is so named. If, moreover, in order to define something the thing in question 
has to fall within a certain relation of genus and species then we are left with 
                                                        
13 Metaphysics 3, 3.998b23. 
14 Physics 1, 2.185a22; Metaphysics 4, 2.1003a33, b5; Metaphysics 7, 1.1028a10. Also 
Metaphysics 5, 11.1019a5, although pollachōs here refers to to einai, rather than to on. 
15 Metaphysics 3, 3.998b4-8. Slightly modified Ross translation. The actual aim Aristotle 
seems to have in this section seems to be to show that eidos, which can be translated as 
either species or form, exemplifies these two distinct senses. Hence, ho logos tēs ousias 
will be different from tōn genōn horismos. Cf. Ibid. 3.998b10-13. Later in the Metaphysics 
(8, 1.1042a19) we are told that a “definition is a formula” [epei de ho horismos logos], but 
as we have seen here, this will refer to a different kind of definition than the genetic-
specific one. 
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two options. The first is that we cannot know the nature of an entity qua entity, 
since to know something is to know it through a definition, and since ‘an 
entity’ is not a genus it cannot be talked or thought about in the context of 
genera and species. The second option is to look for a way to understand an 
entity qua entity that would be different from the definitional, genus-species 
model of knowing. Aristotle proceeds with the latter option and to understand 
how he conceives of it one must first understand the idea of pros hen 
equivocation. 
 
 Let me start by explaining what Aristotle means by equivocals or 
equivocation.  Aristotle’s explanation can be found in the Categories: 
 
When things have only a name [onoma] in common and the 
definition of being [logos tēs ousias] which corresponds to the 
name is different, they are called homonymous [homōnyma]. 
Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals... for 
if one is to say what to be an animal is [to zō(i)ō(i) einai] for 
each of them, one will give two distinct definitions... When 
things have the name in common and the definition of being 
which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called 
synonymous [synōnyma]... for example, both a man and an ox 
are animals... for if one is to give the definition of each – what 
to be an animal is for each of them – one will give the same 
definition [ton auton logon apodōsei].16 
  
Several points have to be made before proceeding. Firstly, the terms 
Aristotle employs are synonym and homonym, rather than univocal and 
equivocal. Since the latter terms are Latin, this is not at all surprising. I will, 
however, following Owens, favour the use of the terms ‘univocal’ and 
‘equivocal’ since, as he points out, it is a more common practice today to use 
the Greek pair of terms to designate relations between words and concepts, 
while for Aristotle, particularly in the context of the Metaphysics, they are 
                                                        
16 Categories, 1.1a1-12. Translation slightly modified. 
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intended to designate relations between things.17 The second point I wish to 
make is that Aristotle, in the section just quoted, explains equivocity and 
univocity through its relation to a different or shared definition. Since I have 
interpreted Aristotle as ruling out any attempt to answer the question of the 
nature of an entity qua entity through the definitional route it seems puzzling 
how the employment of equivocity, if it is to be solely understood through its 
reference to a common definition, can help to answer such a question. The 
solution lies in the conception of pros hen equivocity. 
 
Pros hen equivocity, literally equivocity “towards/according to/in 
reference to one” stands for the relation between equivocals which share a 
reference towards a common single nature or way of being.18 The referent, as 
seen from Aristotle’s description of this relation in the Metaphysics, does not 
have to be towards the same definition. In fact, Aristotle explains that things are 
related as pros hen equivocals when they are united through a reference to a 
single thing, or a way of being, which possesses, or exemplifies, the nature in 
question in the primary sense. Hence: 
 
Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in 
the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it 
produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of 
health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is 
medical is relative to the medical art, one thing in the sense 
that it possesses it, another in the sense that it is naturally 
adapted to it, another in the sense that it is a function of the 
medical art...19  
  
For each of these [terms, i.e. medical and healthy] also we use 
in many senses [pollachōs legomen]; and each is used in this 
way because the former refers somehow to medical science 
                                                        
17 Owens 1963, p. 112. 
18 Other kinds of Aristotelian equivocity that I will not go into are: accidental [kata 
symbebēkos], analogical, and equivocity due to a common origin [aph’henos]. 
19 Metaphysics 4, 2.1003a33-b4. 
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and the latter to health. Other terms refer to other things, but 
each term refers to some one thing. For a prescription and a 
knife are called medical because the former proceeds from 
medical science, and the latter is useful to it. And a thing is 
called healthy in the same way; one thing because it is 
indicative of health, another because it is productive of it.20 
 
 Kosman provides a useful clarification:21 urine, exercise, and medicine 
can all be called ‘healthy’, but not in the same sense. What it is for urine to be 
healthy is different from what it is for exercise to be healthy. But something 
still unites them. Healthy urine is indicative of health, exercise contributes to 
and maintains health, and medicine produces or restores it. What unites them is 
the fact that they are all called ‘healthy’ in relation to a single [pros hen], 
primary sense of being healthy: to the health of an animal, or to an animal’s 
being healthy. Importantly, these instances of the derivative senses of ‘healthy’ 
are not in themselves, or according to their own nature [kath’ hauto], united by 
falling under the same genus. Urine, exercise, and medicine are entities or 
things with their own individual natures and definitions, and in themselves 
they are not related as different species belonging to the same genus as, for 
example a man and an ox both belonging to the genus ‘animal’.22 Neither are 
they related in the way members of the same species are. Their relation 
consists in their equivocal reference to a paradigm instance of the equivocal 
term, in this case a healthy animal. The reference is equivocal because of the 
way in which every other instance besides the paradigm one is different from 
the paradigm one. This equivocity is pros hen – according to one – since the 
equivocal senses are related to the one paradigm sense in a derivative and 
functional way (e.g. producer, restorer, indicator, etc.). To understand what 
                                                        
20 Metaphysics 11, 3.1060b35-1061a6. 
21 Kosman 2013, p.8. 
22 Aristotle even suggests that the aim of Primary Philosophy is to provide the solution 
to the problem “as to how there can be one science of several things which are 
different in genus” (Metaphysics 11, 3.1061b17-18. Trans. Tredennick & Armstrong). If 
pros hen approach does not concern itself with the genus-species structure and can 
point to a unity independent of it, this presents Aristotle with a possible solution. 
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'health' or 'healthy' is, one needs to understand the nature of the paradigm 
instance, in this case the health of an animal. This is where the proper nature 
of health resides; its primary instance, where health qua health can be found. 
This can be reached through tracking equivocal instances through things we 
call ‘healthy’ and, once the investigation is complete, it allows us to posit the 
science of health which will be able to treat across the equivocal instantiations 
of it regardless of the genus or species of things in which these instances are 
found. 
 
 To on, an entity, just like ‘healthy’ is “said in many ways” and Aristotle 
sees the approach of treating it as a pros hen equivocal as a proper way to 
investigate an entity qua entity: 
 
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’ [to 
de on legetai men pollachōs], but they are related to one certain 
point [pros hen], a single nature [mian tina physin]… 
Everything which is healthy is related to health… And that 
which is medical is relative to the medical art… And we shall 
find other words used similarly to these.23  
 
In a later part of the Metaphysics Aristotle reintroduces this relation: 
 
Since the science of the philosopher treats of an entity qua 
entity universally and not of some part of it [tou ontos hē(i) on 
katholou kai ou kata meros], and ‘an entity’ has many senses [to 
d’ on pollachōs (…) legetai] and is not used in only one (…) if it is 
used in virtue of some common nature, it will fall under one 
science. The term seems to be said in the way we have 
mentioned, like ‘medical’ and ‘healthy’.24  
 
                                                        
23 Metaphysics 4, 2.1003a33-b4. Translation slightly modified from Ross who translates 
mian tina physin as “a definite kind of thing.” 
24 Metaphysics 11, 3.1060b31-6. A careful reader will notice that I omit an interesting 
claim by Aristotle which appears in the same parts of the text I quote here in order to 
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 If entity is to be treated of in a manner of a pros hen equivocal this shows 
another difference between Wolff’s and Aristotle’s conception of Primary 
Philosophy. Ens is, for Wolff, ultimately univocal. If something is to be called 
an entity it will be so in the same manner as any other, whether we are talking 
about God, man, or anything in between. For Aristotle, if the investigation into 
to on stands parallel to the investigation into ‘healthiness’, there should be a 
certain hierarchy, or at least plurality of the ways in which something is not 
only called entity, but also of the ways something is an entity. Exercise is 
healthy qua producer of health in an animal, while an animal is that which 
exemplifies the nature of health in itself. If we follow this comparison between 
health and to on further, we can also infer that there should be, for Aristotle, 
some specific entity which serves as a paradigm case uniting the equivocal 
nature of to on. Such a requirement, or anything of that kind, is absent from 
Wolff. 
 
  Another difference between Wolff and Aristotle that is relevant here, 
and which will provide us with an indication as to why Aristotle sees the 
                                                                                                                                                      
support the idea that to on is a pros hen equivocal. The claim is, simply put, that being 
is not said equivocally (11, 3.1060b33 – ei men oun homōnymōs; 4, 2.1003a34 – kai ouch 
homōnymōs). With respect to this aporia I follow Owens, who claims that in this 
paragraph homōnymōs, which Aristotle urges us not to consider being to be, refers to 
things which are totally equivocal, i.e. equivocals of the kind of the bank or the dog 
star. I will not present Owens’ argument here, but it is important to point out that he 
argues for this through the appeal to the “equivocal nature of equivocity itself” 
(Owens 1963, pp. 121-2). Another interesting fact Owens points to in the same 
discussion (Ibid, pp. 124-5) is that the pros hen type of equivocals are not called 
“analogous” by Aristotle, but that such denomination of them was common in the 
subsequent Scholastic tradition. While, Owens argues, these two kinds of equivocity 
are not mutually exclusive, they are clearly distinct. To distinguish them simply, pros 
hen is a two-term (knife is medical as a tool, prescription is medical as a product) while 
analogy is a four-term relation (cf. ibid, p. 123: “As the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the 
shameless man to his victim”). Owens does not speculate about the reasons why the 
tradition took over the name analogy to render pros hen, but we could assume that it 
might owe to the tradition’s not sharing the thought Owens expresses by his claim 
that homōnymōs legetai pollachōs. 
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method of investigation through equivocals as a legitimate philosophical 
method, concerns what I have, in previous chapters, referred to as the ‘double 
primacy of metaphysics’. To recapitulate, I have used the phrase ‘double 
primacy of metaphysics’ to refer to an attempt to posit a philosophical 
discipline which will be ‘primary’ in the order of nature and in the order of 
knowledge. It should be clear from the previous section that for Aristotle 
Primary Philosophy is supposed to stand first in the order of nature. It is 
supposed to discuss the nature of an entity qua entity, and the objects of other 
sciences are dependent on the results of its investigations. However, is it 
primary in the order of knowledge? In one sense it is. If we understand the 
primacy of knowledge as grounded in a discipline that reaches certain 
knowledge that is the most general then this is what Primary Philosophy is 
supposed to be. However, if we look at the primacy of knowledge from the 
perspective of the order of method, then the situation seems different. 
 
 Aristotle opens the Physics with the claim that if the object of an inquiry 
has principles, causes, or elements, knowledge and understanding [to eidenai 
kai to epistasthai] of the object will be achieved through the acquaintance with 
these principles, causes, or elements. 25 What Aristotle calls the natural way of 
attaining such knowledge is to “start from the things which are more knowable 
and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more 
knowable by nature [tē(i) physei].” Since the same things “are not knowable 
relatively to us and knowable without qualification” we must “advance from 
what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear 
and more knowable by nature.” 
 
The Metaphysics26 expresses a similar thought. “[L]earning proceeds,” 
Aristotle stresses, “for all in this way – through that which is less intelligible by 
nature [physei] to that which is more intelligible [by nature] (...) so it is our 
work to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what is 
intelligible by nature intelligible to oneself... [O]ne must start from that which 
is barely intelligible but intelligible to oneself, and try to understand what is 
                                                        
25 Physics 1, 1.194a10-21. 
26 Metaphysics 7, 3.1029b1-12. 
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intelligible in itself, passing (...) by way of those very things which one 
understands.”27 
 
 This can be understood as Aristotelian ‘induction’. For Aristotle, the 
science of metaphysics will not take the course of an a priori deduction in the 
style of Wolff or Spinoza. Aristotle’s method cannot start from certain 
universal principles and deductively proceed towards the particular. For him, 
the procedure is reversed. As Owens writes: “Unlike Parmenides, and to a 
lesser degree Plato, [Aristotle] does not commence by taking a ‘one’ and asking 
how it can be many. He is taking a ‘many’ and asking how it can be one.”28 The 
answer to the question of unity in plurality will be some form of pros hen unity 
exemplified in the primary instance of the object in question. And this is 
possible since the scientific inquiry is supposed to start from what is given, 
from sensible particulars and existing linguistic practices. For Aristotle, if a 
group of words exemplifies pros hen equivocity there is something in their 
nature which grounds this. In this sense there is no primacy in knowledge 
from the perspective of method in Aristotle. What we begin from in knowledge 
is not itself primary in knowing. We have to reach that which is primary by 
starting from what is immediately clear to us. We have to begin, and it is 
legitimate to begin, from the particulars. This however, as Owen points out, is 
not to proceed through abstraction from sensible things, as mathematics 
would do, but is in fact a demonstration through effects.29 Since science is 
ultimately an investigation into causes and principles, the knowledge of these 
causes can be, and has to be, ‘reverse-engineered’ from the effects of these 
causes that are found in the world.  
 
 By the methodological order, it is important to point out, I do not mean 
merely pedagogical order. This is not the question of how philosophical 
                                                        
27 In Scholasticism this will be called a philosophical order and contrasted with the 
theological order of inquiry. See Aquinas, De Trinitate, Prooemium; Gilson 1961, p. 22; 
Wippel 1984, p. 124 & 2000, p. xxvii. 
28 Owens 1963, p. 460. Kosman (2013, p. 111) contemplates whether Aristotle’s thought 
in general is rooted in or influenced by his earlier endeavours in biological thinking. 
29 Owens 1963, p. 26. 
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doctrine is supposed to be taught after it has been investigated and discovered, 
but what a proper method of discovery in science is. In Wolff one can find 
passages that suggest that Primary Philosophy is to be undertaken 
subsequently to historical cognition or the study of logic. But the priority 
exemplified in these passages regards the enabling conditions of a science and 
the pedagogical order of learning it. They do not refer to the essential method 
of scientific enquiry that is a priori and deductive. For Aristotle, on the other 
hand, proceeding from the particulars is the proper method of sciences and 
the way this will be done, particularly in Primary Philosophy, is through 
following the pros hen equivocals of entity to their ultimate causes.  
 
 Bearing all this in mind, how is the equivocal treatment of to on 
supposed to proceed? Firstly, as in the case of health, Aristotle needs to 
identify the ways in which to on is said equivocally. Most of the discussion of 
the equivocal instances of to on can be found in books 5-7 of the Metaphysics. 
Two instances that Aristotle provides (out of several), in which something is 
equivocally referred to as to on, are: “what a thing is or a ‘this’ [to men ti esti kai 
tode ti]” and the sense known from the categories.30 I will not go into more 
detail regarding these or other instances, but will proceed immediately to the 
question Aristotle claims exemplifies the primary nature of an entity qua entity 
which is to be investigated:  
 
[T]he question which, both now and of old, has always been 
raised, and has always been the subject of doubt, viz. what an 
entity is [ti to on], is just the question, what is substance? [tis hē 
ousia] (...) and so we also must consider chiefly and primarily 
and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.31 
2.  2.  To on and hē  ousia 
 
It might seem prima facie strange to claim that the primary object of the 
question ‘what is an entity?’ should be something called ‘substance’. This 
                                                        
30 Metaphysics 7, 1.1028a10-13. 
31 Metaphysics 7, 1.1028b4-7. Translation modified. 
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strangeness, however, is due to the historical path the term has taken from its 
original instantiation as ousia.32 The word which I refer to as ‘an entity’ – to on, 
that which is, – is a neuter active participle of einai, to be. Einai also possesses 
masculine and feminine present participle forms – ōn and ousa. From the 
feminine form, the substantive form ousia is derived.33 A more literal way of 
rendering ousia would be, rather than substance, beingness.34 
 
Besides the etymological link, the reason why the question of the 
nature of entity qua entity is to be posited as the nature of ousia can be 
understood if we recall the two equivocal instances in which to on is used that I 
mentioned above, i.e. ‘what a thing is’ and the categorical sense. Aristotle 
elaborates: 
 
While to on has all these senses, obviously that which is 
primarily is the ‘what’ [proton on to ti estin], which indicates 
the ousia of the thing [hoper sēmainei tēn ousian]. For when we 
say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or 
                                                        
32 Kosman (2014, passim; also cf. Owens 1963, pp. 138-145) gives an account of the “two 
interwoven stories” of Stoicism and Christianity in an attempt to explain the historical 
factors contributing to the decision of the Latin, and subsequently English, tradition 
to understand ousia as substantia and how this resulted in a great deal of historical 
misinterpretation of Aristotle. This misinterpretation, Kosman argues, influenced the 
philosophies of Locke, Descartes, and Spinoza to such an extent that our 
abandonment of such a translation could be problematic for our understanding of the 
philosophical tradition following early modernity. 
33 No pun intended. 
34 It seems that the contemporary scholars rarely tire of making this point – cf. Owens 
1963, pp. 18, 139, 140, 188, et passim; Gilson 1952, p. 74. Kosman (2014, p. ix) also points 
out that ousia tends to be translated as being in translation of Plato’s texts and that 
translating it as substance obscures the fact that Aristotle responds to the Platonic 
worries about being. Another very interesting point is Owens’ (Owens 1963, pp. 138-
151) attempt to argue that the translation of ousia as Entity manages to capture the 
semantic implications in English which ousia might exhibit in Ancient Greek. 
Regardless of my debt to his work, I have not followed Owens in this practice in my 
use of the term ‘entity’. 
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beautiful, but not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; 
but when we say what it is [ti estin], we do not say ‘white’ or 
‘hot’ or ‘three cubits long’, but ‘man’ or ‘God’. And all other 
things are said to be because they are, some of them, 
quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others 
qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other 
determination of it... Therefore that which is primarily and is 
simply (not is something) must be ousia.35 
 
 This shows us that the answer to the question of ‘what is an entity qua 
entity’ will not be found in asking what something is like, how big it is, or what 
colour it is. It has to be sought by asking the question of what something is. 
This what needs to be understood in a sense different from any quality, 
quantity, relation, etc., that the thing in question might exemplify, i.e. from the 
way something is understood when subsumed under categories. To investigate 
a man in this way, is to investigate humanity; to investigate fire is to investigate 
ignicity; to investigate to on is to investigate beingness, or ousia. So to say that to 
investigate an entity qua entity is to investigate ousia is to reconceptualise the 
way the question is asked. It simply means to ask what an entity is, in a sense of 
what it is in itself, simply and primarily. The question of what is ousia is 
primary since, it serves as a question of the nature of entity qua entity, and 
both man and fire are themselves entities. Moreover, it is primary since in 
order to investigate entities in any other sense, we need to know the what of 
those other senses or ways of being: 
 
[W]e think we know each thing most fully, when we know 
what it is [ti estin], e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than 
when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is; since we 
know each of these things also, only when we know what [ti 
esti] the quantity or the quality is.36  
 
                                                        
35 Metaphysics 7, 1.1028a13-31. 
36 Metaphysics 7, 1.1028b1-3. 
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 Ousia will appear as the name for a fundamental object of investigation 
in various other sciences. For example, it is discussed in the Categories, book 5 
and in the Physics. However, in these various other sciences it does not appear 
in its primary sense. The primary sense is discussed in the Metaphysics and 
since this is the description of the primary nature of the entity qua entity, and 
since all sciences are concerned with entities, it will appear, in one way or 
another, in all of them. Indeed, similarly to to on, ousia is also spoken of 
equivocally, and is as such present in other sciences. In the Categories, a logical 
work, it will be understood as the ultimate subject of predication37 and in 
Physics, which is the investigation into the changeable world, it will be 
understood as the underlying matter of change.38 
 
 What this tells us is that the question ‘what is an entity qua entity?’ is to 
be interpreted as the question ‘what is substance/ousia?’ It does not yet tell us, 
however, what an entity qua entity is. But we can already see that this 
investigation differs from Wolff’s. Wolff’s question of what an entity qua entity 
is, is not rephrased in this way. It does not point towards the question of what 
has sometimes been called the “Being of beings”, as we might see Aristotle’s 
investigation doing. Unlike Aristotle’s question of ousia, Wolff will see the 
question of entity qua entity as the question regarding predicates of any 
possible entities, what seems to be more in line with Aristotle’s categorical 
sense, rather than the primary sense. But what is Aristotle’s primary sense?  
 
 
 
                                                        
37 A lot of work has been undertaken in discussing how the account of ousia translates 
from the Categories to Metaphysics. Owens (1963, passim) shows that the 
correspondence is rather erratic and that there is no simple transposition of primary 
and secondary ousia of the Categories into the context of Metaphysics. For a more 
specialized treatment of the problem see Driscoll 1981. 
38 Owens 1963, p. 326. Similarly, since the object of the Physics is not predicates, but the 
realm of change, the subject of predication in the Physics comes to be understood as 
the subject of change. See Physics 1, 7.190a. 
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2.  3 .  Actuality and formal causation 
 
 Physics investigates the changeable realm, the world of motion. Anyone 
familiar with the Physics will be familiar with Aristotle’s definition of motion: 
“actuality of potential qua potential.”39 There has been a lot written about the 
proper interpretation of this cryptic formula, but I cannot go into much detail 
about it. The thing to remember is that motion (and hence change and the 
realm characterized by it) is itself a certain actuality [energeia]. Motion is telic: it 
exists between two points and stops when it reaches its goal. It is, as Kosman 
calls it, a “suicidal mode of being”.40 Motion itself is fully actual; however, 
unlike substance, motion in its complete actuality qua motion is incomplete. It 
is incomplete since its end is not within itself and therefore once it reaches its 
end the motion disappears. If this incomplete actuality, activity, or energeia is 
what characterizes the realm of the physical, is there a way to understand 
energeia in its complete form? 
 
 One might now interrupt and ask why we are suddenly concerning 
ourselves with actuality. We were promised a discourse on an entity qua entity, 
then we suddenly turned to a discussion of substance, and we are now 
changing the topic once again with a discussion of actuality. The reason for 
this, however, will soon become clear.  
 
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle reflects on the physical treatise and tells us 
that the sense of substance as described in the Physics, i.e. substance as a 
substratum, is generally recognized by other philosophers. To understand 
substance in such a way is to understand it in the sense of potentiality and as 
matter.41 This is, Aristotle acknowledges, “the strictest sense of potentiality 
[dynamis], but not the most useful for our present purposes”42 because “both 
                                                        
39 Physics III, 2.201a11. 
40 Kosman 2013, p. 44. I will not go further into the interpretation of motion, but I rely 
on Kosman’s 1969 interpretation and its development in his Activity of Being (2013) to 
which I direct an interested reader. 
41 Metaphysics 8, 2.1042b9-10. 
42 Metaphysics 9, 1.1045b35-6. 
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potentiality [dynamis] and actuality [energeia] extend further than the mere 
sphere of motion [kinesis].”43 Instead, what we must now do is to ask about 
substance of sensible things as actuality or energeia, rather than as substratum, 
or as matter and potentiality [dynamis].44 From the Physics we see that energeia 
“is in the strict sense identified with movement,” but our understanding must 
be extended “from movements to other things.”45 This is because for Aristotle 
actuality is the primary way of understanding substance, because “both 
substance or form is actuality,” and actuality as such is prior to potentiality.46 
 
Why is this so? For Aristotle, to ti ēn einai of each thing, the phrase 
commonly translated as essence,47 “is what it [the thing] is said to be in virtue of 
itself [kath’ hauto].”48 It belongs primarily and simply to substance, and it is a 
pros hen equivocal in the same way ‘entity’ is.49 Furthermore, we only know 
each thing when we know its essence,50 and each “primary and self-subsistent 
thing [i.e. each substance] is one and the same as its essence.”51 In short, to ti ēn 
einai, is one of the ways in which substance is said.52 
 
In the realm of sensible, physical things, substance is usually 
understood as a substrate, hypokeimenon. We have already said that this is not 
supposed to be the primary way of understanding substance, but Aristotle says 
that it is common and important to discuss. Aristotle tells us that by 
                                                        
43 Metaphysics 9, 2.1046a1. 
44 Metaphysics 8, 2.1042b10. 
45 Metaphysics 9, 3.1047a30-2. By “most strictly” Aristotle seems to refer to the way the 
Greek word is most generally understood. 
46 Hē ousia kai to eidos energeia estin. Metaphysics 9, 8.1050b. 
47 Owens translates the phrase as “what-IS-being” in order to eliminate any 
subsequently developed connotations the word essence might bear which would lead 
us away from the proper understanding of what to ti ēn einai is supposed to mean for 
Aristotle. For his arguments and distinctions see Owens 1963, p. 173. 
48 Metaphysics 7, 4.1029b12-14. 
49 Metaphysics 7, 4.1030a35. 
50 Metaphysics 7, 6.1031b20. 
51 Metaphysics 7, 6.1032a4-5. 
52 Metaphysics 7, 3.1028b34. 
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hypokeimenon people commonly refer to either matter [hylē], shape [morphē], or 
the compound of the two, i.e. the concrete thing in question. If we take 
Aristotle’s example of a bronze statue, we understand hypokeimenon to either 
be the bronze, the shape/form,53 or the statue as a compound. Now, if 
substance is to stand for the nature of an entity understood as an entity, as a 
this, and if it is to be identified with essence which is what something is said to 
be in virtue of itself and that by which things are knowable, what does it take 
to know what a statue is kath’ hauto or qua statue? It is not to know its matter. If 
we know the matter of the statue kath’ hauto we know it as bronze qua bronze, 
not qua matter of the statue. It tells us nothing about what this statue is qua 
statue. With the form, however, things are different. If we know the form of 
the statue, we know the statue qua statue, we know what it is to be a statue. If we 
phrase this in terms of potency and actuality, bronze qua bronze, kath’ hauto, is 
actually bronze, but not potentially a statue. There is nothing in the nature of 
the bronze itself which would point towards it being a statue. On the other 
hand, bronze qua statue is bronze as potentially a statue; it is bronze as the 
matter of the statue. But then it is no longer kath’ hauto. It stops being entelic 
and becomes telic – its actualization lies in something else, in a form to which it 
belongs, the form of a statue, rather than to the form of bronze. 
 
 In this way, form is prior to matter in the sense that form is the seat of 
determinacy, actuality and knowability. If we are to know something as it is in 
itself, we must know it qua form. Knowing it qua matter requires us to 
understand what it is the matter of. Matter kath’ hauto, i.e. matter conceived as 
matter without the “of something” is unknowable, since it lacks the necessary 
determination for knowability – it lacks the “of something.” Substance, even as 
a hypokeimenon, cannot be of something, since it is that something. Substance, 
therefore, if it is the essence, form, and energeia, is prior to matter because it is 
what gives matter its determination, it gives matter shape, purpose, and 
context for understanding. This does not mean that the material component in 
artefacts is something ‘less real’ or ‘not really’ part of an artefact, or that every 
                                                        
53 Aristotle here uses morphē, but he seems to treat shape and form equivalently in 
general. Cf. Metaphysics 5, 8.1017b22; 7, 8.1033b5. 
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compound features two things competing for explanatory space. As Owens 
puts it: 
 
The matter, then, is the thing itself. It and the form are one and 
the same thing. The matter is the thing as potency. In saying 
that a statue is bronze, you are expressing the Being of the 
statue. You are saying what it is. Everything in the statue is in 
some way bronze. But you are expressing the Being of the 
statue only as potency. If you say: “It is a figure of Hercules” 
you are expressing the very same Being, but you are 
expressing it as act... there is nothing in the statue considered 
from a material viewpoint, that is not bronze. The bronze 
expresses everything in the statue, but only as its matter... the 
matter has to be conceived as being the whole composite – 
potentially.54 
 
This suggests that for Aristotle, substance [ousia], essence [to ti ēn einai], 
actuality [energeia], and form [eidos] are equivalent in their primary instance. 
This, then, provides us with context for the interpretation of what an entity qua 
entity is. An entity, considered just as an entity, in itself, kath’ hauto, is 
substance, essence, actuality, and form, and this is the context through which 
we need to interpret all other, non-primary instantiations of it.55 
                                                        
54 Owens 1963, p.341. 
55 I recognise this is a very nuanced and complicated matter and I have presented it 
very swiftly and crudely. To gain a complete understanding of Aristotle’s ideas, one 
would need to be clear about how a thing can be one thing in number but different in 
being (e.g. a statue as potency and a statue as actuality are one and the same thing, but 
different in being), understand the difference in substance or being between natural 
things (e.g. horse), accidental instances of natural things (e.g. grey horse), and artefacts, 
and be clear on Aristotle’s mereology, especially ideas of how a dead body is a body 
equivocally, or how a blind eye is not an eye. Even apropos essences, I have only 
provided one instantiation of ‘essence’, to ti ēn einai, while the others remain 
undiscussed. The lack of space and time prevents me from discussing these issues in 
any more detail; however, it might be of interest to note that my understanding of the 
background nuances is largely based on Kosman’s (2013) interpretation. 
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2.  4.  Reduction to Form and Aristotle ’s  Theology 
 
 In his Question Concerning Technology Heidegger writes: 
 
For a long time we have been accustomed to representing 
cause as that which brings something about. In this 
connection, to bring about means to obtain results, effect. 
The causa efficiens, but one among the four causes, sets the 
standard for all causality… The doctrine of the four causes 
goes back to Aristotle. But everything that later ages seek in 
Greek thought under the conception and rubric “causality,” 
in the realm of Greek thought and for Greek thought per se 
has simply nothing at all to do with bringing about and 
effecting. What we call cause [Ursache] and the Romans call 
causa is called aition by the Greeks, that to which something 
else is indebted.56 
 
 One might disagree with Heidegger’s interpretation of the four causes, 
and I do not intend here to put a Heideggerian tint on my interpretation. The 
reason I am bringing up Heidegger is because this way of understanding 
causation is in my view helpful for understanding what I have described 
Aristotle doing so far. If we look at the four causes of through the perspective 
of indebtedness, we can see why Aristotle posits the formal cause as the most 
important kind of cause for Primary Philosophy. A thing is indebted to the 
formal cause for what it is, and, as I discussed earlier, to truly know something 
is to know what it is. A thing owes what it is to its form, and to be what it is 
actually, rather than what it could be potentially. To its matter it owes what it is 
made of, and matter on its own, devoid of any form, is absolutely 
indeterminate and unknowable. It is not anything. 
 
                                                        
56 Heidegger 1977, p. 7. 
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 This enables us to draw an important comparison between Aristotle’s 
and Wolff’s Primary Philosophy. What results from Aristotle’s investigation 
into the nature of an entity qua entity is the positing of a group of pros hen 
equivocals which have to be understood as form in the sense of an act. An 
entity qua entity is understood as a particular actuality grounded on formal 
causation. This is what all entities primarily are. For Wolff, however, the 
primary sense in which an entity is to be investigated is as a logical possibility. 
Wolff’s Ontologia presents us with a group of predicates attributable to any 
possible thing. There is no reduction to causality, except in a sense that all 
predicates in Ontologia are derived through the principle of sufficient reason 
which can be understood as causa essendi. In a sense, both Aristotle and Wolff 
are formalists.57 Primary Philosophy will be an investigation into the primary 
essences of everything. Nevertheless, for Aristotle primary essence will refer to 
the formal actuality of an essence, while for Wolff essences will refer to a set of 
compossible predicates of a thing. The ultimate reduction for Wolff does not 
result in formal cause or actuality of an entity, but in the principle of non-
contradiction. For Wolff, actuality has to do with empirical existence and as 
such has no place in Primary Philosophy.  
 
 This brings us to another similarity between the two. In Aristotle’s 
Primary Philosophy there is also no place for existence. In fact it is difficult to 
locate the conception of existence in Aristotle in general. This might seem 
strange since in Metaphysics 9, for example, Aristotle writes that “actuality 
means the existence of the thing” – hē energeia to hyparchein to pragma.58 The 
problem with this quotation, however, is that hyparchein ordinarily means to 
begin or to be present, rather than to exist. In Tredennick’s rendition of this 
passage in his Loeb translation he uses presence rather than existence. Ross 
translates hyparchein interchangeably as either existence or presence in 
                                                        
57 In Gilson’s (1961, p. 33) terminology they are ‘essentialists’ as opposed to 
‘existentialists’. For Gilson essentialism holds that the element of the form, achieving 
completion in substance, is the very core of reality. Alternatively, within Gilsonian 
existentialism the form is further actualized by existence. 
58 Metaphysics, 9, 6.1048a38-b4. 
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Metaphysics 7, 1041b4-6 and throughout the text he uses the word exist or a 
certain combination (e.g. an existing thing) to render einai or to on. 
 
While suggesting that there is no specific word for existence in the 
Ancient Greek, this also seems to suggest that there still is an understanding or 
a sense of it. Owens (1963, p. 146) and Dancy (1986, p. 50) confirm that there is 
no separate verb for to exist in Greek. All of them, however, Gilson, Owens, and 
Dancy, argue that even the sense of our term ‘existence’ is either lacking, 
overlooked, or ignored by Aristotle. Gilson writes: 
 
Aristotle has never stopped to consider existence in itself and 
then deliberately proceeded to exclude it from being. There 
is no text in which Aristotle says that actual being is not such 
in virtue of its own “to be”, but we have plenty of texts in 
which he tells us that to be is something else. In fact, 
everything goes as if, when he speaks of being, he never 
thought of existence. He does not reject it, he completely 
overlooks it.59 
 
Owens shares a similar sentiment. He argues that in Aristotle 
existential problems and a sense of existence are not denied, but reduced to 
the level of accidents. Therefore, there cannot be a scientific treatment of 
them, Primary Philosophy cannot deal with them, since primary science does 
not deal with the accidental.60  
 
All that is scientifically knowable in the efficient cause is the 
form... Aristotle has shown no interest in any existential 
problems. He sees, most certainly, efficient causality as a fact 
in the world of nature (...) but is satisfied with its explanation 
in terms of form... The agent has the form, and so is able to 
cause that form in another matter. All that has to be 
accounted for is the same form in a different matter... Nothing 
                                                        
59 Gilson 1952, 45-6. 
60 Owens 1963, p. 309. 
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prompts him to ask how existence can be given to the new 
individuals by their efficient cause. The fact is taken for 
granted. The problem is ignored.61 
 
 This is due to the fact that from the perspective of Primary Philosophy 
the efficient cause, the one which we would today understand as the cause of 
the existence of a thing, is reduced to the formal one. For this, we have to look 
a bit closer at book 7 of the Metaphysics. When talking about the production of 
things, i.e. the efficient cause, Aristotle uses the phrase “man begets man”. For 
example:  
 
Both that from which [things] are produced is nature, and the 
type according to which they are produced is nature (...), and 
so is that by which they are produced – the so-called ‘formal’ 
nature, which is specifically the same as the nature of the 
thing produced.62  
 
Similarly, “in some cases it is even obvious that the producer is of the 
same kind as the produced (not, however, the same nor one in number, but in 
form), e.g. in the case of natural products (for man produces man).”63  
 
The significance of the phrase for the status of the efficient cause can 
be additionally clarified by appealing to the Physics, where we are told that: 
“the mover will always transmit a form (...), which, when it moves, will be the 
principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the actual man begets man from what is 
potentially man.”64 
 
This shows us that the efficient cause and the formal cause are 
“formally identical but materially different,”65 meaning that they differ with 
                                                        
61 Owens 1963, p. 359. 
62 Metaphysics 7, 7.1032a22-5. 
63 Metaphysics 7, 8.1033b29-33. 
64 Physics 3, 2.202a9-11. 
65 Owens 1963, p.359. 
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respect to matter. The essential difference between a man and his son, when 
observed on the primary level of substance and to ti ēn einai lies solely in 
matter. Their form is the same, i.e. the form of “man”, but each is made of 
different ‘stuff’. Therefore “since the matter is unknowable, the efficient cause 
must, for the purposes of scientific knowledge, be reduced to the form.”66 This 
suggests that from the metaphysical perspective, the only interesting aspect of 
efficient causation is that it is a certain transmitting of form. How certain forms 
get transmitted, how a man begets a man, is of no interest to Primary 
Philosophy. From the perspective of substance, i.e. the perspective of a thing 
simply in virtue of its being, the only thing which happens in the efficient 
cause is the formation of matter, a form being transmitted. As such, Primary 
Philosophy is concerned only with the form that is transmitted, and not how it 
is transmitted. 
 
 So far I have explained why for Aristotle the question of what an entity 
qua entity is has to be understood as the question of what a substance/ousia is. 
The answer is that an entity qua entity is to be understood in terms of actuality 
or form, which constitutes the ultimate ground of reality. An entity qua entity 
is the form. But the form of what? Of that particular entity. This, however, does 
not seem to give us the kind of answer we might have been hoping for. For 
Aristotle there are many different forms in the world, since every particular 
entity, natural or artificial, has a form, nature, or essence. But what seems to be 
lacking is an overarching unifying principle, such as Thales’ water, Plato’s 
form of the Good, or the Neo-Platonic One. There is no such ultimate principle 
of unity in Aristotle. Forms, the ultimate instances of actuality, are found in 
the state of unreduced plurality. But it would be hasty to say that since there is 
no such principle to be found in Aristotle’s writings explicitly, that such a 
principle cannot be implicitly present in his thought. Let us recall the 
discussion of the pros hen equivocation by which the investigation into entities 
qua entities proceeds. With the example of health, the equivocals were tracked 
towards a particular entity that exemplified the characteristic of health in the 
primary instance: an animal. The same will be true for the investigation into 
entity qua entity. Health is concept that unites disparate entities to which it 
                                                        
66 Owens 1963, p.359. 
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equivocally refers, through the reference to the same nature exemplified in a 
particular entity that is a healthy animal. Similarly, to on, ousia, and energeia are 
equivocals that unite everything and they will themselves have a paradigmatic 
instance which will demonstrate the single nature towards which they all 
point and explain how they relate to it (e.g. as the way in which exercise relates 
to health as its preserver). To understand what this is and how it is supposed to 
operate we need to understand the reduction of the final cause to the formal 
one. 
 
 In Book 12 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle argues that there must 
necessarily be an eternal immobile substance. He appeals to the necessity of 
the eternal continuity and existence of motion, which he has proven in the 
Physics.67 In order to guarantee the eternity and continuity of motion, this 
immobile substance must be actuality [energeia] itself, for if there were any 
potentiality in it there could be no eternal movement, since the movement 
would be able to stop, even if it were never to actually stop.68 Such a mover 
moves the first heavens without being moved and is eternal, is ousia and 
energeia itself. Aristotle then likens this mover to the object of thought, since 
the object of thought moves thought without being moved. This allows 
Aristotle to introduce the idea of the final cause, or “that for the sake of 
which”, through the eternal mover. The final cause is “both that for which and 
that towards which,” and in that sense, all other things move towards the first 
mover through love69 – for when thought is moved by an object that itself does 
not move, it is moved by love. Because such a mover is conceived as pure 
actuality it “of necessity is an entity,”70 and “in so far as it is necessary, it is 
good, and in this sense a first principle.”71 
 
If, therefore, the final cause is primarily understood in the sense of love 
towards the absolutely actual, unmoved, eternal mover, and actuality has 
                                                        
67 Metaphysics 12, 6.1071b5-10. 
68 Metaphysics 12, 6.1071b20-3. 
69 Metaphysics 12, 7.1072a24-1072b3. 
70 Metaphysics 12, 7.1072b10-11. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστίν ὂν. Translation mine. 
71 Ibid. 
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already been identified with substance and form, we can see how the final 
cause has its primary instance with respect to actuality. As pure actuality 
which is not in motion, the eternal mover is entelic rather than telic. Its final 
cause is not outside it, but within it; it is its substance and essence.  
 
Through this series of reductions we reach the primary way and 
primary instance of an entity – an entity as an entity is actuality, energeia, pure 
separate form exemplified in the god of Aristotle and other separate 
substances. This will constitute the paradigmatic instance of the pros hen 
equivocal to on to which other entities relate as subjects of love. Of course, any 
particular entity will possess a particular final cause. When I spoke of motion I 
have mentioned how for Aristotle motion exemplifies a kind of actuality that is 
telic, incomplete, and aiming for fulfilment, the completion and stasis 
exemplified by the separate substances and the Prime Mover. This applies to 
all living beings and is at heart of Aristotle’s eudaimonic ethics. Our striving 
for eudaimonia, our final cause, is a striving for actualisation, for the unity of 
ourselves with our essence, which is given in our form since form, actuality, 
and essence are one. But while particular entities strive towards the reaching 
of their actualisation through unity with their particular essence, an entity qua 
entity must be seen as striving towards the unity with the perfect and purely 
actual separate substance, with the pure form of god. The whole structure of 
final causality, regardless of the particular ways it instantiates itself in complex 
substances, is grounded in this immitatio dei. 
 
This part of Primary Philosophy constitutes what can be called 
Aristotelian Theology, and he would not object to it being called so. Aristotle 
himself tells us that Wisdom will be the most divine and honourable science 
since it is supposed to deal with god amongst the causes of all things, and as a 
first principle, and with divine objects.72 Due to this, Aristotle names it 
theologikē – theology (or theologics).73 Indeed, it is very important for Aristotle 
that Primary Philosophy deal with separate substances besides dealing with 
entities qua entities. Hence in book 6 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes 
                                                        
72 Metaphysics 1, 2.983a8-9. 
73 Metaphysics 6, 1.1026a19. 
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physics and mathematics from Primary Philosophy by saying that the former 
deals with things inseparable from matter, but not immovable; mathematics 
deals with things which are immovable but embodied in matter; Primary 
Philosophy deals with what is separable and immovable.74 In fact, Aristotle 
raises the possibility of there being no substance other than natural substance, 
in which case the science of nature would be the first science.75 
 
This raises a question to which I have in previous chapters referred to 
as the question of ‘the Aristotelian ambiguity’. At the heart of it is the question 
of what kind of science Aristotle’s Primary Philosophy is supposed to be. Is it 
supposed to be a science of the entity qua entity or a science of supersensible 
entities? The problem arises since if understood in the latter sense it is 
understood as a science of a particular kind of entity; in the former sense it 
deals with no particular kind of entity, be that sensible or supersensible. In this 
chapter I have presented an interpretation that attempts to resolve the 
problem through the appeal to the method of pros hen equivocation. Aristotle’s 
philosophy, according to this, is a theology. It is a science ultimately concerned 
with separate ousiai. But the nature of an entity qua entity, and hence of any 
sensible entity is ultimately understood through the reference to the primary 
instance of what it is to be an entity exemplified in an absolutely immobile 
ousia, with final causality serving as the referent connecting the two. 
Understood in this sense, Aristotle’s Primary Philosophy is fundamentally 
different from Wolff’s. Wolff’s understanding of the nature of ens is 
independent from any of its particular instantiations, including in the ens 
perfectissimum. Ens perfectissimum, God, is an object of theology which is a 
completely separate and ‘subservient’ science to Ontologia.  Ens qua Ens, on the 
other hand, is a predicate of greatest abstraction and comprehension, and the 
most empty in content. It requires nothing but non-contradictory 
conceivability and, as such, is a concept for which there is no correspondent in 
Aristotle’s Primary Philosophy.  
 
                                                        
74 Metaphysics 6, 1.1026a10. 
75 Metaphysics 6, 1.1026a27-30. 
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For this interpretation I relied heavily on the work of Joseph Owens 
presented in his book The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. The 
success of Owens’ interpretation, and of my understanding and presentation 
of it, is open for discussion, but regardless of whether it is a correct reading of 
Aristotle or whether it is a coherent theory in its own right, the fact remains 
that Aristotelian ambiguity is a problem any interpreter of Aristotle has to 
address. In the next section I will show that Aristotelian ambiguity, in one 
form or another, has been a persistent problem throughout the centuries of 
the interpretation of Aristotle and, more importantly for my purposes, that 
there is a possibility of tracking attempted solutions to it up to Wolff’s 
conceptualization of ontology. 
3. Aristotelian Ambiguity 
 
 The interpretation of the problematic nature of Aristotelian ambiguity 
in the precise form I have described above is, according to Owens, a relatively 
recent problem: 
 
The systematic dismembering of the traditional metaphysics 
into different sciences, familiar enough from Francis Bacon 
and Christian Wolff, has during the past few years been 
carried back to Aristotle himself. Instead of dealing with a 
philosopher who had one science of a proposed contradictory 
object, or who at successive stages of his career developed 
different conceptions of the science that upon close scrutiny 
turn out to be contradictory, one has now to meet also an 
Aristotle who himself developed and held simultaneously 
two distinct metaphysical sciences each having a different 
object.76 
 
 The two sciences are the science of the supersensible only, described as 
Primary Philosophy or theology, and the science of to on hē(i) on subsequently 
described as metaphysics or ontology. This is, however, a problem with the 
                                                        
76 Owens 1963, p. 16. 
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interpretation of Aristotle that occurs after the historical period that is of 
interest for my project. Owens attributes the origin of this interpretation of 
Aristotelian ambiguity to Paul Natorp’s Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen 
Metaphysik of 1888 where, according to Natorp, Aristotle’s Metaphysics is 
composed of two series of texts expressing a “mutually exclusive” conceptions 
of Primary Philosophy.77 
 
 This is not, however, as Owen himself explains, the first time in the 
long history of the interpretation of the Metaphysics that what I call 
Aristotelian ambiguity has caused problems. Owens points out that under this 
conception of ambiguity the Aristotelian entity qua entity is understood as the 
most empty of notions. This, however, was not the case in Mediaeval 
interpretations of Aristotle, where ens qua ens is understood as both widest in 
comprehension, but also the richest in content. I will discuss some medieval 
interpretations in the next section of this chapter, but at this point I would like 
to investigate Aristotelian ambiguity in a different sense, the one that does 
depend specifically on how one interprets Aristotle’s entity qua entity. 
 
 One can see that in the form of Aristotelian ambiguity described above 
the key tension can be posited as lying between the concepts of Primary 
Philosophy and Theology. Is Primary Philosophy fundamentally a theology or 
is it also something else? The additional problem arises with the introduction 
of the term metaphysics. As everyone knows the term metaphysics is absent 
from Aristotle; however, following the ambiguous time of its conception it has, 
within philosophical terminology, superseded both Primary Philosophy and 
Theology. Wolff’s claim that ontology and theology are to be seen as parts of 
this science called metaphysics would make no sense to Aristotle. However, it 
makes sense to us, and it did to Wolff. One would even see it as a trivial matter 
today (at least if one is a philosopher) that ontology (whatever it may be) 
properly belongs to metaphysics (whatever that may be). But this was not 
always so, and here I wish to see how it was possible for it to become so. 
 
                                                        
77 Owens 1963, p. 35. 
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 The relationship between Aristotle’s Primary Philosophy and 
Theology, the study of an entity qua entity and of divine ousiai, when we 
consider the work of his early Greek commentators, seems to follow the lines 
of my interpretation presented in the previous sections. The universality of an 
entity qua entity is seen as the universality of the divine ousiai by the way of 
reference through causality. Divine ousiai are causes of all other entities, and as 
such investigating them reaches the universality desired in the investigation of 
an entity qua entity.78 The dissociation between Primary Philosophy and 
theology seems to occur around the 12th century, likely due to the connotations 
the term ‘theology’ gained, i.e. becoming the science of the Revealed Truth. 
The question of the nature of the entity qua entity becomes understood as the 
question of ens commune, of what is common to all entities distinct from God. In 
order to elaborate on this position I will now focus on the philosophy of 
Aquinas. 
3.  1 .  Aristotle and Aquinas 
 
 No thinker, including Aquinas, can solely speak on behalf of the whole 
of Scholasticism, not to mention of the whole of mediaeval philosophy. The 
reason I focus on Aquinas is due to the influence he had regarding the 
introduction of Aristotelian metaphysics into systematic theology and due to 
influence that he had on Wolff, at least according to the latter’s claims. 
Subsequently, Aquinas will allow me to formulate a certain conception of non-
ontological metaphysics that we can point to in the development of 
metaphysics after Wolff. 
 
 One noticeable change that happens by Aquinas’ time is the adoption 
of the term metaphysics into general philosophical vocabulary. This term was 
used, similarly to how it remains in use today, to refer to both Aristotle’s text 
and the science Aristotle named Primary Philosophy. The term theology, 
however, is understood as the science of Revelation, although some overlaps 
with Aristotelian conception persist. Hence for Aquinas metaphysics is, 
similarly to Aristotle, a divine science, although less perfect than the science of 
                                                        
78 See Owens 1963, pp. 43-9. 
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Revelation, and proceeds through a different order. One noticeable difference 
is that in Aquinas divinity will refer to what pertains to the God of Abraham, 
unlike for Aristotle and other Greeks for whom “god” and “divine” served as 
predicates to indicate greatness.79 Aristotelian separate substances also 
undergo a contextual transformation and are interpreted through the 
hierarchy of angelic intelligences. 80 
 
Another characteristic of Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle regards 
the positing of two different orders of inquiry. These are called the 
Philosophical and Theological order and are discussed briefly in the 
Prooemium to De Trinitate and SCG Lib. 2, cap. 4. There Aquinas maintains that 
for philosophers, who follow the natural order of cognition, the knowledge of 
creatures comes before the knowledge of the divine things, but for theologians 
the order is reversed. The science of metaphysics will, as is the case in 
Aristotle, proceed through the philosophical order, studying creatures prior to 
studying the Creator, i.e. from the particulars to the universals. Theology, will 
proceed from universals to the particular, or more specifically, from the 
highest reality of God towards the creatures, guided by Revelation.  
 
There are two points I would like to make before proceeding. Firstly, 
Aquinas adopts the philosophical order in his metaphysical texts as it can be 
seen in the Prooemium to De Ente, although he does not call it by that name 
explicitly. His metaphysical conclusions, however, are required not to 
contradict what was revealed in the Scripture and in Aquinas’ eyes the two are 
unable to contradict each other. If philosophy contradicts Revelation it is not 
philosophy in anything but in name, and the contradictory conclusion must 
come as a by-product of bad reasoning.81 This position, more often than not, 
results in Aquinas ensuring that his interpretation of the Scripture and 
Authority supports his interpretation of Aristotle’s thought, rather than vice 
versa. This makes it possible for a philosopher of today to read and engage 
                                                        
79 See Owens 1963, p. 171. 
80 For more details on the Aquinas’ distinction between philosophy and theology 
regarding their objects, see De Trinitate, pars 1, q.5, a.4, co. 
81 De Trinitate, pars 1, q. 2, a. 3, co. 1-2; Contra Gentiles, Lib. 1, cap. 9, n. 2. 
 126 
with Aquinas on the metaphysical level, without the need to take over 
Aquinas’ theological project and concerns.82 
 
The second point I would like to make is that the differentiation 
between the Philosophical and Theological order does not need to be limited 
strictly to attempts to posit a methodological difference between philosophy 
and theology. These terms could be utilised in order to differentiate between 
philosophical methods and systems in general. Aristotle’s approach can then 
be listed as following the philosophical order - the approach was named after 
him after all - but so could Kant’s. They both start from the givenness of 
sensible, empirical reality and proceed to investigate the universal principles 
underpinning it. On the other hand, thinkers such as Spinoza, Wolff, or 
Hegel83 start from a kind of a universal starting point from which the particular 
is supposed to be derived. Hence the reasoning proceeds from the causes to 
the caused, rather than vice versa. This, of course is not supposed to exhaust or 
collapse the differences between the systems and methods used by these 
thinkers. It is more intended as a tool for quick categorisation and comparison 
and the systems grouped within the same order can and will contain 
substantial differences beyond this one unifying category. 
 
So the first difference between Aristotle and Aquinas, and the one 
regarding the Aristotelian Ambiguity, is the use of the term metaphysics and 
the differentiation between metaphysics and theology as two different 
sciences. What happens to Primary Philosophy? For Aquinas, metaphysics is 
still understood to be Primary Philosophy; however, as mentioned above, 
philosophy is no longer considered to be the most perfect science. This will be 
                                                        
82 This is, in few words, Wippel’s position and method of reading Aquinas (Wippel, 
2000, p. xxvii), however, it is not a universally accepted interpretation amongst the 
Thomists and scholars of Thomism. Wippel, for example, criticises Gilson for the 
insistence on reading Aquinas’ philosophy as Christian philosophy and for the denial 
of the possibility to focus only on the philosophical parts of Aquinas’ work (cf. Ibid, p. 
xx & Gilson 1961, pp. 21-2). 
83  At least in the Logic, Phenomenology of Spirit could be seen as a novel way of 
employing the philosophical order. 
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reserved for theology, since it is the study of God. This shows us that Aquinas’ 
metaphysics will not have God as one of its objects, and that the Aristotelian 
structure of understanding an entity qua entity through its primary instance 
exemplified through god understood as a separate substance will not hold. 
Metaphysics, for Aquinas, remains understood as a study of an entity qua 
entity,84 although this now becomes a search for ens commune or esse commune, 
i.e. that which is common to all entities, or common being of entities. This 
ens/esse commune will take the place of Aristotle’s ousia, now referred to as 
substantia.  
 
In Aquinas, as in Aristotle, ‘entity’ is not a genus of things and as such it 
is not susceptible to being defined.85 Ens is also spoken of in multiple ways, but 
it is absolutely, or primarily, said only of substance.86 Within Aquinas’ 
philosophy the concept of substantia remains almost identical with the 
Aristotelian concept of ousia described in the previous chapter. It will signify 
the kath’ hauto way of being of individual entities (composite or simple) 
primarily expressible through energeia, which will be rendered in Latin as 
actuality or act. Another similarity with Aristotle is the concept of essentia 
which is understood similarly to Aristotle’s to ti ēn einai. It applies without 
qualification to substances87 and signifies what a thing is. Essence is also 
related to the form of a thing: “by the form, which is the act of matter, an entity 
is made actual and [made] this something.”88 
 
While both thinkers similarly conceive of the philosophy of an entity 
qua entity, the key difference between them lies in where they locate the 
ultimate ground of reality. For Aristotle, the complete actuality of a thing is 
found in its essence, which is its form, or in the formal cause of the thing. The 
                                                        
84 De Trinitate, pars 3, q.5, a.4, ad.6; pars 3, q.6, a.1, co.22. 
85 SCG Lib. 1, cap. 25, n. 6 refers to Metaphysics 3, 3 to make this point, as does ST Lib. 1, 
q. 3, a.5, co. 
86 De Ente, Caput 1. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid – De 
Ente, cap. 1. 
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thing is not made ‘more actual’ if it exists. Existence, if it is to be found in 
Aristotle, designates merely the transference of form, the matter taking shape. 
An existing man, of course, is more actual than what is potentially a man, but 
that has no impact on the nature or form of a man. Nothing is added to the 
form if it exists. To borrow the term from Heidegger, the existence of an entity, 
for Aristotle, is only of ontic concern and does not relate to Primary 
Philosophy. This, however, changes in Aquinas through his positing of the 
concept of being, esse. 
 
For Aristotle, separate (or simple) substances, those which do not 
possess any matter or potency, are wholly actual. They are pure actuality and 
serve as an example of the primary, formal nature of an entity qua entity. 
Aquinas tells us that separate (or simple) substances are those which 
philosophers prove to be without any matter,89 such as the soul, intelligences, 
and the First Cause.90 The essence of such substances is the form alone. 
Although such substances are forms alone “there is no utter simplicity in them 
nor are they pure act, but have an admixture of potency.”91 Through the 
example of the phoenix in De Ente, Aquinas explains what this means or how a 
substance without matter can have an “admixture of potency” (since matter is 
traditionally what mixes potentiality into a substance).92 
                                                        
89 De Ente, cap. 3. 
90 At this point in De Ente, the First Cause is not identified with God, but Aquinas will 
do that shortly. In the subsequent works, such as the two Summae, Aquinas will see 
the identification of God and First Cause as unproblematic and will focus on 
explicating in what sense God is considered to be the First Cause. Kenny (2002, pp. 25-
6) understands the soul as referring to “the souls of human beings, in the intermediate 
state between death and the final resurrection” existing disembodied, while by 
intelligences he understands “both the angels of biblical tradition and the immaterial 
agencies that in Aristotelian theory were responsible for the movement of the 
heavens”. 
91 De Ente, cap. 3. Cf. also SCG, Lib. 2, cap. 52, n. 1. 
92 Another argument can be found in SCG, Lib. 2, cap. 52-4 based on the distinction 
between God and Created Intellectual Substances. The same basic thought about the 
admixture of potentiality in simple creatures is repeated in the discussion on the 
nature of Angels in ST, Lib. 1, q. 50. 
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The example is as follows: no essence can be understood without its 
parts, because whatever is not of the essence or quiddity comes to the thing 
from outside of it and makes a composition with essence. Any essence can be 
understood without anything being understood about its being – it is possible 
to understand what a man is, or what a phoenix is, without knowing whether 
they exist in reality. Therefore, the being [esse] of a thing is different from the 
essence or quiddity of the thing, except in a case where the thing’s quiddity 
would be its being, and the thing would itself be pure being.93 
 
Whatever belongs to something, it belongs to it either as caused by the 
principles of its nature or comes to it from an external principle. The being of a 
thing cannot be efficiently caused by its own form or quiddity because in that 
case the thing would be the cause of itself. For Aquinas self-causation is 
impossible.94 In that case, every thing which has being other than its nature 
has being from another.95 What has being ‘from another’ is led back to its first 
cause. To avoid infinite regress there has to be something which is the cause of 
being of all things because it is itself wholly being [esse tantum]. Such a cause 
must be God and First Cause. 
 
But this does not yet answer the question about the exact relation 
between the form and being in simple substances and how an entity which is 
                                                        
93 Scholars disagree whether this passage is successful in proving, or whether it is even 
supposed to prove, the so-called thesis of the real distinction between esse and essence, 
however it has been traditionally taken to be Aquinas’ early attempt at doing so. Cf. 
Wippel 1984, p. 113, Kenny 2002, p. 35. The question of how and even whether Aquinas 
posited the real (rather than either conceptual or modal) distinction between being 
and essence is among the most controversial questions about Thomism and is beyond 
the scope of this work. For an interesting interpretation of the distinction, which 
argues against the traditional “misreading” Suarez is culpable for, i.e. of the real 
distinction as a distinction between two “things”, see Gilson 1952, pp. 99-105. 
94 De Ente, cap.3; ST,Lib.1,q.2,a.3,co. 
95 “Habeat esse ab alio.” Owens (1985, p. 77) argues that even if this is the case it still 
allows for the distinction between essence and esse to be only conceptual, rather than 
real. 
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simple, i.e. consists purely of form, the principle of actuality, can have an 
“admixture of potentiality”. As Aquinas has already argued, simple substances 
receive their being from God. Whatever receives something from another is in 
potency to what it receives. That which is received then constitutes the thing’s 
act. Therefore, the form of intelligences is in potency to that being they receive 
from God and that being is received as an act. In a sense, one can therefore 
find potency and act in simple substances, in their essence and esse, even 
though they are pure forms without matter.  
 
Hence, unlike for Aristotle, a formal cause cannot be the ultimate 
expression of actuality. The highest conception of actuality is found in the 
pure simplicity of God and the First Cause. It exemplifies an actuality purer 
than that of a simple substance composed only by form. God, however is not 
the final or formal cause of everything, and does not correspond to ousia, 
whether one is to identify ousia with substantia or essentia. God’s nature is pure 
esse. By using this term, derived from the infinitive of to be, Aquinas develops a 
sense that was not present in Aristotle’s grammatical equivalent: einai. Gilson 
translates esse as “act-of-being” or even “the very act-of-being”.96 This is 
supposed to emphasize the difference between the infinitive esse from the 
participle ens. Esse designates an act, while ens designates a state. Ens signifies 
quasi esse habens97 or quasi esse participans.98  
 
Importantly, since esse is not ousia it is also not the formal cause of a 
thing. God is not “that universal esse whereby each and every thing formally 
is,”99 or esse commune/formale. Formal being [esse formale] is divided into the 
being of substance and the being of accidents and, since God is neither, 
impossibile est igitur Deum esse illud esse quo formaliter unaquaeque res est.100 From 
this can be seen that, for Aquinas, God is not a formal cause of everything, not 
                                                        
96 Gilson, 1961, p. 29. 
97 Sent. Meta., Lib. 12, l. 1, n. 4. 
98 Super. Sent., Lib. 2, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, ad. 3. 
99 De Ente, cap. 4. 
100 SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 26, n2 
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a substance, and not even an entity, except analogically.101 What God is, is pure 
esse. Pure actuality of being. The reason why we sometimes talk about God in 
substance terms is because our intellect, due to its limitations, needs to 
comprehend everything through the model of complex substances.102 The 
being of God is qualitatively different from the being of entities, which is 
formal. This is the reason why the science of theology will supersede 
metaphysics. Metaphysics, while remaining primary philosophy will not be a 
primary science since it cannot reach beyond the level of formal substances, 
which do not represent the fundamental level of reality. This way of inquiry 
into God is insufficient, since due to God’s not being a substance or an entity 
His nature is ultimately unknowable, or inaccessible through reason. Anything 
we can say about God we can only say analogically and through via negativa. 
 
But that does not mean that metaphysics cannot say anything 
interesting about God, even if it can grasp His nature only in an inadequate 
manner. For example, we can say that God cannot be a formal cause, and 
furthermore that as the First Cause He must be understood as the first efficient 
cause. If God were not the first efficient cause He would need to be caused 
either by Himself or by something prior to Him. Efficient self-causation is 
impossible for Aquinas, and if we are talking about a god that is caused by 
something else, then we are not talking about something absolutely primary. 
Aquinas bases this reasoning on an argument, similar to Aristotle’s argument 
for the necessity of the first unmoved mover. There has to be the first 
unaffected efficient cause in order for there to be efficient causation in the 
universe at all, and God, since He is the First Cause, and not in the formal 
sense, is to take such a position.103 
                                                        
101 SCG, Lib. 1, cap. 33, n6. 
102 ST,Lib.1,q.3,a.3,ad.1. 
103 ST, Lib. 1, q. 2, a. 3, co. A careful reader might observe that I have not talked about 
the possibility of God being the material or final cause, but have played this game of 
elimination only between efficient and formal. I do not wish to go into much detail 
about this, but Aquinas does address the possible suggestions that God could be so 
understood. He argues at various points that God cannot be conceived as matter, not 
even prime matter, since matter is potentiality, while God is pure actuality. The 
reason why God should not be primarily understood as the final cause is because 
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An important difference between Aquinas and Aristotle that needs to 
be mentioned here is that, for Aristotle, the Prime Mover is not the first efficient 
cause. The Prime Mover is, qua simple entity, the paragon example of formal 
causality, and influences other entities as their final cause. Moreover, the 
efficient causality of God present in Aquinas is different from efficient 
causality as conceived by Aristotle. It is connected to the Christian idea of 
Creation and to the problem of the existence of the world as such. This is not 
Leibniz’ problem of why there exists something rather than nothing, although 
it might be seen as its precursor. The answer to a question posited in this way 
is trivial for Aquinas: because God willed it so. But the question concerns the 
problem of what it means for God to Create.  
 
Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of efficient causation – the cause of 
being [esse] from the cause of becoming [fieri]. A builder is an efficient cause of 
the becoming of the house, i.e. the one which forms the house from pre-
existing material, and as such the cause of motion or change, the efficient 
cause as conceived in the Aristotelian realm of substance. For God, to Create is 
not to start the process of becoming, to put matter into motion and give it form, 
or to transmit a pre-existing form to it. It is to imbue the world with being, to 
give being where once there was none.104 This, Aquinas agrees, violates the ex 
nihilo nihil fit principle, but he does not see this as problematic in this case. He 
argues that this principle does not apply absolutely. It only applies when we 
understand the efficient cause qua the cause of becoming. It does not apply 
when talking about it as the cause of being. The mistaken idea of the 
absolutely universal applicability of this principle is due, according to 
Aquinas, to the Ancient philosophers’ misunderstanding of what it means to 
make something. They understood it, Aquinas argues, as restricted to motion 
and change. They believed that every case of ‘making’ necessarily involves 
                                                                                                                                                      
unlike the Aristotelian Prime Mover which is a final cause in virtue of its entelic 
completeness, Aquinas’ conception of God’s final causality needs to be understood in 
the terms of God’s free creative Will (Gilson 1961, 78-9) and hence, as connected to 
creation, it sees its actualization in efficient causality. 
104 ST Lib. 1, q. 104, a. 1, co. & ad2. 
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motion or change, burdening themselves with images of building when 
thinking of efficient causation. “A builder constructs a house, by making use of 
cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order 
and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house [esse domus] depends on the 
nature of these materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the 
builder.”105 In the case of becoming, an efficient cause puts pre-existing matter 
into motion and simply transmits a form to it. Its esse, however, is pre-given, 
presupposed. The builder is therefore an efficient cause of becoming, of 
forming, not of being in the sense of existing, of bringing the house out of non-
being. But God cannot be compared to the builder, to “an agent which is not 
the cause of ‘being’ but only of ‘becoming’.”106 Creation, on the other hand, is a 
‘making’, but it is not becoming, or change, except metaphorically107 and God 
is the First Cause in the sense of the first cause of being. 
3.  2.  From Aquinas to Wolff 
 
There are many differences between the philosophies of Aquinas and 
Wolff. For Wolff, the highest principles of philosophy, those treated in 
Ontologia, will be conceived as possible predicates predicable of any entity. In 
themselves they do not express any actuality since actuality is relegated to the 
realm of empirically given entities. For Aquinas and Aristotle, the more one 
moves towards the realm of determinate particulars, the more potentiality one 
introduces. Moreover, even though one can find an ‘ontological’ argument in 
Wolff, i.e. the one which identifies existence as an essential attribute of God, 
the differences between the Thomist and Wolffian conceptions of God remain 
significant. For Wolff, God is ultimately just another entity, albeit a special 
one, and theology as a science is subjugated to ontology. The predicate of 
existence, which Wolff’s God is unique in possessing essentially, does not 
signify a qualitatively different way of being from any other entity. Existence 
in the case of God, as in the case of any other entity, remains a complement of 
possibility. For Aquinas, God is not an entity, but esse, or Being itself 
                                                        
105 ST, Lib. 1, q. 104, a. 1, co. 
106 Non est simile de agente quod non est causa essendi, sed fieri tantum. ST, Lib. 1, q. 104, a. 1, 
ad. 2. 
107 SCG Lib. 2, cap. 37, n.2-4. 
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understood as existence. He cannot be understood through predicates 
belonging to entities, except analogically. Moreover, for Aquinas, entities qua 
entities are ultimately to be understood as creatures in the sense that their 
substantial form does not provide a complete explanation of what it means for 
them to be. For their complete actualisation they depend on the efficient 
causality of God which falls beyond the realm of substance and rational 
conceivability. For Wolff, however, entities are fundamentally understood as 
non-contradictory thinkables, i.e. as whatever can be conceived without 
contradiction. So can we say the following: for Aristotle, what an entity is is its 
actuality (its form), not just its possibility, but also its existence. For Aquinas, 
too, an entity has its “what” or essence (which, as for Aristotle, is its actuality); 
but it also has its Being (esse) or existence through God (as well as its specific 
coming-to-be through the causality of another entity). For Wolff, what an 
entity is is its possibility and whether it exists is an empirical question. 
 
The main difference lies in the fact that Wolff’s philosophy is more 
modern than Aquinas’. Hence, while Aquinas will provide explanations 
through Aristotelian causes, ultimately grounding the being (but not coming 
to be) of all entities on the efficient causation of God, Wolff will provide 
explanations through logical principles that are supposed to serve as 
principles applicable to reality. For Wolff, reality is not ultimately explained 
through either the efficient causality of God, or formal causality of substance, 
but through principles of contradiction and sufficient reason. One interesting 
similarity, however, is that Wolff distinguishes two modes of the principles of 
sufficient reason which he refers to as causes, i.e. causa essendi and causa fiendi. 
The former provides the sufficient reason for an essence of something, while 
the latter explains how a certain particular entity came to exist. These are 
similar to Aquinas’ two conceptions of the efficient cause (divine and natural), 
although it would be difficult to say that this is the direct result of Thomist 
influence.  
 
Another important similarity lies in Aquinas’ conception of ens 
commune. What Aquinas sees as the goal of metaphysics is to find a common 
predicate which would unite all disparate ways in which ens is spoken of. One 
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characteristic of ens commune is that this is a way of being which can be 
predicated of any entity.108 This differs slightly from Aristotle, since if ousia, to 
which ens commune corresponds, is understood in the sense of predication then 
it serves as the ultimate subject of predication, rather than the most universal 
predicate. For Wolff and Aquinas, however, it becomes understood as a 
predicate predicable of anything that is.  
 
*** 
 
The differences between Aquinas and Wolff are great. Wolff claimed to 
be influenced by Aquinas, and even though one of his aims was to modernise 
Scholasticism he was neither a Thomist, nor a Catholic. The purpose of this 
chapter, however, is not to show the direct influence Aquinas had on Wolff, 
but to show how it became possible for Wolff’s concept of ontology to develop 
between the times of Aristotle and Wolff. This will concern the way 
scholasticism developed after Aquinas, hence Aquinas’s philosophy is only 
one step on this trajectory. As de Boer writes: 
 
Emancipating itself from the traditional theological 
orientation of metaphysics, general metaphysics increasingly 
geared itself toward the challenges posed by the modern 
sciences. Its primary task came to consist in a systematic 
investigation of the conceptual determinations that can be 
predicated of all beings, determinations which, as such, are 
necessarily presupposed in the other sciences. This is the 
conception of first philosophy that we also find in Wolff’s 
philosophy.109 
 
My aim here is to give a short account of what led to this result, 
focusing on the problem of defining the object of metaphysics or the problem 
of Aristotelian Ambiguity. Let us remember that, according to the timeline I 
have established in the first chapter, the name ‘ontology’ first appears in 
                                                        
108 SCG Lib. 2, cap. 37, n2-4. 
109 De Boer 2011b, p. 54. 
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Lorhard’s Ogdoas Scholastica of 1606. I have also spoken of Goclenius’ Lexicon 
philosophicum of 1613 and various works by Clauberg, specifically Ontosophia of 
1647. The trajectory presented here will both overlap and extend beyond the 
already discussed period in order to trace the history of the conception of 
ontology rather than of the name. 
 
As de Boer has said, one characteristic of this new conception of 
primary philosophy is its emancipation from theological problems. In fact, 
prior to the period in which the term ‘ontology’ appears, according to Beck, 
philosophy in Germany has for a longer time than anywhere else considered 
philosophy to be ancilla theologiae or ancilla theologorum.110 We have seen a way 
in which this relation can be understood from the discussion of Aquinas. But 
in order to distinguish metaphysics and primary philosophy from theology 
one must devise a new way of classifying the objects of the science which 
appears in Aristotle’s work now known as Metaphysics. 
 
While there were various attempts throughout history to propose more 
clear-cut distinctions between metaphysics, primary philosophy, and theology, 
there was no interest, according to Mora, to do so by classifying philosophy 
into different branches and sub-branches. To do so, and to treat the results of 
such divisions as new philosophical disciplines with specific names, becomes 
much more of a common practice after 1635.111 
 
One of the early distinctions relevant for this trajectory comes from 
Albertus Magnus (1200-1280), an Aristotelian who influenced Aquinas, 
although Aquinas himself does not follow Albertus’ philosophical 
classification.112 Albertus Magnus divides philosophy into logic, Philosophia 
realis, moral philosophy, and theology. His works on logic consist mostly of 
commentaries on the Organon influenced by Avicenna. For Albertus, however, 
logic is seen as the science of reason, rather than the science of language (or 
                                                        
110 Beck 1969, p. 9. 
111 Mora 1963, p. 41. 
112 For more detail on Albertus’ philosophy see Beck 1969, pp. 31-8, on whose work I 
base this account. 
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scientia sermocinalis). Regarding philosophia realis, Albertus divides it into three 
parts: physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. Physics deals with substance in 
which there is a principle of motion and rest; mathematics is understood as 
knowledge of that which can be presented in the imagination but without 
empirical observation as its verification; metaphysics, sometimes called prima 
philosophia, divina philosophia, or theologia, is knowledge of the intelligible entity 
by the exercise of reason alone. As knowledge through reason, metaphysics is 
contrasted with knowledge through Revelation. However, since God 
transcends all the categories, including such categories as cause or ens, this 
knowledge necessarily remains (as in Aquinas) analogical and inadequate. For 
the adequate knowledge of God, Revelation is necessary, although reason can 
be used to defend what was revealed. 
 
This shows us that there is no clear resolution of the Aristotelian 
Ambiguity in the philosophy of Albertus Magnus. It is true that theology as a 
science of Revelation is separated from philosophia realis and metaphysics, but 
the concept “metaphysics” is still used synonymously for prima philosophia and 
theologia. However, according to Mora, the basic division of philosophy into 
logic and philosophia realis becomes very influential for the subsequent 
attempts at the division of metaphysics into separate sciences that occur after 
1635. Logic becomes seen as a science [ars] that studies no object, but only the 
way, or ways, in which objects are studied by other sciences. Philosophia realis, 
or metaphysica, is supposed to deal with ‘real’ objects in the most general sense 
of ‘real’, meaning whatever can become the subject of a true or false 
proposition.113 The majority of divisions of philosophy in this new period are 
presented as branches of the ‘theoretical’ or ‘real’ science, with metaphysica as 
its crowning discipline, and other branches those such as physics, medicine, or 
theology.114 
 
The popularity of the division of philosophy into logic and philosophia 
realis can be attributed to the rising popularity of Thomism and Albertism 
                                                        
113 Mora 1963, p. 39. This is, interestingly, only one sense of ens for Aquinas, and 
certainly not the primary one. See De Ente Cp. 1 & ST Lib. 1, q. 48, a.2, ad 2. 
114 Mora 1963, p. 40. 
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after the Counter-Reformation. German universities, while originally being 
opposed to Albertism and Thomism in favour of nominalism, turn to these 
philosophies, which get subsequently adopted by Protestant Scholasticism 
based on Aquinas and Suárez.115 Before Protestant Scholasticism, let us see 
how the distinction between metaphysics and primary philosophy features in 
the Late Scholasticism of the Jesuits. 
 
Within Jesuit Scholasticism, according to Mora, there was a keen 
awareness of the ambiguity of terms such as first philosophy and metaphysics. 
On the other hand, while the distinctions between the science of the entity qua 
entity and sciences of particular kinds of entities were often sharply posited, it 
appears there was no will to posit a science of the entity qua entity that would 
be called something different from Metaphysica.116 Pedro de Fonseca, for 
example, identifies the term Metaphysica with Philosophia prima: “object 
[subjectum] of metaphysics [is] the entity per se, and real, insofar it is said not in 
a way of one true essence of an entity, but per se in another way.”117 Considered 
as prima philosophia, metaphysics is ‘indivisible’; however for de Fonseca there 
is also “a great number of metaphysical sciences.”118 As indivisible, prima 
philosophia, since it concerns itself with ens qua ens, precedes all of these other 
metaphysical sciences, including theology. It is the only science, besides the 
science of dialectics, that “treats of [versantur] the genus of entity as a whole”.119 
 
Several things should be pointed out here. Firstly, while de Fonseca 
presents a distinction between metaphysics as philosophia prima and 
‘metaphysical sciences’ inclusive of theology, the two kinds of science are still 
subsumed under the generic term ‘metaphysics’. Another important 
characteristic is the inclusion of dialectica into the science of the genus of entity 
as a whole, which, according to Mora, suggests that de Fonseca takes into 
account that metaphysical and logical principles are often the same. If one 
                                                        
115 Beck 1969, p. 72. 
116 See Mora 1963, p. 37. 
117 Quoted from Mora 1963, p. 37; translation mine. 
118 Loc. cit. Translation mine. 
119 Loc. cit. Translation mine. 
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recalls an earlier chapter, we have seen the similar conjunction of logic and 
primary philosophy in the systems of Wolff and Clauberg: fundamental 
metaphysical principles served, at the same time, as fundamental logical 
principles, or laws of thought. Finally, de Fonseca treates the concept ens 
explicitly as a genus, in contrast to how it was treated by Aristotle and 
Aquinas. 
 
A second representative of Jesuit Scholasticism I would like to point to 
is Benedictus Pererius who greatly influenced 17th Century German school-
philosophy, including Goclenius.120 In his De communibus he writes: 
 
It is necessary to draw a distinction between two sciences; 
One, which treats of the transcendentals, and the most 
universal things; the other, of intelligences. The first will be 
called Primary Philosophy and universal science; the other is 
properly called Metaphysics, Theology, Wisdom, Divine 
science.121 
 
 As Vollrath points out, every commentator and interpreter of Aristotle, 
be that Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, or Suarez, attempted to resolve the 
ambiguity arising from the relation between primary philosophy and theology. 
But Pererius’ solution is specific, due to his differentiation between primary 
philosophy and metaphysics, where primary philosophy is exactly not 
metaphysics.122 For Pererius, Primary philosophy is scientia universalis, a 
science of transcendentals, which are predicates applicable to any entity 
regardless of the category the entity might be considered under. The term 
metaphysics, on the other hand, is a name for a group of particular sciences of 
intelligences, such as God, angels, and human souls. This distinction between 
primary philosophy as scientia universalis and metaphysics as scientia 
                                                        
120 Vollrath 1962, p. 267. 
121 Quoted from Vollrath 1962, p. 267; translation mine. 
122 Ibid, p. 269. 
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particularis lays the ground, according to Vollrath, for the later division of 
metaphysics into generalis and specialis.123  
 
One strange result arising from Pererius’ division concerns the way one 
is to understand the term metaphysics. The term is, as we know, not Aristotle’s, 
but to exclude primary philosophy from metaphysics appears strange. If 
primary philosophy is to treat of the entity in the most universal signification 
could it be anything but meta-physics? At least if metaphysics is supposed to 
signify a discipline that treats of what lies ‘beyond’ the physical order. If we do 
not consider the object of primary philosophy as merely logical, or nominal, 
i.e. as merely concerning the way we talk about reality, rather than concerning 
the structure of reality as such (or “the most universal things,” as Pererius 
himself puts it), the exclusion of primary philosophy from metaphysics seems 
an unfortunate consequence of this particular attempt at resolving the 
ambiguity. 
 
 This leads us to Suárez. Like Pererius, Suárez uses the term 
‘metaphysics’ to designate the study of intelligences, i.e. entities abstracted 
from matter, however he also uses it for the science of ens qua ens.124 In fact, 
metaphysics is for Suárez first and foremost the science of ens qua ens, and 
studies it with respect to its principal properties, i.e. the transcendentals.125 
From this we can see that there seems to be no new progress towards 
disambiguating the term ‘metaphysics’. Unlike for Pererius, it signifies both 
primary philosophy and theology, the latter being understood as a special 
science of intelligences. However, in this narrative Suárez is more significant 
for his specific contribution regarding the way the entity qua entity is to be 
investigated. The Wolffian definition of the entity, as that which can be 
conceived without contradiction comes from Suárez.126 For Suárez, one 
meaning of ens signifies a real essence [essentia realis]. Real essence is the one 
which is not an arbitrary product of thought, which means that it is not self-
                                                        
123 Vollrath 1962, p. 267. 
124 Loc. cit. 
125 Bardout 2002, p. 131 
126 Beck 1969, p. 126. 
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contradictory, or brought about by some play of imagination. Instead, real 
essences are true in themselves and hence susceptible to actual realisation. 
Moreover, for Suárez actuality is understood as a particular case of 
possibility.127 To exist is simply to have a fully actualised essence.128 Even 
though for Wolff ens is not understood as signifying actual essences, most of 
the other Suarezian ideas are present in his system. For both Wolff and 
Suárez, primary philosophy will concern essences in some way. The specific 
nature of these essences will be discovered through conceivability without 
contradiction, while the existence of them, or of entities possessing such 
essences, will not form an integral part of the original investigation of such 
essences. Moreover, whether an essence is actual or possible will not, unlike 
for Aquinas, impact on the nature of such an essence at all. For Wolff, 
therefore, existence will only be a complement of possibility, i.e. something 
only complementing an essence, rather than expanding it.  
 
 The thinkers so far concerned have all been representatives of Jesuit 
Scholasticism. We see that during this period various distinctions within 
metaphysics have been made; however, there was no attempt to come up with 
a new name for the philosophy of the entity qua entity. As mentioned earlier, 
the practice of devising novel philosophical disciplines becomes popular after 
1635 and we are now moving to that period. Before we do, I will point out that 
since the term Ontologia starts appearing from 1606, we are now reaching the 
period in which thinkers will start using that term in order to describe prima 
philosophia. 
 
 This, however, is not the case with Johan Heinrich Alsted, who 
according to Vollrath, was influenced by Pererius.129 Alsted was a Calvinist 
taught by Goclenius. For him, pace Pererius, Metaphysics is to be strictly 
understood as a science of the entity in general. In his Cursus philosophici 
Encyclopaedia of 1620 he divides metaphysics into general and specific.130 The 
                                                        
127 Gilson 1952, pp. 97-8. 
128 Ibid, p. 101. 
129 Vollrath 1962, p. 267. 
130 Account of Alsted taken from Vollrath 1962, p. 268. 
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general part is to treat of the transcendentals, while the special part is to treat 
of what he calls “species of an entity”, referring primarily to the concepts of 
substance and accident. One thing to point out here is that once again the 
concept of ens is treated as a genus (since it can have species). This seems to 
become commonplace, in contrast to possible protestations by Aristotle or St 
Thomas. Moreover, in stark contrast to Pererius, Alsted attempts to exclude 
theology from metaphysics. Since metaphysics is the science of the entity in 
general, or the science of substance and accident, theology as the study of 
particular kinds of entities, such as God, angels, and souls, cannot be 
metaphysics. In fact, such an investigation forms a part of a different, 
independent science which Alsted names pneumatica or pneumatologia, with 
the latter reappearing in Wolff’s system as the name for the investigation into 
the same kinds of entities. 
 
 This separation of metaphysics and theology into two separate 
sciences, although opposite to Pererius’ separation, can be reproached with a 
similar difficulty. What it does is to deny the name metaphysics to theology 
and, once again, if metaphysics is supposed to designate what is ‘beyond’ 
physics then the exclusion of God, angels, and souls is at best strange, or at 
worst pantheistic. An attempt at a solution, however, comes from Micraelius’ 
1653 Lexicon Philosophicum. There, Micraelius unites both the investigation of 
the entity qua entity and theology under the same heading of metaphysics. He 
does that through employing the term ontology: 
 
Metaphysics, as a science after or beyond physics, considers 
what is beyond natural bodies… The object of metaphysics is 
an Entity insofar it is an entity. Hence by some it is called 
ὀντολογία. Let that designate how an Entity may be 
understood in general [in communi] under the aspect of 
indifference in total abstraction. Metaphysics is divided into 
General, which treats of an Entity in the most abstract way 
and in all sort of indifference, both of nature and of 
affections, both together and apart; and into Special, which 
treats of an Entity in those species of substances, which are 
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free from all matter, such as GOD, angels, and separate souls: 
though some do not consider Theology, Angelography, and 
Psychology, in which God, Angels and Separate substances 
are treated, as parts of metaphysics, but they suppose them to 
be particular (separate) disciplines.131 
 
 He subsequently informs the reader that ontology is considered by 
some to be “a particular philosophical discipline, which treats of an entity:  
which is nevertheless posited by others as an object of metaphysics itself.”132 In 
this separation we can see a solution to Aristotelian Ambiguity through 
positing metaphysics as a general concept uniting both the philosophy of ens 
qua ens under the name of ontology and theology under special metaphysics. 
The same division can be found in Wolff, with Pererius’ term pneumatologia for 
the study of separate substances. Interestingly, however, Micraelius does not 
seem to identify or use the term philosophia prima, or its Greek equivalent for 
either metaphysics or ontology. Instead, it only appears listed as one of 
Aristotle’s names for metaphysics.  
 
 Besides dividing metaphysics into Special and General, Micraelius 
divides philosophy in general into Theoretical or Contemplative, Practical or 
Active, Organic or instrumental, also called Canonical or Philological. 
Theoretical philosophy is further divided into metaphysics, physics, and 
mathematics. Besides the previously mentioned branches of metaphysics there 
are certain others. These are gnostologia, which investigates everything 
knowable ‘in itself’; hexologia, which investigates habits of the intellect; 
archielogia, concerned with the principles of scientific disciplines; and didactica, 
which investigates the ways of teaching and learning.133 A difference that can 
be drawn between this division and the General-Special division is that these 
disciplines, although metaphysical, do not seem to treat their objects as certain 
kinds of entities. Their focus seems to be epistemological. As Mora points out, 
                                                        
131 Micraelius Lexicon, p. 654. Translation mine. 
132 Micraelius Lexicon, p. 752. Translation mine. Mora 1963, p. 44, strangely claims that 
there is no separate entry for ontology in the Lexicon, while quoting this passage. 
133 Micraelius, Lexicon, p. 925. 
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however, the difference between Ontologia and Gnostologia seems very minor. 
They both concern something that would be knowable ‘in itself’ since to know 
an entity qua entity would be to know it ‘in itself’. For Mora, this suggests that 
Micraelius attempts to formulate the question of ‘what is an entity’ in two 
senses: either as qua entity, and qua knowable.134 But the two seem to overlap, 
and hence what is the most universal qua entity, would be most universal qua 
object of knowledge. This once again points to the double primacy of 
metaphysics, i.e. to the idea that the most universal way in which something is 
known corresponds to the most universal way in which something is. This idea 
of the identity of the thing as it is in itself and as it is qua the object of cognition 
is one of the key features of what I call the ontological tradition in German 
philosophy and the one that will be attacked by Kant.135 
 
 Following further the trajectory of the historical conceptions of 
ontology we must mention two additional thinkers. The first is Juan Caramuel 
de Lobkowitz whom Clauberg credits with the invention of the term 
ontosophia, and Abraham Calovius, whom Clauberg credits with the invention 
of the term Ontologia. For de Lobkowitz: 
 
                                                        
134 Mora 1963, p. 40. 
135 One could here object that the way Micraelius defines gnostology does not require 
there to be an identity between the object of cognition and entity qua entity. He simply 
states it is an investigation into what is scibile qua tale, knowable in itself, or ‘as such’. 
This could, on the other hand, and more similar to the way he describes other 
‘epistemological’ branches of metaphysics, be understood to refer to principles, e.g. 
non-contradiction. There are two things to point out against this interpretation. 
Firstly, if it is correct, we need to remember that for Wolff, the principles of non-
contradiction will fundamentally be the answer to the question of what an entity qua 
entity is. However, it is at the same time the fundamental characteristic of an entity 
qua entity. It is not merely logical, or epistemological, but also a metaphysical 
principle. Secondly, Micraelius does not provide any additional entry to explain what 
gnostology is beyond the one already quoted. What he does, however, is refer to the 
entry on the knowable [cognoscibile] next to the entry on gnostology in the index, which 
he defines as “το γνωςὸν, the object of our knowledge.” Micraelius, Lexicon, p. 147. 
Translation mine. 
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The object of metaphysics is the ENTITY. Ὁντοσοφία is 
called, what is ὅντος σοφία or SCIENCE OF the ENTITY. It is 
spread through various faculties, of which it investigates 
predicates and essential differences of an object, which are 
nothing but properties, passions, attributes. Presupposed by 
all Arts, the one which presupposes none… It is impossible 
for the one who accurately understands ontosophy not to be 
the most learned in all sciences.136 
 
  Although the term is not used in this passage, we can see that de 
Lobkowitz understands ontosophy as primary philosophy in the sense that 
will also be present in Wolff, i.e. in the sense that all other sciences presuppose 
it. This does not tell us much regarding the Aristotelian Ambiguity. It seems 
that ontosophy is identified with metaphysics, or at least is the name for 
metaphysics from the point of view of its object. Another explicit similarity 
with Wolff is that it is posited as the science of predicates and essential 
differences. Moreover, the identity between the way an object is and the way it 
is known, at least in its most abstract sense, can be seen from de Lobkowitz’ list 
of ‘ontosophical principles’. Some of them include: 1) It is impossible for two 
contradictory truths to be given simultaneously; 2) It is impossible for two 
contradictory falsities to be given at the same time; 11) Everything that is, 
provided it is necessary, is to be; 13) He proceeds with impudence, who 
multiplies entities beyond necessity. 137 
 
 As Mora points out,138 the only thing that can be seen to be in common 
to these principles, from our perspective, is that they can be seen as general 
and universal. The first two, however, appear to be general logical principles, 
the third one seems to belong to modal logic, and the last one to pragmatic 
rules. But the way Mora interprets the fact that de Lobkowitz considers all of 
them ‘ontosophical’ is that such grouping is due to the idea that such a list is 
                                                        
136 De Lobkowitz, Rationalis et Realis Philosophia (1642, p. 65). Quoted from Mora 1963, p. 
41. Translation mine. 
137 Taken from Mora 1963, p. 42. Translation mine. 
138 Mora 1963, p. 42. 
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supposed to contain “all the possible general rational principles which they [de 
Lobkowitz and all first ‘ontologists’] thought could be applied to all reality as 
such.”139 Once again, therefore, the fundamental structure of reality is 
identified with the structure of cognition of such reality. 
 
 The final person to briefly mention is Abraham Calovius whom, as 
mentioned before, Clauberg credits with the invention of the term Ontologia. 
When talking about Micraelius I have raised a question regarding the 
difference between Ontologia and Gnostologia, i.e. whether they described the 
science of the same object approached from two different perspectives. The 
answer to this question is unclear in the case of Micraelius; however, there is 
more evidence to indicate that Calovius had a practice like this in mind. For 
Calovius the science of the entity is called Metaphysica when one considers it 
from the perspective of the ‘order of things’; however, from the perspective of 
its proper object [ab objecto proprio] it should be called ὁντολογία. Besides this 
name, however, Calovius coins another name for it which is Noologia.140 Now, if 
we consider that Noologia is a derivative of νοῦς or νόος, which is mind, and 
Gnostologia of γνῶσις, inquiry or investigation, both thinkers seem to posit 
sciences related to knowing or cognition as very similar, if not identical, to 
ontology.141 This, once again, leads us towards the identification, or at least 
affinity, between the ways the things are fundamentally thought of and the 
way they fundamentally are.  
 
 
                                                        
139 Mora 1963, p. 42. 
140 Ibid, pp. 41-2. 
141 Interestingly, Kant will use the term Noology to designate what he sees as differing 
ideas regarding the origins of pure rational knowledge. If one believes such 
knowledge comes from reason alone, they stand with Plato and Leibniz. If one 
believes it comes from experience they are with Locke and Aristotle, and are called 
‘empiricists’. CoPR A854-5. The term noology appears before Calovius in Micraelius. 
For more details on Micraelius’ noology, which he connects with metaphysical 
archaeology rather than gnostology, see Mora 1963, p. 43. 
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4. A Spinozist Digression 
 
 The preceding section has shown a historical progression of 
metaphysical concepts and conceptions of metaphysics that led to Wolff’s 
philosophy adopting the form presented in the previous chapter. What I have 
primarily focused on are terminological developments that enabled Wolff’s 
conception of ontology as a science of predicates of any possible entity to 
develop, as well as on the way in which the idea of ontological primacy in 
nature and knowledge developed. This is one aspect of what I have called the 
double primacy of metaphysics. Another aspect of this double primacy is the 
primacy in order. It is the idea that the kinds of predicates that ontology 
discusses can be discovered through, what Kant would call, pure reason alone. 
One thinker that can be associated with this particular idea of primacy is 
Spinoza. In fact, Spinoza’s idea of a metaphysical system at moments comes 
very close to Wolff’s conception of such a system. In this section I will provide 
a short comparison of the two and argue that Spinoza should not be seen as 
belonging to the ‘ontological’ tradition. This, historically speaking, should not 
be too surprising. What I call the ontological tradition, or maybe I should call 
it the historical trajectory of ontology, is closely connected to German school-
philosophy of the Jesuit and Protestant kind, of which Spinoza, as a resident of 
Amsterdam, was not a part. Spinoza is, besides other sources, influenced by 
Descartes, who is himself, although trained by the Suarezian Jesuits, an 
opponent of the Scholastic way of philosophizing. From this perspective, 
Spinoza’s refusal to take a university position, with universities being 
predominantly Scholastic in some way, was a prudent one.142  
 
Furthermore, in the letter to Boxel of 1674 Spinoza writes: “The 
authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, does not carry much weight with 
me.”143 If we understand the development of the discipline of ontology as 
                                                        
142 Spinoza was, however, aware of Scholastic terminology, at least to a certain degree. 
This can be seen from the way he distinguishes between terms such as essence, 
accident, and proprium, and from his reference to the “scholastic term” of causa essendi 
rerum in IP24c. 
143 Spinoza, Correspondence; in Elwes (trans.) 1955. 
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partially motivated by an attempt to clarify certain terminological relations 
stemming from Aristotle’s philosophy, it is not surprising that the author of 
the previous quotation would not be moved by such a project. Even though 
Spinoza’s writings appear between 1660 and 1677, with his first work being 
published the same year as Clauberg’s Ontosophia Nova (a second edition of his 
Elementa Philosophiae sive Ontosophia of 1647) and appearing after all the works 
discussed in the previous chapter that use the term ontologia, this term does 
not, to my knowledge, appear anywhere in Spinoza’s writings. 
 
 The discussion here does not concern itself with Spinoza’s contribution 
to the history of the concept of ontology. It would be possible to track some 
indirect influence his work had on this history, but it appears fairly late in the 
history of the conception, and does not feature in the history of the name. The 
reason why I make this Spinozist digression is to point out that his system can 
be seen as being fairly similar to Wolff’s, but still qualitatively different. This 
allows me to posit two types of metaphysics present in this period. These could 
be called ontological and non-ontological metaphysics, or ontological and 
non-ontological rationalism. By ontological and non-ontological I mean 
pertaining or not pertaining to the kind of metaphysics exemplified by Wolff’s 
conception of what ontology is, not anything else such a designation could 
stand for today.  
 
Few, if any, historically oriented philosophers today would agree with 
the claim that the separation of the philosophical traditions of the 17th and 18th 
centuries into Rationalism and Empiricism is either a clear or an exhaustive 
representation of philosophical works and ideas available at that time. If we 
observe the Rationalist tradition from the perspective of the ontological 
tradition this provides us with a way to make finer distinctions between the 
thinkers categorised under this genus. In this case, Spinoza, sometimes seen as 
an ur-Rationalist serves as a key example of a kind of Rationalism different 
from the Wolffian kind.144 
                                                        
144 I could be reproached for generally excluding Leibniz from this thesis. Kant’s 
positioning of Leibniz as one of the Noologists does make him relevant to this 
discussion, however, since the understanding of ontology I work with concerns what 
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 One similarity between the two thinkers can be found in their attempts 
to ground metaphysics on the geometrical or mathematical method. I have 
already discussed how Wolff thinks that this approach should proceed. Today, 
it is safe to assume  that anyone  familiar with Spinoza, must know that Ethics 
is to proceed in more geometrico. For Spinoza, geometrical, or 
Euclidian/mathematical method provides “the new standard of truth”.145 In 
this respect, the method of the Ethica and the method of the Ontologia are very 
similar. They both operate through constant reference back to already 
demonstrated propositions. The only noticeable difference between the 
mathematical expositions of the two is that Spinoza goes to great pains to 
employ as many Euclidean terms in his Ethics as he can; the terms such as a 
proposition, definition, axiom, corollary, lemma, etc. On the other hand, Wolff, 
although originally a proponent of this practice, abandons such attempts at 
mimicking the geometrical method to the letter after his early works. But this 
does not make Wolff’s style of philosophising less, or differently, ‘geometrical’. 
In fact, Wolff’s praise of the usefulness and necessity of the geometrical 
method brings him into the dangerous waters of appearing to provide a 
defence of Spinoza: 
 
There is no danger to religion, to virtue, or to the state if full 
freedom to philosophize is given to those who philosophize 
according to the philosophical method…  
 
It might be objected that experience indicates otherwise. For 
Benedict Spinoza philosophized according to the 
mathematical method, which is the same as the philosophical 
method (§139). Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from 
teaching things which are contrary to religion and virtue. To 
                                                                                                                                                      
Vollrath called “the systematic dismemberment” of metaphysics into disciplines, I 
omit Leibniz due to the lack of his own system.  
145 Spinoza, Ethics I.app, II/79. 
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this I reply that it is possible to err in applying philosophical 
method, and thus harmful errors do arise.146 
 
 Wolff does not want to go into detail regarding Spinoza’s errors in the 
text from which this quotation is taken. It seems that Wolff’s sole criticism of 
Spinoza focuses on his deviation from the established signification of words 
due to which Spinoza predicated, in his definitions, only of God that which, in 
Wolff's view, could be predicated of both God and man (e.g. freedom). For 
Wolff, to put his criticism in terms developed after him, this provides validity 
to Spinoza’s definitions and derivations, but does not provide them with 
soundness. Wolff says there are other problems, but he decides not to mention 
them. While it is true that Spinoza’s use of terms such as ‘God’, ‘Nature’, or 
‘Cause’ deviates from the established significations of words (purposefully, in 
my opinion), this criticism is at best fairly weak. But beyond this similarity, 
explicitly addressed by Wolff, there are other, more general ones. 
 
 One of them lies in the fact that Spinoza provides us with the clearest 
example of the Theological order of proceeding in metaphysics. For Spinoza, 
as is well known, God/Substance/Nature is the cause of everything and, by IA4, 
“The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its 
cause.” Moreover, by IP15: “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be 
conceived without God,” and all those who believe otherwise, believe 
otherwise because  
 
they did not observe the [proper] order of philosophising. For 
they believed that the divine nature, which they should have 
contemplated before all else (because it is prior both in 
knowledge and in nature) is last in the order of knowledge, 
and that the things which are called objects of the senses are 
prior to all.147 
 
                                                        
146 Wolff, DP §§167 & 167*. 
147 EIIP10s2. 
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 To remind the reader, I do not refer to Spinoza’s order as theological 
because it starts with God. I am referring to the earlier described Thomist 
distinction between a system that begins with what is most general, rather 
than with objects of senses or similar particulars. If Spinoza decided never to 
refer to Substance, or Nature, as God, the same description of his procedure 
would apply. Aristotle himself at one point concludes that the knowledge of 
ousia is the first in the order of nature and, qua knowledge of nature in-itself, 
the primary and greatest kind of knowledge. But he did explicitly state that it is 
the last in the order of knowledge, something philosophising cannot start with, 
since the latter must in fact start from concrete particular entities. The priority 
of knowledge with regards to ousia is analogous to the final causality of the 
First Mover. It is the primary goal of enquiry, rather than a starting point.  
 
Spinoza’s order, moreover, proceeds in the way analogous to the order 
of Wolff’s system. The ground of Wolff’s system is called neither God, 
Substance, nor Nature, but ens qua ens. However, Wolff does not start from the 
particulars, but from what he sees as the most universal both in knowledge 
and in nature. God, however, is relegated to the status of an entity explainable 
through that primary science of the entity qua entity. Regardless of this, the 
order of both Spinoza’s and Wolff’s proceeding can be called theological. 
 
 Another similarity between Spinoza and Wolff is that the highest way 
in which something can be known corresponds to the primary way in which 
something is. The most well known passage from Spinoza expressing this idea 
is certainly the proposition on what is known as ‘parallelism’: “The order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”148 But 
this idea is ubiquitous throughout the Ethics, and can be found everywhere. 
For Spinoza, if something can be it can be conceived, and if it cannot be it 
cannot be conceived. This can be found implicitly there in the already quoted 
IA4, but also explicitly in IP14: “Except God, no substance can be or be 
conceived,” et passim. 
 
                                                        
148 EIIP7.  
 152 
 In short, what unites the systems of Spinoza and Wolff is the shared 
adherence to the double primacy of metaphysics. They both hold the idea of 
the congruence between the fundamental way of knowing and being (what is 
first in nature is first in knowledge), and also adopt the theological order, 
starting their systems from the investigation of these primary elements. But 
this is where the clearer similarities between the two stop and the 
dissimilarities that show why Spinoza’s philosophy cannot be seen as an 
ontology stricto sensu can come to fore. 
 
One of the characteristics of Wolff’s philosophy is the identification of 
Primary Philosophy with Ontologia. Spinoza uses neither of these terms. Wolff 
also specifies that Ontologia is a particular metaphysical science, standing in a 
certain relation to other sciences and ways of cognition. Ethics could be called 
Primary Philosophy, either if we use this term simply to designate a synonym 
for metaphysics,149 or in reference to the proper order of philosophy. Spinoza, 
however, does not provide us with an exact explanation of what kind of 
inquiry Ethics is supposed to be, either qua science in general, or qua 
philosophical discipline. When reading Wolff, we see that he makes it clear 
that Ontologia is to be understood as a fundamental part of the science of 
metaphysics dealing with ens qua ens. With Spinoza, we are thrown into a 
series of definitions, axioms, and propositions concerning God’s nature 
without an ‘external’ discussion of the nature of the treatise. The only thing we 
know is its name – Ethica – and that it is in ordine geometrico demonstrata.  The 
text itself never directly explains what this ethics is supposed to be. If we look 
through it, looking for a metaphysical treatise or a science similar to Wolff’s 
Ontologia, we will find that such a thing is not present in Spinoza’s text, beyond 
the aforementioned characteristics. 
 
The defining question of Ontologia is the question of what an entity qua 
entity is. Spinoza does not pose a question of this kind. Going through the text 
                                                        
149 A term which Spinoza seems not to be fond of: “…these and similar faculties are 
either complete fictions or nothing but metaphysical entities [entia metaphysica] or 
universals, which we are used to forming from particulars…” EIIP48s. Emphasis mine. 
Translation modified. 
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we can see that Spinoza tends to use the term ens very sporadically, although 
consistently.150 Spinoza uses the term ens only to refer to God or Substance. 
This is, in fact, in line with the Aristotelian tradition of the understanding of 
the term. We should recall that for Aristotle the question “what is an entity” 
was identified with the question “what is substance”. And since for Spinoza 
there is only one substance, it seems only proper for there to be only one ens. 
The identification of ens and substantia can be seen in E1P10s, where Spinoza 
discusses the distinction between attributes and says that although attributes 
can be considered really distinct this does not mean that they constitute “duo 
entia, sive duas diversas substantias”.151 Ens seems to be applied to finite 
particulars only when Spinoza is presenting a possible conclusion he disagrees 
with, such as in E1P11alt2: “if what now necessarily exists are only finite entities 
[entia finita], then finite entities are more powerful than an absolutely infinite 
entity [ente absolute infinito].” References to God as an “absolutely infinite” 
entity do not appear only here. Whenever Spinoza refers to God as ens the 
reference always includes the qualification of absolute infinity.152 As already 
mentioned, there are very few references to ens overall beyond the ones I have 
already given. But they are consistent in being applied to God only. Particular 
or singular things are not referred to as entities. And Spinoza’s system 
certainly requires they not be called entities. Spinoza sees particular things as 
modes of the one Substance, and sticking to the traditional terminology modes 
are not entities (except equivocally), but modifications of an entity or a 
substance.153 God is similarly never understood as particular or singular, but 
                                                        
150 Curley’s translation unfortunately does not exemplify this consistency in the same 
manner. Curley uses terms “being”, “beings”, and “Being” to translate either ens or esse 
and his choice is, at some points, difficult to grasp. I will continue to translate ens as 
‘entity’ and esse as either ‘being’ or ‘to be’. 
151 See Curley’s note on translating sive/seu as an equivalence rather than an 
alternative in Ethics, p. xix. 
152 E.g. E4P28dem. 
153 There are two exceptions in which Spinoza uses the term ens for particular things. 
One is the mentioned reductio ad absurdum of E1P10s. The other case is in E5P30dem: 
“To conceive things under a species of eternity, therefore, is to conceive things insofar 
as they are conceived through God’s essence, as real entities [entia realia], or insofar as 
through God’s essence they involve existence.” But this is a special case of the third 
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always as infinite or unique. Hence if there is only one, unique substance, and 
everything else existing in Nature is its modification then there can only be 
one entity. In this sense, Spinoza’s terminology is fairly consistent with the 
tradition. But while for Wolff, the science of an entity qua entity would apply 
to the world of particularly existing individuals since everything around us is 
an entity, this will not be the case for Spinoza. The investigation into God’s 
nature and what follows from it will teach us something about the world, not 
because, as for Wolff, the world is filled with entities which all share certain 
essential predicates qua entities, but because there is only one entity from 
which everything else follows. 
 
In fact, there are some passages in Spinoza that suggest that a science in 
the manner of Wolff’s Ontologia is impossible. One of the passages refers to 
Spinoza’s short rejection of the Transcendentals. Spinoza writes: 
 
I shall briefly add something about the causes from which 
the terms called Transcendental have had their origin – I mean 
terms like Entity, Thing, and Something [ens, res, aliquid]… 
When the images in the body are completely confused, the 
mind also will imagine all the bodies confusedly, without any 
distinction, and comprehend them as if under one attribute, 
namely, under the attribute of Entity, Thing, etc. [sub attributo 
entis, rei, etc.] These terms signify ideas that are confused in 
the highest degree.154 
 
From what we have said before about the term ens, the problem 
Spinoza has with it, and with terms such as res or aliquid, is not the mere 
existence or use of these concepts, but their being considered as 
transcendentals, i.e. predicates applicable across all Aristotelian categories. I 
have already provided examples where Spinoza uses the term ens himself. 
                                                                                                                                                      
kind of knowledge in which particular things are not understood as modes, since in 
their regular signification modes do not involve existence through God’s essence. In 
this case they lose their particularity and temporality and are seen through God. 
154 E2P40s. 
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With regard to the term res, he tends to use it when referring to God, not 
absolutely, but as expressed through an attribute.155 Since this passage shows 
that Spinoza rejects the understanding of ens as a transcendental, this seems 
more troubling for the earlier scholastic conception of ens as a transcendental 
rather than for Wolff’s conception of the science of ens qua ens from Ontologia, 
the work which will not be published for another 53 years after Spinoza’s 
Ethics.156 There is, however, another paragraph which can be seen as 
anticipating and rejecting ontology in the style of Wolff: 
 
Perfection and imperfection, therefore, are only modes of 
thinking, that is, notions we are accustomed to feign because 
we compare individuals of the same species or genus to one 
another… For we are accustomed to refer all individuals in 
Nature to one genus, which is called the most general, that is, 
to the notion of an entity [ad notione entis], which pertains 
absolutely to all individuals in Nature.157 
 
What Spinoza tells us here is that this attempt to philosophise 
according to what is common to all particulars through the notion of an entity 
is customary, but mistaken. And this is one of the foundations of Wolff’s 
system: to investigate ens qua ens, as that which is common to all individuals. 
For Spinoza, however, this constitutes the wrong approach to Nature. 
 
On the other hand, someone could say that what Spinoza and Wolff are 
doing is ultimately the same. If for Spinoza there is only one entity, God, and 
everything has to be and be known through God, does this not mean that 
everything is ultimately known through the investigation of ens qua ens, i.e. 
through the investigation of God in His infinity? This certainly does constitute 
a similarity, and I have begun this comparison by stating that there certainly 
are similarities between the two. But the way Spinoza’s system develops, even 
                                                        
155 See, for example, E2D1, P1, P2, P5. 
156 For details on the difference between Wolffian ontology and scholastic scientia 
transcendens see de Boer 2011. 
157 E4 Prae. II/207. 
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admitting this as being reminiscent of Wolff’s way of proceeding, does not 
warrant a claim that the two systems are ultimately the same in their way of 
investigation, or that Spinoza’s system can be called an ontology in the style of 
Wolff. The reason for that is that Wolff’s ontology differs from Spinoza’s 
philosophy, beyond the fact that the former, unlike the latter, investigates ens 
as a genus common to all entia, by proceeding to investigate predicates 
common to all the possible particulars. One difference regarding this aspect is 
that for Spinoza the only proper predicates, or predicates comparable to the 
way ontological predicates are conceived by Wolff, are the attributes or “what 
the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence.” Modes, on 
the other hand, are “affections of a substance, or that which is in another 
through which it is also conceived.”158 Taking that into account, one problem 
with the comparison between Wolff and Spinoza is that for Spinoza only two 
of these predicates seem to be knowable: thought and extension. Anything else 
that might appear in Wolff as a predicate of a possible entity, such as motion, 
duration, finitude, possibility, necessity, etc. while although they might appear 
in Spinoza, will not appear as predicates of possible entities, but as results of 
God’s activity. In short, Spinoza is not in the business of cataloguing predicates 
of all the possible particulars, but instead attempts to understand everything 
through the explication of the nature of a unique, absolute entity. 
 
Approached from that perspective, and paired with the question of 
Aristotelian Ambiguity, Spinoza’s system seems more similar to the one that 
sees Primary Philosophy as theology in Aristotle’s sense, rather than as a 
science of ens qua ens. Both Spinoza and Aristotle, instead of focusing on the 
science of the universal concept of ens, or to on, focus the specific entity which 
serves as the prime expression of substance and actuality, with its way of being 
imitated by the particulars.159 But Spinoza is far from being properly called an 
‘Aristotelian’. It is true that from the perspective of the Aristotelian Ambiguity 
he falls more on the theological, rather than ens qua ens, or ontological side, 
                                                        
158 E1D4 & 5. 
159 In Aristotle this is the telic completion of the Prime Mover, in Spinoza it is the 
conatus through which the infinite power of God is expressed as striving to persevere 
in existence. 
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and that for both philosophers God exemplifies the way of being of supreme 
actuality and is, as Spinoza puts it, “absolutely the first cause.”160 Moreover, 
both Spinoza and Aristotle reject the idea of treating the concept of the entity 
as a genus common to all, but in different ways. In Aristotle, “entity” is a pros 
hen equivocal, and for Spinoza it is said only of God or Substance since, pace 
Aristotle, there is only one Substance. Furthermore, for Aristotle, god, who is 
ultimately only one among many substances, is seen as the first cause, but the 
first final cause. For Spinoza, however, God is the first efficient cause “not only 
of the existence of things, but also of their essence.”161 As we remember from 
before, existence is not a concern of Primary Philosophy, neither for Wolff, nor 
for Aristotle. Moreover, one of Spinoza’s conceptions of God is Natura naturans 
which stands for “what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such 
attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, that is… God, 
insofar as he is considered as a free cause.” This is opposed to Natura naturata, 
which signifies “whatever follows from the necessity of God’s nature.”162 
Natura naturans, therefore, expresses the conception of God as an absolutely 
active nature, in opposition to the passive (or less active) nature of the modes 
that follow from God. Now, it is true that Aristotle’s god can be considered to 
be ‘active’ since he exemplifies energeia or activity/actuality in the highest 
degree, being completely free from any potentiality. However, the source of 
Aristotelian energeia lies in the fact that god is a purely formal cause, free from 
any matter. For Spinoza, however, it lies in the fact that God is the first 
efficient cause, or rather, in his conception of God’s power, which “is his 
essence itself.”163 This means that for Spinoza the conception of the supreme 
entity will not be understood through its form, through what it is, but through 
its efficiency, or through what it does. And what it does is to express infinitely 
many things in infinitely many modes. 
                                                        
160 E1P16c. There are some other similarities between Spinoza and Aristotle or 
Aristotelians. For example, Spinoza’s understanding of a proprium, which seems to 
underpin the way things “follow” from the absolute essence of God, is dependent on 
this Scholastic-Aristotelian idea. 
161 E1P25. 
162 E1P29s. 
163 EIP34. 
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This focus on efficient causality as the foundation of everything is more 
reminiscent of Aquinas than Aristotle. Both Aquinas and Spinoza see the 
efficient cause as the cause exemplifying the primary way of being, or God’s 
productive power. For Spinoza, as it is for Aquinas, “God’s existence and his 
essence are one and the same.”164 Moreover, for both, God is not the cause of 
the essence of man, but is the cause of its existence. In Spinoza, we can find 
this in E2P10: “The being of substance [esse substantiae] does not pertain to the 
essence of man, or substance does not constitute the form of man.” Now the 
paragraph containing that similarity also contains an important difference 
between the two. For Spinoza, God is not the cause of man’s essence, of the 
essence of a finite mode, when God is understood absolutely. However, if God 
is understood as modified by a modification he “is the only cause of all things, 
both of their essence and of their existence… Not only of their becoming [fieri], 
but also of their being [esse].”165 This, however, would not work in Aquinas’ 
system. God’s efficient causality, for Aquinas, is seen as strictly different from 
the efficient causality of ‘making’ or ‘becoming’, and two ways of perceiving 
God, absolutely and as affected, has no parallel in Aquinas. Finally, there is an 
infinite distance between Aquinas’ and Spinoza’s conception of God, since 
under latter’s conception God is “the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all 
things.”166 But one aspect that significantly differentiates Spinoza from both 
Aquinas and Wolff is the distinction in the conception of divine volition. 
 
Both Aquinas and Wolff consider God’s act of Creation to be a free act 
in the sense of a voluntary act. God willed to create everything, so He did. For 
Spinoza, the situation is different. God being free to create, for Spinoza, means 
simply that God was not forced by an external cause to create. Instead, all that 
can be called ‘creation’ follows necessarily from God’s nature. Creation is 
hence not a free voluntaristic act, but instead is a necessary result of God’s 
power. This impacts how one conceives the idea of omnipotence. Under the 
voluntaristic model, omnipotence can be understood as God’s power to create 
                                                        
164 E1P20. 
165 EIP10s2. 
166 EIP18. 
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whatever He wills. If God is then seen as the first cause of everything this 
creates a possibility of God not willing to create or willing to create the world 
differently. This results in the world that God has chosen to create being 
characterised by the possibility of being created differently, since we could 
argue that in order for creation to be an act of free volition God must have 
been able to create a different world. In that sense, to see the world from God’s 
perspective is to see it as a particular actualisation of a series of potential and 
possible worlds. Omni-potentia can then be understood as a power of 
actualising any possibility, and creation as an act of actualising a particular 
possibility. And this is what Wolff’s approach to the science of the entity qua 
entity is. It is an investigation into the necessary predicates of any possible 
entity. Truly actual entities are irrelevant. To see the world from God’s 
perspective is to see the set of possibilities which can be actualised, or not to 
care what really is actualised, but instead, to concern oneself with what lies in 
the realm of possibility prior to any actualisation. For Spinoza, the situation is 
reversed. God has no will, hence there is no voluntaristic act of creation that 
would require different possibilities to be or not to be actualised. Creation 
simply emanates necessarily from God’s nature:  
 
But to those who ask “why God did not create all men so that 
they would be governed by the command of reason?” I 
answer only “because he did not lack material to create all 
things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest”; 
or, to speak more properly, “because the laws of his nature 
have been so ample that they sufficed for producing all things 
which can be conceived by an infinite intellect.”167 
 
 So for Spinoza, omni-potentia would not signify God’s power to 
potentially create everything, but the fact that everything potential necessarily 
follows from the nature of that which is eternally actual. Possibility and 
contingency for Spinoza, which are essential to ontology as the science of 
                                                        
167 E1app, II/83. 
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predicates of possible entities, are nothing but the names for our ignorance of 
causes of singular things.168 
 
 This comparison between Wolff and Spinoza on the basis of their 
implicit relation to omnipotence (since neither of them describes omnipotence 
in those ways) is not meant as a genetic or a similar kind of argument. I do not 
wish to say that the difference between the two thinkers boils down to their 
theological preconceptions. The reason I draw this analogy is because it seems 
useful for expressing a basic difference between the nature of the systems of 
Wolff and Spinoza. I have already provided several differences between them, 
regarding the application of the concept of ens, and the treatment of 
predicates, and this is merely the last one, i.e. the one regarding their 
understanding of the position of the ideas of possibility and actuality in their 
systems. Spinoza’s system does not start from the position of possibility, or by 
asking the question of what is common to all possible entities. To treat 
something as possible is simply to be ignorant of its causes. Spinoza is 
interested in the nature of the actual reality. Wolff is interested in quite the 
opposite. He remains firmly in the realm of possibility. The predicates of ens 
qua ens are actual in the sense that they will apply to all actual entities. They 
describe the real structures of both the world and our cognition of it, but they 
do not themselves fall under the realm of actually existing entities. They 
signify the real structures of entities, but are not entities. The realm of 
actuality, for Wolff, is the realm of existing particulars, and is not the purview 
of ontology. And this difference in relation to possibility is the final thing 
making both of these systems metaphysical or rationalist, but only one of them 
ontological. 
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Part 2:   
 
The Possibility of Ontology 
Chapter Four:  Kant and Ontology 
 
With the previous chapter the history of the name and of the 
conception of ontology has been complete. We have seen both how 
the name reached Wolff and how the history of philosophy 
progressed in order to make it possible for Wolff to develop the 
discipline of ontology in the way he did. Now the investigation shifts 
to what happens to ontology after Wolff, or more specifically, to the 
idea of the possibility of such science. The first person we reach on 
this journey is Kant, and ontology does not seem to be in good 
standing for him: 
 
“[T]he proud name of an Ontology (…) must, therefore, give 
place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of pure 
understanding.”1 
 
 Besides the above-quoted passage the term ontology appears in two 
more places in the Critique of Pure Reason: in the Architectonic of Pure Reason as 
Ontologia, and in the Dialectic. Moreover, in the three instances in which the 
term appears, the meaning it bears is not equivalent. This allows us to talk 
about three senses of ontology in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. These I will call: 
the proud, architectonic, and theological sense. I will argue that every time Kant 
uses the term ‘ontology’ in these three instances he is indeed using the term in 
a different sense, but that the three senses stand in a mutual relation. They are 
connected through different ways they address the question of the possibility 
of Wolffian ontology. 
 
 The chapter will start with a short comment on certain recent literature 
that discusses, or at least appears to be discussing, Kant’s ontology. Following 
this, I will explicate the three senses of ontology that can be found in the first 
Critique and argue why and how they are supposed to be understood as three 
senses of ontology. I will start with the Architectonic sense, followed by the 
                                                        
1 CoPR, A247/B303.  
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Proud and Theological, and through this I will attempt to clarify what the term 
ontology meant for Kant himself, and which of the senses he adopts. By doing 
this, I hope to demonstrate that Kant belongs to the German ontological 
tradition and explain his position regarding the question of the possibility of 
Wolffian ontology. 
1. Kant and Ontology Today 
 
Kant’s rejection of ontology, which is expressed in the opening 
quotation of this paper, tends to be mentioned in the literature2 although not 
discussed in great detail, i.e. there is not much treatment of what it is that Kant 
is rejecting. Allison  does specify that the ontology rejected by the 
Transcendental Analytic (that is, in A247/B303) deals with “beings as such” or 
“things in general” and he equates it with “general metaphysics” or with a 
science of “being qua being.”3 From what I have already said in the previous 
chapters it is clear that this conception of ontology applies to Wolff’s 
conception of ontology. There are some other instances that suggest that when 
Allison talks about ‘ontology’ he is talking about Wolff. For example, when 
discussing the question of whether spatio-temporal predicates can be 
predicated of things in general Allison argues that Kant rejects “the whole 
ontological framework in which the question had traditionally been posited.” 
This, Allison continues, makes Kant’s move not a “novel move within 
ontology” but a “radical alternative to ontology.”4 If I understand Allison 
correctly, he argues that this is due to the fact that Kant does not intend to 
ascribe an ontological status to spatio-temporal properties, i.e. to claim that they 
do (or do not) apply to things themselves, but he intends to limit the 
predication of those properties to the domain of possible experience.5 What 
Kant limits, according to Allison, is consistent with ontology as conceived by 
Wolff and this limitation would indeed be an alternative to rather than a move 
within Wolffian ontology.  
 
                                                        
2 See Allison 2004, p. 308 and Grier 2012. 
3 Allison 2004, pp. 308, 327; cf. Allison 2015, p. 22. 
4 Allison 2015, pp. 28-9. 
5 Ibid, pp. 33-4. 
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At the present moment, I am not interested in arguing whether Allison 
is correct or not about this. What I want to see here is whether Allison uses the 
term ‘ontology’ when talking about Kant in its historical sense, or in an 
anachronistic sense. There are two things in Allison’s account that point 
towards his, possibly unintentional, use of the term ontology anachronistically 
when talking about Kant. Firstly, while I agree that Kant proposes a radical 
alternative to traditional or Wolffian ontology, and, in a sense, rejects the 
whole of the traditional ontological framework, I believe it is important to 
make this qualification (“traditional”) very explicit. This is because, as we shall 
see later, Kant retains the concept ontology within his own system and what he 
rejects is the traditional or Wolffian conception of it. While Allison seems to 
implicitly, and correctly, identify the traditional ontology with Wolffian 
ontology, there is no explicit or elaborate discussion of that philosophical 
discipline, or an account what the term ontology is used for by Kant. Secondly, 
if I am correct in reading Allison as claiming that Kant’s rejection of ontology is 
exhaustively explained by his denial of the “ontological status” of certain 
properties (in this case space and time), then Allison seems to be using the 
term ontology, or the adjective ontological, anachronistically. This is because 
the phrase ontological status is not present in Wolffian philosophy. For Kant, 
and the Wolffian tradition preceding him, the term ontology does not 
immediately refer to possible ways of treating properties, but to a specific 
philosophical science. To say in that case, that spatio-temporal properties are 
not ontological predicates would mean that they are not to be derived within 
the discipline of ontology, and not, as Allison seems to be using it, that they do 
not apply to things themselves. For example, for Wolff, predicates of special 
metaphysics are not ‘ontological predicates’, but they still apply to things as 
they are in themselves. 
 
 Another approach to discussing Kant’s conception of ontology is 
provided by Beiser.6 In discussing Kant’s pre-critical writings, specifically The 
Dreams of the Spirit-Seer and the Inaugural Dissertation, Beiser argues that the 
metaphysics Kant develops during this period is and should be an ontology. On 
the other hand, Beiser argues, that this is not to be understood as ontology in 
                                                        
6 See Beiser 1992, pp. 46–52. 
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the traditional sense, by which Beiser means “a science about some kind of 
thing.”7 By Kant’s new ontology, Beiser means a system of the most general 
attributes or predicates of things which does nothing more than determine 
concepts that are the necessary limits and conditions of reason. According to 
Beiser, the Inaugural Dissertation in this way limits metaphysics to an “ontology 
of pure concepts,” by which he means “concepts about the conditions under 
which anything can be thought.”8  
 
While I find myself agreeing with the structure Beiser sets up, I find it 
necessary to draw certain distinctions in order, once again, to separate a 
potentially anachronistic employment of the concept of ontology from the 
traditional or Wolffian one. Beiser’s definition of traditional ontology seems 
somewhat vague, especially since we know that the tradition Kant comes from 
understands ontology as a science of an entity qua entity. Unless we specify 
what we mean by this it is unclear to me why ‘ontology of pure concepts’ 
would not be a ‘science about some kind of thing’, specifically of pure 
concepts. Moreover, it is insufficient to define traditional ontology as a 
“science about some kind of thing”, since all branches of special metaphysics 
are sciences about some kind of thing (God, Soul, World), while not being 
ontology. Now if what Beiser has in mind is that the difference between the 
traditional ontology and the ontology of pure concepts consists in the former 
being a science about the thing in itself, a thing qua thing or an entity qua entity, 
which would be the same in this case, while ontology of pure concepts is a 
science of “concepts about the conditions under which anything can be 
thought,” while at the same time explicitly not being the science of things as 
they are themselves, then we can recognise this as a distinction between Wolff 
and Kant. However, the question then arises why call this science of pure 
concepts ontology? If such a discipline, while investigating, as was the practice 
of traditional ontology, the most general attributes and predicates, limits the 
domain of this investigation to the objects of cognition should it not rather be 
called an epistemology of pure concepts? The reason for that lies in the fact that 
for Wolff there was no difference between the most general conditions of our 
                                                        
7 Beiser 1992, p. 50. 
8 Ibid, pp. 52, 50. 
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cognition and the most general structures of how the things, or entities 
themselves, are. So if Kant rejects the part of the traditional ontology that 
claimed knowledge of the structure of ta onta, but retained the idea that we can 
derive the principles of our cognition a priori, it seems strange to call his science 
ontology.9 To emphasise, I am not here arguing that Beiser’s interpretation is 
incorrect, but rather that his use of the concept of ontology is ambiguous. It is 
not clear whether he intends to use it in the Wolffian sense, to argue that Kant 
himself reconceptualises what ontology is supposed to be, or whether he uses 
it in a third sense that I am not understanding. 
 
 While the works of Allison and Beiser seem to at least touch on the 
conception of ontology developed by Wolff, although often without 
referencing him or discussing its shape in details, there are authors discussing 
Kant and ontology who do not use the term in its traditional or Kantian sense 
at all. To identify such a practice one needs to look no further than Ameriks’ 
(1992) paper “The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology.” 
While Ameriks’ title sounds like a perfect title for this chapter, the way in 
which ontology in relation to Kant is discussed, and the topics Ameriks treats, 
are completely different from my approach and focus. For example, the 
mentioned paper does not provide a discussion of Kant’s understanding of 
what ontology is. Moreover, at various points Ameriks unproblematically 
equates ontology and metaphysics, either by using them interchangeably or by 
equating “traditional ontology” with “rationalist metaphysics”.10 Furthermore, 
when describing “traditional ontology” Ameriks talks, among other things, 
about Leibniz’s position that all events within the spatio-temporal field are 
                                                        
9 See de Boer 2011b, p. 56. As she argues Kant rejects the aspects of Wolff’s ontology 
that claims that pure concepts and principles can be attributed to any entity 
whatsoever, but retains the “epistemological strand of Wolff’s ontology.” 
10 See Ameriks 1992, pp. 249, 272. One straightforward danger with equating ontology 
(especially the traditional one) with metaphysics comes from the fact that, as we will 
remember, the latter served as a more general term than ontology. Metaphysics was 
itself divided into metaphysica generalis, which was called ontologia, and metaphysica 
specialis, which was not. Moreover, while one can equate traditional ontology with 
rationalist metaphysics, the inverse does not hold, as I hope to have shown in the 
previous chapter. 
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governed by the principle of sufficient reason, states that ontological questions 
deal with the exact nature of substance, cause, matter, etc., and categorises the 
question of whether there are simple substances as “the general ontological 
question”.11 The problem with this approach is that it applies the concept of 
ontology anachronistically, or at least imprecisely regarding the way we have 
seen it being developed by Wolff. For example, I have shown that “the general 
ontological question” of Wolff was “what is an entity qua entity” and not any 
sort of “what there is” question, which were the domain of special 
metaphysics. In that case, what Ameriks exactly means when talking about 
‘ontology’ or even ‘traditional ontology’ remains unclear.  
 
 This short excursion over these texts hopefully shows that the 
discussion of ontology in Kant is alive and well in some of the contemporary 
leading Kant scholarship. The fact, however, which differentiates my approach 
from the ones that can be found above is that I intend to discuss Kant’s 
relationship to ontology in a sense dominant in Kant’s own time and in a sense 
in which he saw himself using the term. As mentioned above, there are three 
senses in which Kant uses the term ontology and them I will call: the 
Architectonic, the Proud, and the Theological sense. 
2. The Architectonic sense 
2.  1 .  What is  the Architectonic sense of Ontology? 
 
To undertake an architectonic is to engage in “the art of constructing 
systems.”12 In this case this means to construct a system of science, specifically 
of metaphysics. To understand the Architectonic sense of ontology we first 
need to sketch out the outlines of Kant’s system of metaphysics. 
 
In the Architectonic chapter Kant tells us that Philosophy “in the strict 
sense of the term” consists of the metaphysics of nature and morals (also called 
                                                        
11 Ameriks 1992, pp. 253, 258, 261. The “ontological” question of simple substances is 
contrasted with the “cosmological issue of whether “beings in the world” consist of 
simple parts.” 
12 CoPR, A832/B860. 
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“the system of pure reason”), and of “that criticism [Kritik] of reason which 
serves as an introduction or propaedeutic to metaphysics.” This suggests that 
philosophy is, strictly speaking, metaphysics, or the employment of pure 
reason. It is the science of the “higher” (non-empirical) employment of our 
faculty of knowledge.13 But there is another element, or part, of philosophy 
besides the system of pure reason, or metaphysics - the propaedeutic or 
criticism [Kritik].14 The positioning of the critique of pure reason (or of 
metaphysics) as an additional procedure prior to the setting up of the system of 
pure reason is what Kant sees as a key difference between his system and the 
previous ones, e.g. the Leibniz-Wolff system, and as an essential distinguishing 
feature between the philosophies of scepticism, dogmatism, and criticism (the 
third surpassing the former two).15 
 
Kant’s system of pure reason, or metaphysics in the narrow sense (i.e. 
exclusive of criticism), further consists of “transcendental philosophy” and of 
“physiology of pure reason.”16 By physiology of pure reason (physiologia 
rationalis), Kant understands the treatment of nature, understood as a sum of 
objects given to the senses.  
 
If objects are treated as given to senses, we are talking about immanent 
physiology, which is concerned with either corporeal nature (rational physics) or 
thinking nature (rational psychology). If the sum of objects is treated in a 
connection which transcends all experience, i.e. as not given or givable to 
senses, we are talking about transcendent physiology, which is concerned either 
with nature as a whole (rational cosmology – transcendental knowledge of the 
world), or with the relation of nature as a whole to an entity above nature 
(rational theology – transcendental knowledge of God). 
 
Another part of the system of pure reason is called transcendental 
philosophy. In the Architectonic chapter not much is said about it. Kant only 
                                                        
13 CoPR, A835/B863. 
14 CoPR, A841/B869. 
15 CoPR, A856/B884. 
16 CoPR, A845/B873. Cf. CoPR, A841/B869. 
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briefly states that it “treats only of the understanding and of reason, in a 
system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general, but 
[which] take no account of objects that may be given.” What is important for our 
concerns is that at this point Kant names transcendental philosophy ontologia.17 
The following two diagrams could therefore illustrate Kant’s conception of 
philosophy as a systematic science: 
 
 
 
 
In the A/B Introduction we find out more about Transcendental 
Philosophy. It is a system of both analytic and synthetic Transcendental 
Knowledge,18 where Transcendental Knowledge is all knowledge concerned 
with the possibility of a priori knowledge of objects.19 From this we can 
conclude that ontology in the architectonic sense is the systematic 
investigation into the possibility of synthetic and analytic a priori knowledge of 
objects.  
 
From the fact that we know that one of the formulations of the goal of 
the critique of pure reason is an investigation into the possibility of synthetic a 
priori knowledge, it seems that there is no sharp separation between the 
propaedeutic to and the system of pure reason, or between Kant’s critique and 
ontology as conceived by Kant. The state of the matter, however, shows itself 
to be slightly more complex.  
 
                                                        
17 CoPR, A845/B873. 
18 CoPR, A12/B25. 
19 CoPR, A11/B25. 
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  Ontology, or transcendental philosophy, is “only the idea of a science 
for which the critique of pure reason has to lay down the complete 
architectonic plan,”20 i.e. guarantee the completeness and certainty of the 
structure in all its parts. The critique of pure reason (both as a discipline and as 
a philosophical text) is “not itself to be entitled transcendental philosophy.”21 It 
contains all that is essential in transcendental philosophy and is therefore a 
“complete idea of transcendental philosophy” without being equivalent to it.22 
One reason for this non-equivalence is the fact that the critique of pure reason 
concerns itself only with the possibility, extent, and application of synthetic a 
priori knowledge, while the complete system of pure reason, would need to 
contain an exhaustive analysis of the whole of a priori knowledge,23 both 
synthetic and analytic. Furthermore, the system of reason would also include, 
for example, “the definitions” of the categories and the “predicables” that are 
to be derived from them.24 
 
So one difference between Kant’s Critique and Kant’s Ontology is in 
the scope of the content they are discussing. While Ontology, or 
Transcendental Philosophy proper, would provide us with the totality of a 
priori concepts and principles, and with everything derivable from them, 
critique does this only for the synthetic a priori. 
 
But the main difference lies in the fact that the critique, as a 
propaedeutic, is supposed to be the science of the “examination of pure 
reason, its sources and limits”25 while ontology, as a (part of the) system of pure 
reason, is further philosophising within these limits. This difference is not 
merely between the extent of the content the two disciplines cover, but 
establishes the two as different kinds of disciplines.  
 
                                                        
20 CoPR, A13/B27. 
21 CoPR, A13/B27. 
22 CoPR, A14/B28. 
23 CoPR, A13/B27. 
24 CoPR, B108. 
25 CoPR, A11/B25.  
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What the critique does is to provide a general form under which any 
more contentful metaphysics (as a science of pure and speculative reason) is to 
operate. In addition, the critique justifies the application of the fundamental 
concepts and principles essential for metaphysics (in this way providing some 
content itself), which may or may not have traditionally been employed in it. 
Critique orients and justifies, ontology further derives. 
 
The way in which the Critique determines the form of subsequent 
metaphysics can be seen through the division of the text. The division of the 
Critique, understood to be a division of the propaedeutic to the system of pure 
reason, tells us how to treat various topics, traditionally considered 
metaphysical (in the sense of both general and special metaphysics). This is 
the sense in which the Critique lays down the “complete architectonic plan” for 
metaphysics. Specifically, Transcendental Aesthetic establishes rational 
physics and psychology (which together constitute immanent physiology), 
Transcendental Dialectic establishes rational cosmology and theology 
(together constitute transcendent physiology), and transcendental analytic 
establishes ontology. The following diagrams can further illustrate this 
division:  
 
 
 
The way in which the Critique establishes rational physics is by 
showing that any sort of metaphysics that wishes to discuss the external world 
needs to understand the world as determined by the form of outer intuition – 
space. Rational psychology, or the metaphysics of the soul, is to treat of its 
object as falling under the form of inner sense. In this way, the propaedeutic 
establishes the form of immanent physiology, or the metaphysics of nature qua 
sum of all objects given to senses. If a metaphysician is concerned with a world 
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which is not given (and cannot be given) to the senses, i.e. if they wish to treat 
“the connection of objects of experience which transcends all experience,”26 
the Critique also establishes a way to deal with such issues in a scientifically 
justified manner. The world in its totality and God are not to be understood 
and treated by rational cosmology and theology, as they once have been, as if 
they were separate entities whose origin, existence, or essential structure one 
attempts to deduce a priori. What Kant’s propaedeutic establishes, through the 
Transcendental Dialectic, is that such metaphysical topics are to be understood 
and treated as the Ideas of Reason. 
 
It is important to note that what determines the legitimate treatment 
and the form of engagement with these topics is not called ontology, but 
propaedeutic. For Kant, the form and function of ontology is itself defined by 
the propaedeutic, more particularly, the Transcendental Analytic part of his own 
propaedeutic: the Critique of Pure Reason. The position of ontology in the 
metaphysical system is determined through using the same criteria utilised in 
defining the two kinds of physiologies, i.e. its relation to objects of experience. 
The defining feature of ontology, for Kant, is that it treats of objects in general, 
without taking into account the specific manner in which they are given in 
intuition. While immanent physiology treats of specific objects that are given 
in intuition, such as matter and the empirical self , transcendent physiology of 
objects that cannot be given in intuition, ontology will treat of what is common 
to both kinds of objects. In the architectonic sense, therefore, ontology is the 
science of the pure form of the thought of possible objects of cognition.  In this 
sense, there is a similarity between what ontology is for Kant and what it was 
for Wolff. It is still general metaphysics or philosophy of the most general 
concepts and principles, the one that will treat of what is common to all 
objects of metaphysics indiscriminately.  
 
Transcendental Analytic posits the form and the minimal, essential 
content of ontology. By the form, I understand the fact that the Critique is 
intended to show that the science of ontology will treat its subject-matter 
under the phenomena-noumena distinction, under the principle of all analytic 
                                                        
26 CoPR, A845-6/B873-4. 
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judgments (i.e. non-contradiction) and under the Highest principle of all 
synthetic judgments: “every object stands under the necessary conditions of 
synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.”27 From 
the Highest principle, according to Kant, it follows that the conditions of the 
possibility of experience in general are conditions of the possibility of the 
objects of experience.  
 
Besides positing only the form of a legitimate metaphysical science, the 
Critique will also establish and justify the essential content ontology will work 
with. By this content I understand, among others, the Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding, or the Categories, which, analogously to the purpose of Kant’s 
ontology, “think objects in general, without regard to the special mode 
(sensibility) in which they may be given.”28 Additional content posited and 
justified by the Critique can be found in the section 3 of the second chapter of 
the Analytic or Principles.29 This content is posited in the propaedeutic, but it 
seems as if it concerns (or falls within) ontology itself, suggesting again a 
possible interchangeability between them. Regardless of this apparent overlap, 
there is still a significant distinction between the two disciplines. This 
distinction is to be found in the way the two deal with such overlapping 
content.  
 
In the referred-to section, the Critique puts forward and works with 
certain positive metaphysical content. For example, talking about the axioms 
of intuition, Kant tells us that “[a]ll intuitions are extensive magnitudes.”30 
Similarly, the first and the second analogy, respectively, tell us that “[i]n all 
change of appearances substance is permanent,” and that “[a]ll alterations take 
place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect.”31 These 
claims sound as if they could unproblematically apply to the metaphysics of 
                                                        
27 CoPR, A158/B197. 
28 Cf. CoPR, A254/B309 & A845/B873. 
29 By this I refer to the Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of 
Experience, and Postulates of Empirical Thought in general. 
30 CoPR, A162/B202. 
31 CoPR, A182/B224 & B232. 
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nature itself, or appear under the heading ontology in some previous (or 
subsequent) metaphysical systems. The reason, however, why they do appear 
in the propaedeutic and at this point ground ontology, rather than are ontology, 
is due to the role of the propaedeutic. Its role is to show which of these 
principles, which might have appeared before in the metaphysical tradition, 
can now be used in a legitimate, rather than dogmatic manner. The 
propaedeutic to metaphysics, in Kant’s case the Critique of Pure Reason, is here 
to test and justify the plurality of concepts and principles that have 
traditionally been at metaphysicians’ disposal. The purpose of Kant’s ontology 
is to further develop whatever necessarily follows from these concepts and 
principles shown to be (il)legitimate by the propaedeutic, even if the ending 
and the starting point of the propaedeutic and ontology, i.e. the Categories and 
principles derivable from them, do come together. 
 
 Since the propaedeutic formally establishes ontology to be the 
philosophy of the most general concepts and principles, all of the established 
distinctions and concepts ontology works under, including the Highest 
principle, will apply to the domains of special metaphysics (or physiology) as 
well. Since ontological principles, according to the results of the Critique, are 
the principles of the science of objects in general, they also apply to the sciences 
treating of objects in a specific rather than general way, i.e. specific ways these 
objects relate to intuition. Due to this, to investigate any domain of theoretical 
philosophy will be to investigate the concepts and principles applying to 
objects of experience, rather than to things in themselves, or Wolffian entities qua 
entities. 
 
 This complete architectonic of the system of pure reason, with all its 
limitations, according to Kant, necessarily follows from the criticism of pure 
reason. As Kant puts it, the criticism itself is prescribed by the originative idea of 
a philosophy of pure reason itself and is in accordance with the essential ends of 
reason and so unchangeable and of legislative authority.32 This means that the 
system of pure reason follows from the fundamental conception of what 
criticism is: the attempt to investigate the limits of cognition before cognizing. 
                                                        
32 CoPR, A847/B875. 
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Such a basis ultimately shows that any metaphysical edifice needs to fall 
within the laws and limits of cognition. 
 
To philosophise is to think under the tribunal of pure reason itself. But 
to criticise is to investigate and establish such a tribunal.33 This is what it 
means to establish a form of philosophical system, while the actual system is to 
be completed subsequently and would be “not half as large, but incomparably 
richer in content” than the Critique of Pure Reason.34  
2.  2.  The name ontology 
 
 Ontology in the architectonic sense is a science that attempts to 
establish the totality of our a priori concepts and principles, synthetic and 
analytic, within the limits and the sense designated by the philosophical 
propaedeutic, or the Critique of Pure Reason. The Critique provides the 
fundamental concepts required for such a science (categories, schematism, 
phenomenal-noumenal, etc.) and determines the limit of employment of such 
a discipline. Ontology, and hence any subsequent theoretical philosophy, can 
only talk about concepts and principles applicable (or related) to objects of 
experience and not to things in general, or entities qua entities. Any 
metaphysical discovery is therefore a discovery of the way in which an object 
is represented in cognition, rather than a way in which a thing itself is.  
 
 But why is Kant justified in calling such a science ontology and why 
does he call it so? The first answer concerns the tradition of naming the most 
general branch of metaphysics. The way in which Kant’s system as a whole 
(with an exception of the propaedeutic) is described in the Architectonic shows 
that it does not differ very much in its structure from the ‘traditional’ or 
Wolffian system of metaphysics. Wolff, as we have seen earlier, defines 
Ontology as “First Philosophy, or science of the entity in general [scientia entis in 
genere], or to the extent it is an entity,”35 the first principle this philosophy 
investigates being the principle of contradiction. For Baumgarten, similarly, 
                                                        
33 CoPR, Axi-xii. 
34 CoPR, Axxi. 
35 WO, §1. Translation mine.  
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Ontology (which he also names ontosophia, metaphysics, universal metaphysics, 
architectonics, and first philosophy) is “the science of the more general predicates 
of an entity.”36 Due to this practice, it is not strange to call the most general 
metaphysical (but not critical) investigation ontology, since this is the term the 
dogmatist tradition used for such an endeavour. 
 
 By investigating the architectonic sense of ontology we see that Kant is 
aware of Wolff’s conception of ontology and as such belongs to the German 
ontological tradition. But we can suggest that there is a more significant reason 
why Kant calls Transcendental Philosophy ontology. The reason is that we can 
see what Kant is doing as an act of appropriation: the adoption of a term with 
intent to dispel the original meaning and replace it with one’s own. By 
changing the idea of philosophy from the investigation of things or entities as 
they are in themselves (entities qua entities) into the investigation of things or 
entities as they are for us (entities qua objects of cognition), Kant effectively 
appropriates the notion of ontology for his new philosophical science, cutting 
it off from its traditional sense. It is in this sense that Kant’s definition of 
ontology differs from the ones proposed by Wolff and Baumgarten, to which 
we are now moving. 
3. The Proud Sense 
 
 In the Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment Kant informs us that the 
Transcendental Analytic reaches an important conclusion. It concludes that 
the most the understanding can achieve a priori is to anticipate the form of a 
possible experience in general. Since that which is not appearance cannot be 
an object of experience, Kant continues, understanding can never transcend 
those limits of sensibility within which alone objects can be given to us. This 
conclusion immediately leads Kant to the rejection of Ontology:  
 
[P]rinciples [of understanding] are merely rules for the 
exposition of appearances; and the proud name of an 
Ontology that presumptuously claims to supply, in 
                                                        
36 BM, §4. Translation modified. 
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systematic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori knowledge of 
things in general (for instance, the principle of causality) 
must, therefore, give place to the modest title of a mere 
Analytic of pure understanding.37  
 
This description does not seem to fit with what was earlier said about 
Kant’s ontology. In the Architectonic there was no mention of ontology giving 
place to the analytic of understanding. Instead, the Analytic was supposed to 
architectonically ground the legitimate sense of ontology and its essential 
content, while being separate from it at the same time.  
 
This incompatibility comes from the fact that the term ontology 
appearing in the Architectonic is used in a different sense in the Analytic. The 
quoted passage (from the Analytic) refers to the conception of ontology as used 
by Wolff, i.e. to the science of the most general predicates of things or entities, 
with the example in the parenthesis referring to Leibniz’s application of the 
Principles of Sufficient Reason to things in general.38 
 
This proud sense, therefore, exemplifies the dogmatist, or Wolffian 
conception of ontology, rather than the critical conception of ontology. It 
refers to ontology not scrutinised by a prior critique, to ontology as a discipline 
that believes it is providing an account of the principles of things applicable 
beyond our possible experience. This reference serves as an example of Kant’s 
appropriation of the term. The dogmatist’s illegitimate use of the term ontology 
is to be replaced by the more modest, legitimate use prescribed by the Critique 
(science of entities qua objects of cognition, not qua entities). The proud, 
dogmatic, sense rejected in the Analytic is to be replaced by the more humble, 
or deflated sense, proposed in the Architectonic. In this case, it is not so much 
                                                        
37 CoPR, A247/B303 
38 Although for Wolff the “systematic doctrinal” derivation of the predicates of things 
in general was supposed to proceed in an analytic, rather than synthetic manner. 
Kant’s arguments for understanding metaphysics and geometry as synthetic rather 
than analytic sciences is a significant aspect of his critique of Wolff, but I will 
unfortunately not go into it in more details. 
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that ontology gives way to the analytic of understanding, but that the dogmatist 
sense of ontology gives way to the legitimate one, i.e. the one established by the 
Critique. 
 
There is, however, a sense in which ontology itself does “give way” to 
the analytic. The sense in which it does so is as first philosophy. What gives way 
is the idea that, methodologically, philosophy is to start with, aspire to, or be 
grounded in the investigation of things as they are in the most general way. In 
other words: in God’s perspective of the world.  
 
In what seems like an implicit attack on Spinoza, Kant comments: “in 
the infancy of philosophy, man began where he should have ended – in the 
knowledge of God.”39 But this is not merely a problem of the infancy of 
philosophy since “[m]etaphysics has accordingly lapsed back into the ancient 
time-worn dogmatism.”40 What begins and grounds Kant’s modern, non-
dogmatist philosophy, and grants it the much-desired scientificity, is the 
propaedeutic to philosophy undertaken through the critique of the limits of 
cognition. The results of this critique show, according to Kant, that all 
metaphysics is ultimately to be limited by sensibility in some way. Immanent 
physiology in that case is the philosophy of objects that can be (and are) given 
in sensible experience. Transcendent physiology is its opposite, the 
philosophy of that which cannot be given in experience, and as such it only 
has significance due to its immanent contrary.41 Even the part of metaphysics 
which by its very definition does not concern itself with mode of givenness (in 
sensible or any other intuition), i.e. ontology, has been shown by the Critique to 
need to relate ultimately only to what can be given in sensibility and therefore 
to give us principles only of possible experience, rather than of things in 
general. 
 
                                                        
39 CoPR, A852/B880. 
40CoPR, Ax. 
41 As this is, for example, visible through Kant’s inclusion of the Ideas of Reason and 
Transcendental Illusion within the complete propaedeutic, while arguing that they 
are to be taken merely in their regulative employment. 
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Rejecting this, or better to say, failing to realise this, is what makes 
dogmatist philosophy proud. Dogmatism, in Kant’s view, does not see a need 
to begin philosophy by investigating the limits of cognition. Due to this it 
believes that our cognition can achieve more than it can achieve: that it can 
achieve what could only possibly be God’s perspective on things. For pride, or 
better arrogance, is superbia, the seventh sin, the source of all the others, the 
belief that one’s power is greater than it is, making one believe that one’s 
power is more important than God has intended it to be, or even that it is 
independent from God. Humilitas – the opposite of superbia – humbleness or 
groundedness, signifies recognition of one’s limitations, self-restrain, and 
submission to God’s grace through clear understanding of one’s place in 
Creation. The critique of cognition shows, according to Kant, that cognition is 
indeed limited, and limited by sensibility, and what is left for us is to 
understand this and proceed with philosophy within such, more modest, 
context. 
4. The Theological Sense 
 
 The proud sense, the sense that ignores our God-given limitations, 
leads us to the third sense of ontology present in the Critique: the theological 
sense. While this sense of ontology can be found in the Dialectic, the term does 
not appear explicitly. Instead, it is to be found in terms such as ontotheology 
and ontological proof.  
 
Today we tend to use the term ‘ontological argument’ for various a 
priori arguments for the existence of God based on His definition or essence, 
whether we talk about such proofs appearing in Anselm, Aquinas, or 
Descartes. These thinkers, however, did not call the type of argument they 
utilised ‘ontological’ and I was not able to find any use of such a name for this 
kind of argumentation prior to Kant. It is safe to assume, therefore, that the 
phrase ‘ontological proof’ is yet another of Kant’s many terminological 
contributions to subsequent philosophy which we tend to employ uncritically 
when talking about our contemporaries or about pre-Kantian philosophers. 
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 In the chapter of the Dialectic, entitled The Ideal of Pure Reason, Kant 
proclaims that “There are only three possible ways of proving the existence of God 
[Dasein Gottes] by means of speculative reason:”42 the physico-theological proof, 
cosmological proof and ontological proof. 
 
 Kant’s rejection of the ontological proof on the grounds that existence 
is not a real predicate, and hence does not belong analytically to a concept of 
an entity containing all reality, is certainly not an obscure or rarely discussed 
part of the Critique of Pure Reason. The question I want to ask is: why is this 
proof called ontological, or what is its connection with ontology? 
 
 What distinguishes the ontological proof from the other two proofs is 
the fact that it proceeds from the nature of a specific entity – Ens Realissimum – 
to the claim that such an entity exists of necessity.43 The other two types of 
proof attempt to demonstrate the need for some sort of necessary existence 
and then ascribe it to Ens Realissimum.44  
 
This is one of the reasons why I believe this proof is called ontological. It 
starts by appealing to the nature of a most universal entity, rather than with an 
object of cognition. The reason why a dogmatist theologian could not treat Ens 
Realissimum as merely an object of cognition comes from the fact that the 
concept ex definitio contains all predicates, not only those which can be given in 
intuition. To adopt a more traditional formulation: God is a being than which 
a greater one cannot be conceived, and a being containing all the predicates of 
possible, sensible experience could not be greater than a being containing all 
predicates simpliciter.  
 
                                                        
42 CoPR, A590/B618 – original emphasis. 
43 Ens Realissimum being a term inherited from Wolff for whom “Ens perfectissimum 
dicitur, cui insunt omnes realitates compossibiles in gradu absolute summo.” See TN 2, 
§6. Emphasis mine. 
44 Here I am adopting Michelle Grier’s reading of the Dialectic, as presented in, for 
example, Grier 2012. 
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The important factor in calling this proof ontological lies in the fact that 
it starts by focusing on the nature of God and understands God as the most 
universal entity – hence its alternative name onto-theology. In this way, it 
follows the procedure of dogmatist ontology of starting with the most abstract 
conception of a nature of an entity, the one supposedly shared by all other 
entities, and deriving conclusions from it, a priori.45 Furthermore, again in line 
with the dogmatist conception of ontology, the ontological proof tries to derive 
the existence of God, understood as a special kind of entity, from His mere 
concept. Finally, the entity, whose existence it analytically derives, is the one 
that would itself transcend the Kantian limits of cognition, i.e. it would be a 
thing or entity in itself, not one given or able to be given in intuition.  
 
Putting these characteristics together shows that the ontological proof 
proceeds in a way analogous to the way proud ontology proceeds. It starts 
from the most general concept of something (in this special case with God, in 
the general case with the entity qua entity) and then attempts to a priori derive 
the characteristics that would apply to entities in themselves, even if these 
entities could not be given in intuition. 
 
Another parallel with dogmatist ontology comes from Kant’s claim that 
the other two theological proofs are grounded in the ontological one. This 
suggests that the ontological proof relates to the other two, as the Wolffian, or 
                                                        
45 There is a long tradition of such philosophical way of thinking into which we can 
place, for example, Aristotle’s identification of Primary Philosophy with Theology, 
that is his idea that the formal way of being of entities is the best exemplified by the 
purely formal, simple way of being of god (see Metaphysics 6, 1.1026a19, Metaphysics 12, 
6.1071b20-3 & 7.1072b10-11). Aristotle, however, while believing that the order of nature 
proceeds in that direction, posits the inverse order or knowledge (Physics 1, 1.194a10-21) 
and hence does not fall neatly in this picture. Interesting comparison is with Aquinas’ 
who defines metaphysics as a science of what is common to all entities, or the science 
of esse commune, and argues that the order of theology starts from the positing of the 
most universal (God) and from it deriving the particular (De Trinitate, pars 3, q.5, a.4, 
ad.6; pars 3, q.6, a.1, co.22.; ST, Lib. 1, q.3, a.4, arg.1; SCG Lib. 2, cap. 4). Aquinas, on the 
other hand argues against the idea that God is an entity and rejects the ontological 
argument. 
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proud, ontology relates to the Wolffian specific metaphysics. The posits of 
proud ontology (i.e. the posits about the most general concepts and principles 
applicable to things, or to entities) determine the structure and apply to 
subsequent investigations of rational specific metaphysics.46 Analogously, the 
ontological proof can be seen as grounding any kind of rational theology in the 
same way. It serves as the first theology, in the same way as proud ontology 
serves as the first philosophy.  
 
In summary, what makes ontological proof ontological is the fact that 
Kant sees it as unfolding analogously to the procedure of traditional ontology. 
It is not the case that it is called ontological because it is ultimately concerned 
with the existence of a certain entity. What is significant is the original concern 
of the ontological argument, and that is the nature of a certain entity, rather 
than its existence or existence itself. Moreover, I would argue that even the fact 
that it is ultimately concerned with the existence of a particular entity, or the 
fact that it presupposes that existence is a real predicate, is not relevant in 
calling this proof ontological.47  The reason why it is ontological is due to the 
fact that it does what dogmatic ontology does. It concerns itself with entities, or 
things in general, rather than objects of cognition, and believes that from such 
concepts it can infer a priori properties of things that cannot be given in 
intuition and of things as they are in themselves. 
 
The theological sense of ontology is therefore nothing more than the 
proud sense applied to a domain of special metaphysics. They are both rejected 
in the same way: they belong to the pre-critical dogmatist belief that 
philosophy can begin without the previous critique of the limits of cognition. 
                                                        
46 We should remember Wolff’s conception of subsequent sciences “borrowing” 
predicates from ontology. 
47 Except maybe accidentally. The reason why the proof is ontological is not because it 
attempts to posit the existence of something, but due to the fact that it wants to posit 
the existence of something in itself from its mere concept, as traditional ontology 
attempted. In that case, if it were possible to posit the existence of God qua object of 
cognition from the mere concept of God, the name “ontological argument” would be 
less suitable. 
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Once the critique has established those limits, i.e. the legitimate limits of 
ontology, it shows that such endeavours do not possess the legitimacy required 
for making theoretical judgments. This allows Kant to further appropriate 
ontology, and appropriate God Himself, within the framework of 
transcendental philosophy. 
5. The Impossibility of Ontology 
 
 In this chapter I have argued that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
uses the term ontology in the three different, but mutually related senses which 
I have called: the Architectonic, Proud, and Theological sense. 
 
Ontology in the Architectonic sense is the science of objects of cognition 
in general, i.e. regardless of the way they may actually be given in intuition. Its 
goal is to collect and systematise the totality of our a priori concepts and 
principles, both synthetic and analytic, under the framework set by the 
Analytic of Understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason and from the minimal 
content posited (and shown to be legitimate) by the Critique. This is the 
primary and the only legitimate sense of ontology and is seen as a replacement 
of the earlier Wolffian conception of ontology. As such, is Kant’s conception of 
Ontology. 
 
Ontology in the Proud sense is ontology as understood by dogmatist 
metaphysicians: an a priori science of the most general principles of things or 
entities qua entities. It is traditionally seen as the beginning of any scientific 
philosophical system, and as the science on whose findings all subsequent 
metaphysics (and science in general) depends. As such, it believes that the 
most general concepts and principles available to us are applicable to the 
world as it is in itself and fully derivable a priori. 
 
Ontology in the Theological sense, is the example of the proud sense as 
applied to rational theology. It derives the name from the fact that it starts with 
the most general, or indeterminate concept of an entity, proceeding in the 
same way as ontology in the proud sense does. The part of the Critique in 
which ontology in the theological sense is rejected, i.e. the transcendental 
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dialectic, is intended as a refutation and replacement of Wolffian special 
metaphysics. However, the refutation of the ontological argument serves as a 
synecdoche for the refutation of Wolffian ontology in general, and the 
argument derives its name from this relation it holds regarding Wolff. 
 
 The three senses of ontology are united in the way they relate to the 
propaedeutic to systematic philosophy – to the Critique of Pure Reason. While 
the architectonic sense is the ‘correct’ or ‘legitimate’ one, the other two 
exemplify the way we go (and have gone) astray in metaphysics if we forgo a 
propaedeutic criticism. For Kant, criticism is necessary and ultimately shows 
that theoretical, speculative philosophy has to be limited by sensibility. On the 
other hand, Kant intended to adopt huge parts of Wolffian ontology for his 
finished system of pure reason. The concepts and predicates Wolff derives in 
his philosophy are not, for Kant, all incorrect. What had to be done though, is 
to show that they do not, and cannot, apply to entities as they are in 
themselves. In that sense Kant does not reject ontology if by this we 
understand a science more ‘modest’ than the one of Wolff. But the core of 
Wolff’s ontology, it being a first philosophy and a science of entities qua 
entities, one cannot maintain upon awaking from the dogmatic slumber. 
Chapter Five:  Hegel and Ontology 
 
 By reaching this section we have arrived at the last stage of this history 
of ontology. The first chapters described how the term was coined and the 
intellectual trajectory that led it to its realisation in the system of Wolff. The 
Kant chapter showed how the term passed through Kant and what place it 
took in his philosophy. Now it is time to see how it showed itself by the time it 
reached Hegel.  
 
 My aim in this section is to show that Hegel belongs to what I have 
called the ‘German ontological tradition’. As a reminder, by this I mean that 
Hegel’s understanding of what ontology is, is based on Wolff’s conception of 
that philosophical science. Similarly to what was the case with Kant, this does 
not mean that Hegel is undertaking a kind of scientific investigation identical to 
the one Wolff was undertaking. In fact, it means that, again as is the case with 
Kant, whenever the term ‘ontology’ is used it is used in a way that either 
criticises or adopts certain features of Wolffian ontology, which Hegel more 
often than not tends to call either ‘the old metaphysics’, ‘common 
metaphysics, ‘previous metaphysics’, or simply ‘metaphysics’. As members of 
the German ontological tradition, therefore, both Kant and Hegel show 
themselves to be engaging in a dialogue with Wolff, and with Wolff’s 
conception of ontology (or scientific philosophy in general), more than they 
are usually credited with. Moreover, reading Hegel from the Wolffian 
perspective will show us whether any new light can be cast on the nature of 
Hegel’s philosophy in general. Finally, the treatment of Hegel’s use of the 
concept and the conception of ontology will show us the further fall of this 
discipline into temporary obscurity and continue the story of the loss of the 
unified significance of the concept and conception of ontology reached in 
Wolff. This will ultimately enable us to showcase the period after which our 
contemporary, disparate conceptions of ontology were allowed to develop. 
 
The primary aim of this chapter, as a part of the whole, is historical, 
and that primarily regarding the history of ontology. It is not meant to be an 
exhaustive analysis or history of Hegel’s philosophy. However, when Hegel’s 
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text is read from the perspective of Wolff’s ontology, as is the case with any 
perspectival reading, a certain interpretation of the nature of Hegel’s system is 
bound to arise. One can find many different interpretations of the nature of 
Hegel’s system amongst current scholarship and what all of them minimally 
do is argue for a level of plausibility of their interpretation. Regarding Hegel, I 
am not attempting anything grander. I believe that if we read Hegel from the 
perspective of the history of ontology a certain way of reading Hegel’s Science 
of Logic gains additional traction. By this I mean that a certain interpretation of 
the nature of this text, rather than, say, a particular transition or a category 
within the text, becomes more and more plausible. One difficulty with claims 
to plausibility in general, however, is that the criterion of what makes 
something plausible does not necessarily need to be shared among the 
commentators.  
 
One way to make a theory found in a historical text plausible is to aim 
to present the most ‘charitable’, ‘reasonable’, or ‘useful’ reading of the text: to 
devise a reading which would make Hegel palatable to modern readership, or 
relevant for modern debates. This, however, is not my aim. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with these approaches attempting to make an old system 
topical. But throughout the thesis I have tried as hard as I could to avoid the 
danger of anachronism. To try to do so and to present a reading that would 
kindle an interest in Hegel for scholars focusing on what they see as 
‘contemporary problems’ is too great a task for me. 
 
What I believe is that approaching Hegel from the Wolffian perspective 
is conducive to understanding the nature and aims of Hegel’s philosophy 
itself. My aim is to use this history to discover the nature of Hegel’s philosophy 
as he himself conceived of it, or more precisely, to suggest a possible avenue 
for the interpretation of Hegel’s Logic which presents itself as a believable 
perspective on the nature of his work on the basis of this specific historical 
trajectory.  If such philosophy is ultimately ‘wrong’ or impossible by today’s 
standards, or standards of any time, I have no horse in that race. As Kreines 
puts it, it is one thing to defend one’s philosophical position, either through 
historical philosophising or by other means, but “it is hard to see why we 
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should view Hegel through the lens of [a] particular contemporary ambition.”1 
If the ‘historically correct’ interpretation of Hegelianism leads to its 
overturning on the basis of Hegel’s own mistakes, if we can show that Hegel is 
immanently wrong on his own terms, then such a reading is as valuable, if not 
more, as the strongest defence of it. On the other hand, if I am overplaying the 
influence of Wolffianism on Hegel, seeing it as present where it is absent as a 
conspiracy theorist would, or if my misreading of the former leads to the 
misreading of the latter, then I am in trouble. 
 
All this being said, we begin by investigating Hegel’s use of the concept 
‘ontology’ to see how it is used and whether it can be said to have its origins in 
Wolff. Then we investigate how Hegel conceives of this ontology regarding its 
scientific status and seem to witness a rejection of ontology as a dogmatic, pre-
Critical activity. Subsequently, imitating the movement from immediacy 
through mediation, we reach the moment of sublation and Hegel’s 
formulation of the possibility of ontology. At the end, we will look at Hegel’s 
texts from a slightly greater distance and observe what this reading could tell 
us about Hegel’s system and how to see it in the context of some other, more or 
less similar, interpretations of its nature in contemporary academic literature. 
1. Hegel and the Name “Ontology” 
 
 Before looking into where the term ‘ontology’ appears in Hegel’s works, 
let us remind ourselves where we have left this term so far. The last place I 
have discussed it was in Kant’s philosophy. For Kant, ontology is a ‘proud 
name’ used in dogmatic metaphysics that is to be replaced by the more modest 
name of the ‘analytic of the understanding.’ In its more modest, Kantian, form 
the place of ontology is in the completed system of metaphysics that was 
planned to follow the Critique of Pure Reason, but was never finished. In the 
Critique, the term ‘ontology’ explicitly appears twice (as Ontologie and Ontologia, 
i.e. in German and Latin respectively), and implicitly several more times of 
which the most significant, as I have argued, is in the construction ontological 
argument. 
                                                        
1 Kreines 2006, p. 468. 
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 In the Science of Logic, the term also does not appear very frequently, 
and when it does appear it is primarily in the adjectival form present in the 
term ‘ontological argument’. I have previously argued that Kant’s naming of 
this kind of argument or proof ‘Ontological’ should be seen as significant, 
indeed should be seen as a synecdoche for Kant’s critique of the science of 
ontology, or dogmatic philosophy in general. The failure of the ontological 
argument, itself a part of special metaphysics, or its arrogant insistence that it 
can, of its own power, infer existence from an essence stands for, or is seen as a 
consequence of, the arrogant belief of dogmatism or Wolffianism that their 
‘proud’ ontology or general metaphysics can derive the predicates of the in-
itself from pure thinking. With regards to Hegel’s use of the term ‘ontological 
argument’ there is no evidence to support the claim that he intends to use it in 
the same sense Kant does, i.e. as an implicit critique of dogmatism. Instead, in 
the 35 years between the first editions of the Critique of Pure Reason and the 
Science of Logic, it seems that the name ‘ontological argument/proof’ has simply 
become a standard name for what was previously referred to as ‘a priori proof’, 
“Anselm’s proof”, etc. This is how it remains used to this day, its name devoid 
of any significance it might have held within Kant’s system. However, in the 
Logic Hegel rarely uses the term without connecting it to Kant, so we can see 
his usage of the term as referring specifically to Kant’s discussion and 
refutation of the ontological argument.2 But putting its adjectival use on one 
side, what does Hegel actually say about ontology? 
 
Hegel starts the Logic, more specifically the first Preface to it, with what 
seems to me to be a lamentation for ontology, or more precisely, for the old 
metaphysics: 
 
That which (…) was called metaphysics has been, so to speak 
extirpated root and branch and has vanished from the ranks 
of the sciences. The ontology, rational psychology, 
                                                        
2 See LoHP, v3, p. 44, f56.  I will say more about what we can learn from Hegel’s 
discussion of Kant’s conception and refutation of the ontological argument, but at this 
point I am limiting myself only to the use of the term. 
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cosmology, yes even natural theology of former times – 
where is now to be heard any mention of them, or who would 
venture to mention them? The fact is that there no longer 
exists any interest either in the form or the content of 
metaphysics, or in both together… It is (…) remarkable when 
a nation loses its metaphysics, when the spirit which 
contemplates its own pure essence is no longer a present 
reality in the life of the nation.3 
 
 Looking simply at this passage, one could say, it remains ambiguous 
whether this is a lamentation or a celebration. Sure, it would also be 
remarkable to see a country losing its fundamental economic mode of 
production, but if that mode is based on, for example, slave labour, then good 
riddance to it. To note that a loss is remarkable by witnessing the 
consequences of it is not the same as lamenting what was lost. In the same 
place we find out that this loss, amounting to the “renunciation of speculative 
thought”, was brought about by the “exoteric teaching of Kantian philosophy”, 
i.e. that the understanding should not overstep the boundaries of experience, 
lest it generate nothing but the “fantasies of the brain.” Maybe Hegel is 
claiming that we are better off being free from such fantasies and that we have 
Kant to thank for liberating us from them. Maybe what we needed all along 
was to renounce speculative thought and Kant finally brought this forward. 
 
 The Introduction to the Logic, however, suggests something different. 
Hegel claims that Kantianism cannot be seen as a sufficient replacement for 
Wolffian dogmatism. Its deficiency lies in the fact that it has focused on the 
“so-called transcendental aspect of the categories”, which yields “a blank result,” 
since it cannot contribute at all to the knowledge of the nature of the 
metaphysical categories. While Hegel believes Kantianism was a necessary 
step in the history of philosophy so that “the cognition of the infinite form, that 
is, of the Concept, would be introduced,” the Kantian standpoint has to be 
overcome. The purely formal, and for Hegel subjectivist, aspect under which 
Kantianism sees and treats the categories has to be reformulated. Pure thought 
                                                        
3 SL, p. 26. 
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has to think itself in its purity. The form of the categories has to be able to give 
itself content.4 
 
 So the old metaphysics, now lost through the Kantian renunciation of 
speculation, cannot be sufficiently supplanted by Kantianism itself. In other 
words, ‘proud ontology’ cannot be sufficiently replaced by the ‘more modest 
analytic of the understanding’. Something else must come in its place: 
 
The objective logic then, takes the place rather of former 
metaphysics which was intended to be the scientific 
construction of the world in terms of thoughts alone. If we 
have regard to the final shape in the elaboration of this 
science [i.e. of former metaphysics], then it is first and 
immediately ontology whose place is taken by objective logic.5 
 
Instead of the analytic of the understanding it will be the ‘objective 
logic’, i.e. the parts of the Science of Logic known as the Doctrine of Being and 
Essence, that will replace the former ontology. This identification of the 
Objective logic with ontology, or the idea that the objective logic replaces 
ontology, appears at least once more in Hegel’s work. It is also stated in the 
Propaedeutic, where Hegel says that the Logic is divided into three parts which 
he, at that point, calls the ontological, the subjective, and the doctrine of the 
idea.6 
 
But how do we know that this ‘ontology’ refers to Wolffianism?  
That this ‘final shape’ is in the shape of a wolf? This can be inferred 
from the fact that when Hegel refers to ontology and ‘former 
metaphysics’ in his various other works he inevitably links it to the 
                                                        
4 SL, p. 63. 
5 Loc. cit. 
6 Propaedeutic, Encyclopaedia for the higher classes (1808), p. 127, §15. By the time the 
Science of Logic is published the Doctrine of the Idea will be placed under the 
Subjective Logic, however, the ‘objective logic’ remains to be called, or remains 
analogous to, ontology, at least in the introduction.  
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philosophy of Wolff, either explicitly or implicitly. Wolffianism, as it 
is easy to see, is presented in the Encyclopaedia Logic as the 
culmination of the first ‘Stellung’ of thought regarding objectivity, i.e. 
of metaphysical philosophy.7 As Hegel puts it in the Propaedeutic: 
“[t]he objects of the common system of metaphysics are the Thing [das 
Ding], the World, Mind, and God, which give rise to the different 
metaphysical sciences: Ontology, Cosmology, Pneumatology, and 
Theology.”8 From what we know about Wolff, we know that this 
division of metaphysics is Wolffian in nature.9 Moreover, in the 
Encyclopaedia, Hegel tells us that “in its orderly shape this [former, or 
pre-Kantian] metaphysics had as its first part, Ontology. The doctrine 
of the abstract determinations of essence.”10  
 
We can here recognise the elements of Wolff’s ontology that I have 
spoken of in the earlier chapter. Ontology is put in a system of sciences 
together with cosmology, theology, and psychology, and it regards 
determinations of essences abstractly. But what about Wolff’s definition of 
ontology as a science of an entity qua entity? Hegel seems to refer to this as 
well. In the first passage from the Propaedeutic referred to above, in which 
Hegel states that the Logic falls into the ontological, the subjective, and the 
doctrine of the idea, Hegel defines ontological logic as “the system of the pure 
concepts of the entity.”11 Similarly, in the Lectures on Logic, when talking about 
Wolffianism and the first Stellung of thought, ontology is defined as the 
metaphysics of entities, but also placed in an analogy with one other historical 
system: 
                                                        
7 See specifically EL, §27 for “metaphysics of the recent past” in Germany before Kant, 
as well as §§33-4 & ad for the characterization of metaphysical thinking through 
Wolffian framework. 
8 Propaedeutic, For middle classes (1810-11), p.76, §6. 
9 It is Wolffian if not strictly speaking Wolff’s since in Wolff’s system what Hegel here 
calls ‘pneumatology’ is called ‘psychology’, while both natural theology and 
psychology constitute pneumatics.  
10 Abstrakten Bestimmungen des Wesens. EL, §33. 
11 “Das System der reinen Begriffe des Seienden.” Propädeutic, Enzklopädie für 
Oberklasse (1808), p. 149, §15. Translation modified. 
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The first branch of metaphysics is ontology, τὸ ὄν, the entity, 
the metaphysics of what is: the determinations of essence, 
being, unity, manyness, substance, and the phenomenon on 
the whole make up the Aristotelian categories. In his 
Metaphysics Aristotle goes through the same categories, the 
categories concerning whatever is.12 
 
 It is important here to note that Hegel provides this description in the 
section specifically talking about the First Stellung of thought, or the 
metaphysical period of the history of philosophy, and that it is not his only 
identification of Wolff’s metaphysical project, or at least of ontology in 
general, with Aristotle’s. For example, in his Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy Hegel once again links ontology and Aristotle’s first philosophy, but 
this time with his own term for such a discipline: 
 
Aristotle and the ancients did not know this work by the 
name of Metaphysics; it was by them called πρώτη 
φιλοσοφία. This pure philosophy Aristotle very clearly 
distinguishes from the other sciences as “the science of that 
which is, in so far as it is, and of what belongs to it implicitly 
and explicitly.” The main object which Aristotle has in view 
is the definition of what this substance (ousia) really is. In this 
ontology or, as we call it, logic, he investigates and minutely 
distinguishes 4 principles: first, determination or quality as 
such, the wherefore of anything; secondly the matter; thirdly 
the principle of motion; and fourthly, the principle of final 
cause or of the good.13 
 
 Besides this suggested affinity of Aristotle’s philosophy with ontology 
and Hegel’s logic, ontology is later in the same lectures further linked to 
                                                        
12 LoL, p. 21. Translation modified. 
13 LoHP, v2, pp. 137-8. Emphasis mine. 
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Aristotle’s logic. When talking about Aristotle’s Categories, Hegel provides this 
further analogy between the two: 
 
The Categories of which the first work [of the Organon] treats, 
are the universal determinations, that which is predicated of 
the entity [was von dem Seienden gesagt wird] (ha tôn ontôn 
katêgoreitai): as well as that which we call conceptions of the 
understanding [Verstandesbegriffe], as the Essentialities of 
things [als Wesenheit der Dinge]. This may be called an 
ontology, as pertaining to metaphysics; hence these 
determinations also appear in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.14 
 
 Seeing Aristotle’s logic as the logic of the understanding, connecting it 
to ontology, and seeing it in the similar way to Wolffianism is repeated later in 
the lectures on the history of philosophy, this time under the section on Wolff: 
 
Theoretical philosophy. It concerns firstly 1. Logic, purified of 
the endless Scholastic elaboration: it is the logic of the 
understanding that Wolff has systematised; then 2. 
Metaphysics. This contains a) Ontology, the doctrine of the 
abstract and universal categories of philosophising, of Being 
(on), that which is ens unum, bonum; [of] the One, Accident, 
Substance, Cause and Effect, Phenomenon, etc. – it is abstract 
metaphysics.15 
 
                                                        
14 LoHP, v2, p 212. Translation modified. See also EL §24: “[L]ogic coincides with 
metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts [der Wissenschaft der Dinge 
in Gendanken gefaßt] that used to be taken to express the essentialities of the things 
[die Wesenheiten der Dinge].” 
15 “Ontologie, die Abhandlung von den abstrakten, ganz allgemeinen Kategorien des 
Philosophierens, des Seins (on), daß das ens unum, bonum ist, das Eine, Akzidenz, 
Substanz, Ursache und Wirkung, das Phänomen usf. kommt vor; es ist abstrakte 
Metaphysik.” LoHP, v3. p. 158/VGP III p. 256. Translation modified. 
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 All of this suggests several things. Firstly, on the majority of occasions, 
Hegel identifies ontology with the sense established by Wolff. While he does, 
on three quoted occasions, ascribe it to Aristotle, this should not be seen as 
problematic, since the quotations suggest that Hegel sees the ontological 
aspects in Wolff and Aristotle to be very similar, if not the same. Importantly, 
this understanding of what ontology is, which Hegel identifies in both 
Aristotle and Wolff, corresponds to the Wolffian understanding of what 
ontology is, rather than certain understandings which might be more popular 
today. Hence for Hegel, ontology is a science of the abstract determinations of 
essences, or of universal categories, or the predicates of entities. It is not, for 
example, an investigation into which entities exist or do not exist.  
 
So when Hegel claims that it is now the job of the objective logic to take 
place of pre-critical metaphysics in its “final shape” of elaboration, we can see 
that the Logic is supposed to be taking place of ontology understood in the 
Wolffian sense. This can be seen from the fact that when Hegel talks about 
pre-critical metaphysics he explains it through the architectonic shape posited 
by Wolff (ontology, cosmology, psychology, theology), but also from the fact 
that at several points mentioned above Hegel refers to ontology as a science of 
the predicates of the ens. Moreover, the identification of ontology with the 
investigation into the nature of the ens in general can be seen from the 
continuation of the above quotation in which Hegel announces the 
replacement of ontology. Hegel continues: 
 
It is first and immediately ontology whose place is taken by 
objective logic – that part of this [former] metaphysics which 
was supposed to investigate the nature of ens in general; ens 
comprises both being and essence [Das Ens begreift sowohl Sein 
als Wesen in sich], a distinction for which the German 
language has fortunately preserved different terms.16 
 
 From all of this we can see that Hegel is aware of and understands 
ontology in the Wolffian sense. Furthermore, he sees his logic as a 
                                                        
16 SL, p. 63. 
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replacement, or a reformulation of this Wolffian ontology after the similar 
attempt to do so by Kant, according to Hegel, did not show itself to be as 
fruitful as hoped for. Moreover, he sees ontology, in some shape, appearing as 
early as Aristotle’s Primary Philosophy suggesting a metaphysical tradition 
starting with Aristotle, passing through Scholasticism and experiencing 
transformation in the systems of Kant and Hegel himself.17 So what Hegel sees 
is basically what I refer to as the German ontological tradition, and a history of 
its conception: a trajectory in the conceptions of metaphysics and philosophy 
that can be understood through the concept of ontology established by Wolff. 
In fact, this tradition itself is supposed to be grasped, and improved, logically 
or philosophically by the first two parts of the Science of Logic, while my thesis 
seems to be trying to do so historically through the totality of its content. 
 
 Now that we have identified that there is in fact a Wolffian aspect to be 
found in the Logic, specifically in the first two parts, let us see where this takes 
us. Hegel has, so far, told us what he considers ontology to be, that he is 
dissatisfied by the way it was supposed to be replaced by Kant’s Analytic of the 
Understanding, and that he will provide a proper replacement of it in the 
Objective logic. More than once, Hegel suggests that there is a certain identity, 
                                                        
17 In general, and after making this claim, one could object to my identification of 
Hegel’s references to pre-critical philosophy as exclusively Wolffianism, i.e. as if he 
does not also refer to Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, etc. There is a complex and a 
simple answer to that. The complex answer is that while placing such canonical 
thinkers under the heading of ‘metaphysical thinking’ historically, Hegel seems to 
treat them as if they somehow stay above its pitfalls. The only person who is 
described as being completely mired in this thinking seems to be Wolff. This suggests 
that Hegel’s relation to the tradition of pre-critical metaphysics is more complex then 
I suggest here, but could be argued for. On the other hand, the simple solution, which 
I believe will suffice, is that when Hegel is talking about Spinoza, Leibniz, or 
Descartes, he talks about Spinoza, Leibniz, or Descartes. When Hegel is talking about 
Wolff, or more precisely Wolffian style metaphysics, he tends to speak about 
‘dogmatism’, or ‘past metaphysics’, ‘former metaphysics’, etc. What I mean is that 
while Wolff is not the only pre-critical metaphysician for Hegel, whenever Hegel talks 
generically about ‘(pre-critical) metaphysics’ he can be shown to talk about 
Wolffianism.  
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or affinity, between the Logic and Wolff’s ontology. In fact, both Wolff’s 
Ontologia and Hegel’s Objective logic seem to have the same content: ens.18 It 
truly seems that Hegel’s Logic is supposed to be an argument for, or even an 
example of, the possibility of ontology after Kant. If Kant replaced ontology by 
replacing entia with phenomena, Hegel seems to be putting the ens back into the 
picture. The difficulty with putting the point this way, however, is that while 
we have established that Hegel knows what ontology is for Wolff and seems to 
suggest some affinity between Wolff’s project and his own, we still do not 
know what ontology is supposed to be for Hegel, especially since the objective 
logic is somehow supposed to replace it. Let us pass, in that case, from the 
concept to the conception. 
2. Hegel and the Conception of Ontology 
 
 Before going properly into Hegel’s critique of Wolffian ontology 
something more has to be said about the way in which the Logic replaces 
former metaphysics. I have so far twice quoted the passage claiming that the 
Logic is supposed to replace former ontology, but the passage has a 
continuation that I have so far omitted. It is not, it seems, that only ontology, or 
general metaphysics, is to be replaced by the Logic, but special metaphysics as 
well: 
 
[I]t is first and immediately ontology whose place is taken by 
objective logic… But further, objective logic also comprises 
the rest of metaphysics in so far as this attempted to 
comprehend with the forms of pure thought particular 
substrata taken primarily from figurate conception 
[Vorstellung], namely the soul, the world, and God; and the 
determinations of thought constituted what was essential in the 
mode of consideration.19 
                                                        
18 By this I do not mean that Sein or Dasein are what Hegel understands ens to be. As 
we shall soon see, Hegel does not posit a clear category of either ens or das Seiende and 
closest he comes to Wolffian conception of ens is das Ding, with characteristics similar 
to those of Wolffian of ens being first discernable under the category of Etwas. 
19 SL, p. 63. Original emphasis. 
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 The reason I am pointing this out now is due to the fact that Hegel 
criticises pre-Critical metaphysics both in its general and special mode and, 
while the two are criticised in a different way, I will show that Hegel’s criticism 
of each can be seen as contained in a critique which encompasses both. To 
begin with, and I will elaborate on this later, we should note that the objective 
logic is supposed to both replace ontology or general metaphysics and comprise 
what was known as special metaphysics. 
2.  1 .  The Logic and the Entity qua  Entity 
 
 How is this replacement of ontology supposed to be understood? So far 
we have seen that when referring to ontology Hegel sees it as a science of the 
ens, or to on, which he translates by its German morphological correlate ‘das 
Seiende’. If the Logic is supposed to be the replacement of Wolff’s ontology it 
will, however, not be a replacement that takes the same form of proceeding. 
Specifically, while the Logic is seen to replace Wolffian general metaphysics, 
Hegel will not do so by proposing an alternative science of an entity qua entity. 
The Logic is not presented as the study of das Seiende selbst, or of the predicates 
that are supposed to be applicable to an abstractly conceived Entity lacking 
internal contradictions. In fact, the Logic will be seen as “the science of the Idea 
in and for itself,”20 or of “thinking, of its determinations and laws,” although 
“not as formal thinking, but as the self-developing totality of its own peculiar 
determinations and laws which thinking gives to itself, instead of finding it 
already had it.”21 Unlike what we have seen in Wolff (and earlier in for 
example Clauberg), Hegel’s Logic is not supposed to begin with the most 
abstracted internally non-contradictory thought, name that of ‘an entity’, and 
proceed to analytically derive predicates that apply to that possible thought, or 
to the object of that thought. Hegel does start with a pure thought, but this is 
the pure thought of Being – Sein – free from any determination. But what is in a 
name? Is it the case that Hegel simply decides to call the thought occurring at 
the starting point ‘Being’ instead of ‘Entity’? If this were the case it seems there 
                                                        
20 EL, §18. 
21 EL, §19 & 19*. 
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would not be much difference between Wolff’s ontology and Hegel’s 
replacement of it, at least with regards to the starting points they posit for their 
systems. The beginning of the Logic with Sein rather than das Seiende or ens, 
however, is something more significant than a mere terminological preference. 
 
 Firstly, in Wolff’s system the ens is treated as the most abstract subject of 
predication. The aim is to posit it as a starting point from which we can 
discover predicates which are to be predicated of any possible entity, be that 
entity finite, infinite, empirically existing, or imaginary. Since some of the 
predicates are mutually exclusive on pain of contradiction (e.g. finite-infinite, 
simple-complex), they cannot apply to one and the same entity. But since what 
we are investigating, and starting from, is an entity qua entity, rather than an 
entity in any particular determination, we have at our disposal a certain 
abstraction of which these predicates can be predicated. Since Hegel does start 
from an abstraction, indeed, what he sees as the greatest possible abstraction, 
the starting position is similar. But for Hegel, Being from which the logic starts 
a) does not serve as a possible subject of predication, and b) is not a starting 
point from which we derive predicates applicable to it, guided by principles of 
thinking such as contradiction and sufficient reason. In fact, the thought of 
“Being, pure Being, without further determination” vanishes into Nothing. 
Neither Nothing, nor later Becoming, is predicated of Being. There is no talk of 
the subjects of predication, possible predicates of those subjects, or predication 
at all – at least until very late in the Logic.  
 
 Another difference between the conception of Wolff and Hegel’s 
system regarding the science of an entity qua entity can be inferred from the 
quotation regarding the Logic and the concept ens given above. “Ens,” Hegel 
tells us, “comprises both being and essence, a distinction for which the German 
language has fortunately preserved different terms.”22 Later on in the Logic, he 
states that: “The German language has preserved essence in the past participle 
[gewesen] of the verb to be [sein]; for essence is past – but timelessly past – 
being.”23 The first thing to note is that in Latin and Ancient Greek there is no 
                                                        
22 SL, p. 63. 
23 “…aber zeitloss vergangene Sein.” SL, p. 389. 
 199 
form of a past participle for the verb to be.24 But all three languages have a 
morphological correlate of the present participle in to on, ens, and das Seiende. 
So why go with Sein? A clue might be in Hegel’s description of the relation 
between sein and gewesen. Since the Doctrine of Essence is supposed to follow 
the Doctrine of Being we can assume that Hegel sees the participle form of 
expression of something to be more determinate or derivative from the 
infinitive form of expression. This, however, is not to say that for Hegel it 
simply ‘sounds better’ to use the infinitive to begin the Logic rather than a 
participle. Hegel believes that language (or at least German language) itself 
possesses a speculative spirit that can display the relations of the categories 
present in the Logic. 25 This would mean that the concept das Seiende could not 
serve as a starting point of the Logic since its participle form suggests it to be a 
“further determination” – something from which “Being, pure being” needs to 
be without.  
 
But this argument does not have to be seen as resting only on a 
grammatical fact that participles are derivable from infinitives. If we keep in 
mind that the participle form of ‘to be’ in Latin and Greek can also be 
translated as ‘that which is’ or ‘the one which is’, we could say that it is quite 
intuitive that these kinds of expressions sound more determinate than simply 
saying ‘to be’. Even without being overly familiar with the relations between 
thought-determinations of the Logic we could agree that simply saying, or 
more precisely thinking, ‘to be’, or Sein/Being does not provide us with much. 
But also that to think ‘the one which is’ or ‘that which is’ seems to be to think 
something richer in determination. Such phrases have a ring to them 
suggestive of particulars with properties, of a certain one or a certain something 
                                                        
24 Strictly speaking, Latin, unlike Greek, does not have a naturally forming present 
participle of esse, with ens or essens, being purposefully invented to translate Greek 
philosophical term ousia.  
25 See EL, §96ad and Letter to Rosenkranz in EL, p. xvi. Interestingly, Melamed (2009, 
pp. 45-7) argues that a similar position, i.e. that in Spinoza’s Compendium to Hebrew 
Grammar “one an easily find some of Spinoza’s most crucial metaphysical doctrines,” 
such as that nouns, adjectives, and participles correspond to substance, attributes, and 
modes. 
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describable in a certain way. But this is too much to start from if the thought of 
‘pure Being’ has no further determination than itself. 
  
But there is a case to be made, not dependent on morphological or 
linguistic phenomena, that Hegel believes that das Seiende, or ens, as it was 
conceived by Wolff, cannot serve as a staring point of the Logic. If we read 
Hegel’s claim that ens comprises both being and essence, as I do, as referring 
specifically to the Wolffian conception of ens, this tells us that in Hegel’s view 
the problem is not simply that the subject matter of ontology is called ens, but 
that the very way the starting point of ontology as first philosophy is conceived 
is problematic. The claim then, that ens comprises both Being and Essence 
suggests that the starting point of Wolff’s system (or of Wolffianism) is overly 
determined. Earlier, I have presented various different definitions of Wolffian 
ontology that Hegel gives, but in general he considers it to be either a 
philosophy of to on, of the Entity, or the “doctrine of the abstract determinations 
of essence.”26 Both of these definitions apply to the shape of Wolff’s ontology as 
discussed earlier in this thesis. If either of these describes the starting point of 
Wolff’s ontology, then his starting point is, in Hegel’s view, overly determined. 
This means that the categories or thought-determinations required for its 
formulization, for the proper exposition of the category of ens, are plentiful. If 
we were to start with a category, ens, which depends on both the 
determinations of Being and of Essence then the determinations required for 
its formulation can only be presupposed. Even if one is to object and claim that 
ens should be taken to stand for a simple, indeterminate ‘something’, ‘etwas’, 
this category is still too determinate to serve as a beginning, since in order to 
reach it one has to pass through Being, Nothing, Becoming, and Determinate 
Being. Finally, even if we were to disagree with Hegel and say that in some way 
the Logic should start with the thought of the Entity, or das Seiende, that there is 
nothing in its concept or conception which prevents it from serving as a 
starting point, or which differentiates it from Being or Sein, that might work 
well on its own but cannot on its own be levied as a defence of Wolff’s starting 
point. As mentioned above, Hegel is correct, in my opinion, in his diagnosis of 
the Wolffian starting point, i.e. Wolff’s conception of the entity qua entity, as 
                                                        
26 Abstrakten Bestimmungen des Wesens. EL, §33. 
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the one that encompasses both essence and being, since Wolffian ontology is 
supposed to be the science of the predicates of entities as they are, but also of 
the abstract determinations of essences. This is because these predicates are 
supposed to be combined into the essences of particular kinds of entities. In 
this sense, unlike Wolff’s ontology, the Logic, or at least the starting point of the 
Logic, cannot be seen as a science of entities qua entities.  
 
Wolffian Ontology and Hegel’s Logic are both sciences from which the 
system of philosophy has to start. As Hegel puts it in the Encyclopaedia, the 
Logic as “the system of pure thought-determinations” is the “animating soul” or 
the “all-animating spirit” of all sciences, since the thought-determinations 
present in the logic appear in their particular modes in other philosophical 
sciences.27 In this sense, the Logic is supposed to be positioned at the same 
place in the system of philosophy as ontology was, i.e. as the first philosophy, 
or general metaphysics, from which all other sciences, to use Wolff’s term, 
‘borrow’ categories. But now, the first philosophical science cannot be the 
science of ens or of das Seiende, since that concept is, in Hegel’s view, too 
determinate to serve as a starting point. This we can call Hegel’s critique, or 
problem, of the beginning of science as applied to Wolffianism: 
 
But if no presupposition is to be made and the beginning 
itself is taken immediately, then its only determination is that 
it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is 
present is simply the resolve that we propose to consider 
thought as such. Thus the beginning must be an absolute, or 
synonymously, an abstract beginning; and so it may not 
presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything, nor 
have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire 
science. It must consequently be immediacy itself. The 
beginning therefore is pure being.28 
                                                        
27 EL, §24, ad2. 
28 “Der Anfang ist also das reine Sein.” SL, p. 70. Original emphasis. I qualify this 
specifically with reference to Wolffianism since Hegel has more to say about the 
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But does the Logic give us an explication of what an ens is, or how to 
properly conceive of it? Unfortunately, it is difficult to say. The term ens does 
not appear, to my knowledge, at any other point in the Logic except in the 
above-quoted passage. When it appears in other works, it tends to appear 
specifically in reference to Wolffian (Rational) Psychology about which Hegel 
says that it treated the soul as an ens or as a Ding. For example, in the 
Encyclopaedia Hegel tells us that spirit “is not supposed to be considered as an 
ens lacking all process [ein prozeßloses ens], the way it was regarded in the older 
metaphysics.”29 In the same section he tells us that Rational psychology started 
by considering the soul as a Ding, suggesting the equivalence between the 
two.30 But what about das Seiende? 
 
Das Seiende appears minimally 24 times in the Logic, but never seems to 
be posited as a specific category of the Logic, the way, for example Sein and 
Nichts, Werden, or Schein are.31 Miller, for example, translates it in most cases as 
something ‘affirmatively present’ or as ‘affirmative being’.32 Another examples 
of Miller’s rendition are as ‘being’, ‘immediate being’, ‘sphere of being’, or 
‘what simply is’.33 At certain places he renders Seiendes as a state of having 
being. For example, “Etwas aber ist schon ein bestimmtes Seiendes, das sich 
von anderem Etwas unterscheidet” is rendered as “but the being of something is 
already determinate and is distinguished from another something,” instead of: 
“but Something is already a determinate Entity, distinguished from another 
Something.”34 Similarly, “Die vielen Eins sind Seiende,” is rendered as “The 
                                                                                                                                                      
problem of beginning in philosophy. See SL, pp. 67-78. There are other problems 
connected to the way ens is conceived in Wolff to which I will get to shortly. 
29 EL, §34, ad. 
30 See also LoL, p.21. for the same point and the same identification between the 
Wolffian Ding and ens.  
31 The count refers to the substantive occurrences, such as das Seiende or (ein) Seiendes. 
The purely participle use, i.e. seiend, is ubiquitous in the text. 
32 SL, pp. 164, 165, 168, 484. 
33 SL, pp. 117, 122; 224, 700; 439; 546, 627. 
34 SL, p. 83. 
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many ones have affirmative being” instead of “the many ones are entities.”35 It 
is not clear that every instance of das Seiende should be translated as the entity, 
or that the way Hegel uses it is intended as a direct correspondent to Wolff’s 
ens. As mentioned above, in the lecture course of 1808 Hegel does refer to the 
Logic as “Das System der reinen Begriffe des Seienden,”36 but it is questionable 
whether he still considered that definition of Logic to be suitable by the time 
the work on its was complete. Regarding the references to Wolff, there are 
parts of the Logic where we can say that Hegel does have Wolffian conception 
of ens in mind when talking about entities. For example, above I have spoken 
of Hegel’s identification of ens or Ding with the way in which Wolffian rational 
psychology saw the soul. The same point is repeated in the Logic: “In rational 
psychology, which is an abstract metaphysics, the soul is considered not as 
spirit but as a merely immediate Entity, as a soul-thing.”37 Similarly, “the 
definitions of metaphysics, like its presuppositions, distinctions, and 
conclusions, seek to assert and produce only an Entity and indeed an Entity in 
itself [nur Seiendes und zwar Ansichseiendes].”38  Finally, if we keep in mind the 
problem of the beginning regarding Wolff’s philosophy, the following part 
from the first remark on Becoming can be seen as referring to the Wolffian 
conception of entities: “Nothing is usually opposed to Something; but 
Something is already a determinate Entity, which differentiates itself from 
another Something.”39 
 
But these examples all come either from remarks or from Hegel’s 
references to previous metaphysics. How does das Seiende feature in the main 
content of the text, in the actual derivation of categories? The first appearance 
of it, which does not fall under remarks or introductory parts of the text, can 
be found under the section on Finitude, where Hegel states: 
                                                        
35 SL, p. 170. 
36 Propädeutic, p. 149, §15. 
37 “…nicht als Geist, sondern als ein nur unmittelbar Seiendes, als Seelending”. SL, p. 224. 
Translation modified. 
38 SL, p. 122. Translation modified. Although this is probably better to translate as 
“that which is” and “that which is in itself”. 
39 SL, p. 83.  
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In the first section, in which determinate being in general was 
considered… [determinate being] had, as at first taken up, the 
determination of the Entity [die Bestimmung des Seienden]. 
Consequently, the moments of its development, Quality and 
Something, equally have an affirmative determination 
[affirmativer Bestimmung]. In this section, on the other hand, 
the negative determination contained in determinate being is 
developed.40  
 
This suggests that in the quoted section, das Seiende is used as a term 
that encapsulates the positive element of the Being-Nothing dialectic. Since all 
the categories in the Logic are, in a way, the result of this fundamental dialectic, 
it seems that das Seiende will be a term used to refer to the positive result, 
aspect, or determinations stemming from it: to the aspects of the dialectical 
progression of the Logic resulting from the determining of Being, rather than of 
Nothing. This might tell us something about Hegel’s relation to Wolff. Let us 
consider two other instances. In the section on Repulsion and Attraction, 
Hegel tells us that: “The many ones are entities [Die vielen Eins sind Seiende]. 
Their determinate being or relation to one another is a non-relation, is 
external to them – the abstract void.”41 Furthermore, under Contingency: 
“Similarly, the possibility, as a simple in-itself [Ansichsein], is an immediate, 
only an Entity [nur ein Seiendes], or opposed to actuality, it is equally an in-itself 
that lacks actuality, only a possible.”42 What unites the three instances is the 
fact that we can see these characteristics exemplified in Wolff’s conception of 
an entity. Firstly, regarding an affirmative determination, Wolffian entities are 
defined and understood only through their affirmative determinations. By this 
I mean that they are supposed to be understood through their essential 
predicates, which can be shown to belong to them by not being contradictory 
to other predicates they possess. Wolffian entities, seen as bearers of particular 
                                                        
40 SL, p. 117. There is an earlier instance, under the category of Something, but Hegel 
there talks about Daseiendes.  
41 SL, p. 170. Translation modified. 
42 SL, p. 545. Translation modified. 
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positive predicates, therefore only have affirmative determinations. Secondly, 
“their relation to one another is a non-relation”. A Wolffian entity can be finite 
or infinite, but Wolff’s ontology does not postulate a relation between entities 
of which the predicate ‘finite’ can be predicated and those of which it cannot. 
This is not the task of Wolff’s ontology. Ontology simply tells us that ‘finite’ 
and ‘infinite’ cannot be predicated of a same entity. The relation between 
complete essences, i.e. ones which exhaust the combinations of all non-
contradictory predicates, is not its concern. Hence their relation is a non-
relation or is external to them, since there is nothing in the nature of finite 
entities which could relate them to infinite entities, besides the fact that they 
contain an exclusory predicate. Finally, since Wolff’s ontology is not a science 
of actually existing entities, but of predicates of possible entities, we can see 
them in Hegel’s connection of ein Seiendes to simple possibility.  
 
The important point to take from this comes from the fact that if we 
were to understand the concept of entity in this way, as purely affirmative, 
non-relational, and possible, this would show us the way towards Hegel’s 
general criticism of Wolffian ontology to which I am now moving to. 
2.  2.  Understanding,  Reason, and Dialectic 
 
 I have already mentioned the problem of the beginning that Hegel 
identifies in Wolff, specifically, the idea that one cannot begin a philosophical 
system with a category more determinate than Being, which is what Wolff 
does. Besides the problem of the beginning we can identify two other general 
problems with Wolffian metaphysics. I will refer to these as the problem of the 
Understanding and the problem of the Dialectic. 
  
In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel states that: 
 
The first form of philosophy that thinking generates is 
metaphysics, the form of the reflective understanding 
[denkendes Verstand]. The second form is scepticism and 
criticism directed against this reflective understanding… The 
second attitude is negative towards the first; it is the critique 
 206 
of metaphysics, and it attempts to consider cognitive knowing 
on its own account, so that its determinations are deduced 
from cognition itself and dealt with as determinations that 
develop out of cognition itself.43 
 
 These ‘forms’ of philosophy refer to the ‘positions of thought with 
regard to objectivity’ expressed in the Encyclopaedia. I have already spoken 
about them, but as a reminder the first position, or Stellung called metaphysics, 
encompasses pre-critical (especially rationalist) metaphysics with its highest 
form being expressed in Wolff’s philosophy. The second Stellung refers to Kant 
and empiricism and, as Hegel here states, is seen as a reaction to the first 
Stellung. With regards to the second Stellung I will focus on Kant when the time 
comes to discuss the Dialectical problem with Wolff.44 But first, what does it 
mean to say that metaphysics takes the form of understanding and why is that 
a problem? 
 
 Hegel’s criticisms of the first Stellung of thought can be found scattered 
across his work. In the Encyclopaedia Logic, however, he presents three 
problems of this philosophising.45 First problem, Hegel tells us, is that the 
determinations of metaphysical philosophising (e.g. the categories or 
predicates of Wolff’s ontology) were “in their abstraction (…) taken to be valid 
on their own account, and capable of being predicates of what is true.” This 
metaphysics “presupposed that the cognition of the absolute could only come 
about through the attaching of predicates to it.” Moreover, according to Hegel, 
this metaphysics never investigated these determinations (such as finite-
infinite, simple-composite, one-whole) in themselves, to see whether they are 
themselves true and whether they can achieve what they claim to achieve, i.e. 
the knowledge of the Absolute through predication.46  
 
                                                        
43 LoHP, v3, p. 106. 
44 There is also a third Stellung which encompasses Jacobi’s philosophy, but I will not 
address it in this thesis. 
45 Specifically in EL, §§27-33. 
46 EL, §§28 & ad. 
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 The second criticism Hegel gives is that the objects [Gegenstände] of this 
metaphysics were God, Soul, and the World. This is not a problem in and of 
itself. The problem is that, according to Hegel, the way in which this 
metaphysics understood these three key objects was through representation 
[Vorstellung]. What does that mean? Hegel explains that the basic way this 
metaphysics discussed the ideas of God, Soul, or the World was not as they 
were in themselves.47 As he puts it “it did not allow the ob-ject to determine 
itself freely from within, but presupposed it as ready-made.”48 By this Hegel 
means that metaphysics or Wolffianism has simply adopted the common way 
these concepts are understood and then, by applying predicates to them it 
tried to match the philosophical or logical conception of them with the 
ordinary conception. For example, we have an idea of God as omnipotent, as a 
Creator, as just, etc. or of the soul as some incorporeal substance which 
persists after death. Hegel’s claim is that pre-critical metaphysics conceived of 
its traditional objects on the basis of these common ideas. For example, we all 
know that God is the eternal creator of the world, hence He must be 
necessarily existing. If He necessarily exists, that means that existence must be 
a part of His essence. Since we know, from Wolff, that essence is composed of 
predicates, then existence needs to be a predicate necessarily applicable to 
God. Similarly, since we know that the Soul survives after the death of the 
body, then we know that the soul should be incorporeal, since it needs to be of 
a different kind from the body to survive its perishing. But also, since we know 
that the soul is supposed to spend eternity with God (or, more likely, in 
damnation) then it has to be simple, since it cannot perish or be destroyed, and 
to perish is to be decomposed into simple parts. Hence since the soul needs to 
be immortal, it cannot be perishable, or composite. Hence it must be simple.  
 
We see that this second criticism applies specifically to special, rather 
than general metaphysics. But the two are connected. General metaphysics 
adopted the traditional predicates and dualities, such as finite-infinite, simple-
composite, at face value. Special metaphysics adopted the traditional objects, 
and the two were then combined. According to Hegel, this practice does not 
                                                        
47 Or maybe more precisely, in the way they have to be properly thought. 
48 EL, §31 ad.  
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extend throughout the whole period of pre-critical metaphysics. Ancient 
Greeks thought about these objects freely. The problem of importing the 
content from representation into philosophy comes from Scholasticism which 
“adopted its content as something given, and indeed given by the church.” 
This continued into modernity, and “we moderns are initiated, through our 
whole education, into representations that it is in the highest degree difficult 
to transcend.”49 So by the time of Wolff metaphysicians find themselves in a 
double abyss of merely adopting traditional categories, assuming they are 
objectively applicable to reality, and assuming that they can describe the 
objects which they have simply adopted from representation, from custom. In 
order to understand these objects properly, however: “Genuine cognition of an 
ob-ject (…) has to be such that the ob-ject determines itself from within itself, 
and does not acquire its predicates in this external way.”50 
 
  Finally, due to the kind of finite determinations to which this thinking 
was limited, it had to assume that “of two opposed determinations (…) one must 
be true, and the other false.” For Hegel that means that this metaphysics 
“adheres to one-sided determinations of the understanding whilst excluding 
their opposites”, such that “the world is either finite or infinite, but not both”. 
Hegelian idealism, on the other hand, will say that “The soul is neither just 
finite nor just infinite, but is essentially both the one and the other, and hence 
                                                        
49 EL, §31 ad. One interesting thing to consider is that this does not need to be seen as a 
result of some religious bigotry of Scholasticism, since Religion is the mode in which 
the Absolute is expressed in Representation. With that in mind, Hegel’s claim does 
not have to be seen as merely historico-sociological. Moreover, in reading Scholastic 
philosophy, Latin or Arabic, one can see that there is a constant tension between 
philosophical thought and the Scripture, but this sometimes results in either the 
modification of the philosophical position or in the modification of the Scriptural 
hermeneutics. Hence, for example, Averroes, rejects the doctrine of the creation of the 
World since Aristotle has proved that the world is eternal and reads the creation 
stories as didactic metaphors. Aquinas, on the other hand, at least in the way I read 
him, posits the esse above ens and formally simple substances in order to argue that 
God can create the eternally existing world since God creates by endowing the world 
with esse, rather than with essentia.  
50 EL, §28 ad. See also PoS, §31. 
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neither the one nor the other.”51 Now this one-sidedness of determinations does 
not apply only to predication over objects of special metaphysics. Wolff’s 
ontology presents us with a set of predicates, predicable of possible entities. 
The problem, for Hegel, does not merely consist in such a system not being 
able to allow predicating the opposing predicates of the same entity, but in the 
very fact that these predicates are understood as absolutely opposed binaries, 
in which the presence, or the very nature of one of a pair completely excludes 
the other. This is what, for Hegel, made Wolffianism into dogmatism.52 In 
Hegel’s view, however, “these determinations are not valid when they are 
isolated from one another but only when sublated”.53 
 
What for Hegel unites all these three criticisms, of predication, 
adoption of objects and determinations from representation, and aversion 
towards contradiction with emphasis on abstract opposition, is that this 
philosophy is “the way in which the mere understanding views the ob-jects of 
reason” and this thinking never went beyond this.54 Understanding, we can 
say, is the faculty of finite concepts: 
 
Being itself finite, the understanding is cognizant only of the 
nature of the finite… Finite things behave as ‘cause’ and 
‘effect,’ as ‘force’ and ‘utterance’; and when they are grasped 
according to these determinations, they are known in their 
finitude. But the ob-jects of reason cannot be determined 
through such finite predicates, and the attempt to do this was 
the defect of the older metaphysics.55 
 
                                                        
51 EL, §§32 & ad. See also LoL, p. 25. 
52 Out of the three criticisms presented here this is not the one Kant would consider as 
the reason why pre-critical metaphysics is considered to be dogmatism. Kant would 
be more likely to go for the second part of the first criticism, i.e. the fact that categories 
and predicates used were not evaluated in themselves regarding their validity. 
53 EL, §32 ad.  
54 EL, §§27 & 28 ad. 
55 EL, §28 ad. 
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 The problem was not only that the objects of reason (God, Soul, World) 
were determined by the categories of the understanding but that Wolffianism 
proceeded “from general determinations of the understanding, although 
linking with them experience and observation of how natural objects present 
themselves to spirit.”56  
 
We might say it is not bad that the findings were supported or linked 
with observation, but this is not the point being made. If the proper content of 
the Logic is the infinite then this cannot be reached by simply classifying 
objects of everyday concrete observations. Such a practice is all well and good 
in itself, and it is good for finite sciences, but not for metaphysics. Moreover, 
and in more Kantian terms, if the source of our cognition of pure concepts is 
everyday experience we cannot know that the categories we employ in 
metaphysics really are pure categories or empirical ones. Alternatively, one 
may find oneself as an empiricist and consider the so-called metaphysical 
categories, and the universality they ascribe to phenomena, as mere habits of 
speaking or, in the case of Hume, of thinking. But this armchair anthropology 
is not what Wolffianism aimed to be. 
 
It must be pointed out that the way of thinking of the Understanding is 
not anathema to Hegel. Understanding is a faculty of determinate concepts57 
and as such it is indispensable for thinking in the sphere of determinate, finite 
objects, such as the ones found in the empirical sphere. The problem occurs if 
philosophical thinking consists of mere understanding, or is, a philosophy of 
understanding.58 Consider the following quotation: 
 
But [Wolffian] metaphysics did not go beyond the thinking of 
mere understanding. It took up the abstract determinations of 
thought immediately, and let them count in their immediacy 
as predicates of what is true. When discussing thinking we 
must distinguish finite thinking from the thinking of the mere 
                                                        
56 LoHP, v3 p. 158. See also LoL, p. 28. 
57 SL, p. 600. 
58 LoL, p. 21. 
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understanding, from the infinite thinking of reason. Taken in 
isolation, as immediately given, the thought-determinations 
are finite determinations. But what is true is what is infinite 
within itself; it cannot be expressed and brought to 
consciousness through what is finite.  
 
What is finite is what comes to an end, what is, but ceases to 
be where it connects with its other, and is thus restricted by 
it... [T]hinking, is infinite because it is related in thinking to 
an ob-ject that is itself…  
 
Thinking is only finite if it stays within restricted 
determinations, which it holds to be ultimate.59 
 
 One thing to ask at this point is what this distinction between reason 
and understanding consists in. What allows Hegel to posit the thinking of 
reason as the thinking of the infinite and then say that the deficiency of 
Wolffianism is the lack of this kind of thinking? One clue lies in the nature of 
what it is to think logically: “Logic has for its content the determinations 
peculiar to the thinking activity itself which have no other ground than the 
Thinking.”60 According to the second, above-quoted paragraph, when thought 
relates to itself it thinks the infinite, since the object of its thinking is not 
limited in kind. This seems to be a Spinozist insight, but is also related to the 
starting position of the Logic.61 If a philosophy of understanding is to start from 
the content of thinking itself, it would be tempted to conceive of it as a system 
of mutually opposed thoughts or thought-determinations, such as finite-
infinite, simple-complex, etc. In this sense, it would start, and in the case of 
Wolff has started, from finite thought determinations. As we know from the 
Science of Logic, however, the logic, which is supposed to be conceived as a 
science of pure thought, is supposed to start completely starved of 
determinations. So Wolffian categories, or thought-determinations, even if 
                                                        
59 EL, §28, ad. 
60 Propaedeutic, Logic for Middle class (1810-11), p. 74. 
61 See Ethics, ID2 & P8. 
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they were not simply adopted from Vorstellung or tradition, would encounter 
this problem of being conceived or treated as finite. An important thing to note 
is that Hegel is here not referring to any particular category that might appear 
in Wolff. Most of the content of Wolff’s Ontologia reappears in a new form in 
the Logic, especially in the Doctrine of Essence.62 Further to this point, Hegel is 
not saying that these previous systems themselves considered their categories 
to be finite. In fact, exactly the opposite is true. The problem of the naiveté of 
the pre-critical metaphysics lies in the fact that it did not recognise their 
categories as finite and hence thought of them as applicable univocally to all 
entities, finite and infinite alike, empirical or transcendent. 
 
 This allows us to link this problem of Wolffianism to the second one: 
the lack of the dialectical element. The concept of finitude appears in Hegel’s 
logic relatively early on and is logically prior to the concept of infinity. This 
however, is not what Hegel means by saying that the philosophy of 
understanding restricted itself to finitude. It is not that Wolffianism starts from 
the category of finite as conceived by Hegel or implicitly understands itself as 
operating under what Hegel conceives as finitude. In fact it cannot. For Hegel, 
once the concept of the true infinite is derived: “neither can be posited or 
grasped without the other, the infinite not without the finite, nor the latter 
without the infinite.”63 In a sense, one could say, the two could not be grasped 
without each other in Wolffianism since they compose an exclusory pair; 
however, they can be posited without the other. In fact, they have to be so 
posited since anything can only be either finite or infinite. Secondly, for Wolff, 
the opposing predicates are grasped merely as exclusions: where there is one, 
the other is absent, while for Hegel: 
 
Since both the finite and the infinite itself are moments of the 
progress they are jointly or in common the finite, and since they 
are equally together negated in it and in the result, this result 
                                                        
62 But also in the Doctrine of Being; as it should since Hegel tells us ens comprises both 
doctrines. 
63 SL, 143. 
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as a negation of the finitude of both is called with truth the 
infinite.64 
 
 Now it would take too long to give a full exegesis of this quotation, or of 
Hegel’s argument for and explanation of the True Infinite, but the point to 
note is that in Wolffianism the opposed predicates such as finite and infinite 
cannot, on the pain of contradiction, be conceived as being ‘equally together’ 
in anything. This is because, as we have said before, the way in which the 
Understanding thinks is by positing predicates in opposition.65 Due to this it 
cannot do two things: it cannot think ‘through’ contradictions, i.e. see 
something as both finite and infinite and it cannot see the necessity within 
thought that generates contradictions. One could, however, under the system 
of understanding say that something is finite in one sense and infinite in 
another, or ‘think through a contradiction’ by explaining an apparent 
contradiction in judgment as a misapplication of the genus-species position. 
For example, saying “an animal is both rational and irrational” can be judged 
as true if we say “an animal is rational qua human, and irrational qua duck.” 
These two ways of the treatment of contradiction, however, see contradiction 
only as apparent, as a mistake of judgment or reasoning, and in order to explain 
its occurrence they shift the discussion from the subject-matter at hand, from 
the thought of something as it is in-itself, to an external aspect of it, e.g. to a 
higher genus that is supposed to nullify the contradiction. 
 
 And this is indeed what Wolffianism did: “In the perspective of the 
older metaphysics it is assumed that, where cognition falls into contradictions, 
this is just an accidental aberration and rests on a subjective error in inferring 
and arguing.”66 Regarding the second result of non-dialectical thinking, i.e. 
being ignorant of the necessity of thought itself to generate contradictions, 
Kant already provided such a critique of previous metaphysics: 
 
                                                        
64 SL, 148. 
65 Remember Lorhard’s ontology, expressed through nothing but opposed pairs of 
predicates. 
66 EL, §48, ad. 
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For Kant, however, it lies in the very nature of thinking to 
lapse into contradictions when it aims at cognition of the 
infinite. To point out antinomies should be regarded as a very 
important advance for philosophical cognition because in 
that way the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysics of the 
understanding is set aside and attention is directed to the 
dialectical movement of thinking.67 
 
 Indeed, for Hegel “Kant was the first to emphasise the difference 
between understanding and reason in a definite way, establishing the finite 
and conditioned as the subject matter of the former, and infinite and 
unconditioned of the latter.”68 Hegel very often refers to Kant as someone who 
has provided a successful, indeed a crushing critique of previous 
metaphysics.69 Interestingly, when explaining how Kant achieved this, Hegel 
references Kant’s antinomies. It is significant to point out that the Antinomies, 
indeed the whole of transcendental dialectic that includes them, are intended 
as a critique of special metaphysics. As quoted above, Kant shows that 
understanding necessarily lapses into contradictions when it aims at the 
cognition of the infinite. Hence, for Hegel, it was Kant who has already proven 
before him that the way Wolffianism used its categories needed to result in 
contradictions when applied to objects such as God, Soul, and the World. But 
this suggests that while Kant provided an important critique of special 
metaphysics, it is questionable whether he provided a valid critique of 
dogmatic general metaphysics or ontology. The answer to this appears to be the 
negative. This is because:  
 
The main point that has to be made is that antinomy is found 
(…) in all objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts, 
and ideas. To know this, and to be cognizant of this property 
of ob-jects, belongs to what is essential in philosophical 
study; This is the property that constitutes what will 
                                                        
67 Ibid. 
68 EL, 45, ad. 
69 See SL, pp. 190, 816; EL, §§47 ad, 48, 81 ad. 1.; LoHP, v3, pp. 185-6. LoL, p. 26. 
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determine itself in due course as the dialectical moment of 
logical thinking…   
 
…the pointing out of the antinomies should be regarded as a 
very important advance for philosophical cognition, because 
in that way the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysics of the 
understanding is set aside and attention is directed to the 
dialectical movement of thinking. But at the same time, it 
must be noted that here again Kant again stopped at the 
merely negative result (that how things are in themselves is 
unknowable), and did not penetrate to the cognition of the 
true and positive significance of the antinomies. This true 
and positive significance (…) is that everything actual consists 
opposed determinations within it.70  
 
 
 Kant has therefore, already pointed out the lack of the dialectical 
element in Wolffianism. While Kantian criticism is, according to Hegel, 
important and insightful and applicable to pre-critical metaphysics, it 
possesses two shortcomings. Firstly, the criticism present in the Dialectic 
(antinomies and paralogisms), which Hegel sees as the main Kantian critique 
of Wolffianism, only applies to the predication of the concepts of understanding 
to the so-called Ideas of Reason, or to the content of special metaphysics. The 
dialectical element in the categories as such, absent in Wolff, and partially 
present in Kant, is fully developed only in Hegel’s philosophy. Secondly, and 
connected to this, in his references to Kantian criticism of Wolffianism Hegel 
does not refer to the transcendental analytic, to what Kant called the 
“important result” of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant saw this part, unlike the 
dialectic, as the criticism of Wolff’s general metaphysics. By referring only to 
the dialectic as Kant’s proper critique of dogmatism, Hegel can be read as 
indirectly suggesting that the general part of Wolff’s metaphysics is not 
sufficiently or adequately criticised by Kant. And indeed Hegel says something 
close to this in the Encyclopaedia, §41 when he accuses Kant of not considering 
                                                        
70 EL, §48 & ad. 
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“the content” of the categories used in metaphysics. However, since the 
general and the special metaphysics stand connected, the Kantian rejection of 
Wolffianism, even of special metaphysics, will be insufficient and “Objective 
logic is therefore the genuine critique of [the objects of special metaphysics] – 
a critique which does not consider them as contrasted under the abstract 
forms of the a priori and the a posteriori, but considers the determinations 
themselves according to their specific content.”71 
 
 As we have seen previously, objective logic was supposed to be the part 
of the logic replacing the former ontology and also comprising the former 
special metaphysics. Now we come closer to understanding what this means. 
By introducing the dialectical element into Wolffian special metaphysics Kant 
shows the limit of its method and content. Certain objects of thought, i.e. the 
soul, God, and world, cannot be treated as independent entities of which we 
can predicate properties guided by the law of contradiction. According to 
Kant, this is because when the Understanding attempts to prove anything 
regarding this kind of content of thinking it is able to prove the opposite of it 
with equal validity (e.g. world is both infinite and finite). Kant’s solution, in 
that case, is that these traditional objects of thought are not to be treated as 
separate entities, but as Ideas of Reason. Hegel partially agrees. The negative 
or dialectical side of Kant’s criticism, i.e. that the traditional objects of special 
metaphysics generate contradictions if treated by the logic of the 
understanding, Hegel accepts. He even accepts, with Kant, that we should not 
judge objects of former special metaphysics to be entities, i.e. as things in 
themselves. The clearest examples of this come from Hegel’s references to 
rational psychology. Hegel, for example, writes: “One good result of the 
Kantian critique is that philosophising about the spirit has been freed from the 
soul-things [Seelendinge] and their categories; and from questions whether the 
soul is simple or composite, material, etc.” Also: “In rational psychology, which 
is an abstract metaphysics, the soul is considered not as spirit but as a merely 
immediate entity, as a soul-thing.”72 Speaking of God, Hegel writes: “Existence, 
                                                        
71 SL, p. 64. 
72 “…sondern als ein nur unmittelbar Seiendes, als Seelending” SL, p. 224. Translation 
modified. 
 217 
then, is not to be taken here as a predicate or as a determination of essence…”73 
and “any talk of God merely as the ‘highest essence’ [Wesen] must be called 
unsatisfactory. For the category of quantity that is applied here has its place 
only in the domain of the finite. But God is not merely an essence, and not 
even merely the highest essence. He is the essence.”74 
 
 This tells us something about the Objective logic comprising both 
general and specific metaphysics. If we think back to the previous chapter we 
can remember that I have argued that since transcendental analytic is seen as a 
replacement for ontology, and transcendental dialectic as a replacement for 
special metaphysics, the former will inform the way in which the traditional 
objects of special metaphysics are to be understood. Since cognition and 
judgment are limited to what can be given in experience, rather than able to 
reach entities themselves, this will allow us to modify the way in which we 
understand the traditional objects of special metaphysics. They will no longer 
be seen as separate entities of which we can predicate properties a priori. This 
is because we, properly speaking, cannot predicate properties a priori of entities 
at all. But once we know that synthetic judgments a priori refer only to the 
objects of possible experience, and such things as God, Soul, and World as a 
whole cannot be given as objects as possible experience, we know they have to 
be treated in a different manner, i.e. as regulative concepts of reason. When it 
comes to Hegel, while he accepts the negative aspect of Kant’s criticism, i.e. 
that if one is to use the concepts and methods of understanding in trying to 
grasp pure objects one necessarily ends up in contradictions, he does not seem 
to accept the whole picture: 
 
Kant himself makes cognition in general, and even 
experience, consist in the fact that our perceptions are thought; 
i.e. that the determinations which first belong to perception 
are transformed into thought-determinations. For Kant the 
defect of these thoughts is that they are unsatisfactory 
because they do not match up with what is perceived, or with 
                                                        
73 SL, 483. 
74 EL, §112 ad.  
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a consciousness that restricts itself to the range of perception. 
The content of thoughts on its own account does not come 
under discussion…   
 
The fact that, through his polemic against the older 
metaphysics, Kant removed those predicates from the soul 
[i.e. substance, simplicity, etc.] and the spirit must be 
regarded a great result, but the reason that he gives for doing 
this is quite wrong.75 
 
 What this quotation suggests is exactly what I have been saying above. 
Kant is right in two aspects: a) reason generates contradictions when it applies 
the concepts of understanding to infinite objects (of reason) and b) objects of 
former special metaphysics have wrongly been treated as independently 
existing entities of which one is supposed to predicate properties a priori. 
However, something is lacking in Kant’s critique of general metaphysics. This 
something, regardless of his discovery of the dialectical element in thinking, 
has to do with Kant’s system still being the system of understanding. Due to 
this, as mentioned earlier, Kant locates the dialectical element of thought only 
in those situations in which the understanding applies categories to the 
infinite. What neither Kant nor Wolff saw, however, is that the dialectical 
element has to extend beyond this particular employment of thinking: 
 
The absence of thought in sense-knowledge, which takes 
everything limited and finite for an Entity [für ein Seiendes], 
passes over into the stubbornness of the understanding, 
which grasps everything finite as something-identical-with-
itself, and not inwardly contradicting itself.76 
 
To emphasise, for Hegel, Kant fails to discern the dialectical moment in 
all categories taken by themselves (not just in their application to infinite 
objects). This is because Kant does not examine concepts and categories by or 
                                                        
75 EL, §§47 & ad. 
76 EL, §113*. Translation modified. 
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in themselves, but is interested only in their role in the cognition (or 
miscognition) of objects. In this sense, Kant does not undertake a general 
critique of the form and content of the categories of general metaphysics (that 
also inform special metaphysics).  
2.  3 .  Hegel ’s  Rejection of Ontology 
 
 I have so far spoken of Hegel’s critique of ontology as referring to three 
main problems. These were the problems of the beginning, of understanding, 
and of dialectic. The problem of the beginning was mainly concerned with the 
idea that Wolffianism started with an over-determined category (ens) and that 
it adopted its objects and categories from imagination. The problem of the 
understanding consisted in the fact that it conceived of the philosophical 
procedure as the one of the application of abstract, oppositional predicates to 
an abstract subject, guided by the presupposed principles of contradiction and 
identity. The problem of the dialectic was that it could not see that 
contradiction is necessary to thought and treated any occurrence of 
contradiction as an error in reasoning, rather than as a way in which the object 
of thought, when observed in itself, develops on its own accord. 
 
 The three problems that I have here separated do not stand in isolation 
from each other. The fact that Wolffian philosophy is a philosophy of the 
understanding means that it sees thinking as a process of enumerating 
opposing predicates and predicating them of possible entities. Since it can only 
grasp predicates in isolation from or in abstract opposition to one another it 
cannot track their development ‘through’ their contradiction. This is because it 
a) does not believe that any essence or a proposition is, or should be, internally 
contradictory; and b) if it finds such a contradiction it has to discard it as an 
error of reasoning. Finally, such a philosophy, being a non-dialectical system 
of the understanding, could not begin with a pure thought of Being, as Hegel’s 
Logic does. Since it requires opposition to be given to it, and since it cannot 
think of the truth of something being its negation, it could not conceive the 
movement of the vanishing of Being into Nothing, or formulate the Hegelian 
category of Becoming.  
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Hence when Hegel says that this philosophy has adopted its content 
from Representation [Vorstellung] this is not to be seen as merely an accusation 
of some form of intellectual laziness or complacency with philosophical 
tradition or doctrinal authority. In a sense, when the philosophy of mere 
understanding looks for the content within pure thought it is as if it cannot see 
anything there. This is because, according to Hegel, if one were to examine the 
realm of pure, immediate, and indeterminate thought looking for simple 
oppositions like the ones present in Wolff there are none to be found there. 
Hence the content of such metaphysics must have been imported from outside 
of free, pure thought. Of course, there is also a problem of uncritically adopting 
a position that the forms of thought of the understanding are capable of being 
“determinations of the thing-in-itself”, a position validly put under scrutiny by 
Kant. 77 This is because the way of thinking of ordinary understanding is the 
way of thinking of ordinary logic, the validity of which was taken for granted 
as applicable to both finite and infinite sphere, i.e. to the sphere of the 
understanding and of reason. “Ordinary logic embraces only the matters that 
we here encounter as one part of the third part of the whole, together with the 
so-called laws of thinking that we encountered above.”78 The ‘third part of the 
whole’ here refers to the thought-determinations present in the doctrine of the 
Concept, while the ‘laws of thinking’ refer to laws such as non-contradiction, 
sufficient reason (or ground), excluded middle, syllogistic inference, etc. In 
Hegel’s view, Kant is right to say that there is no native content to such logic, 
that it is a purely formal way of thinking. As such it had to adopt its content 
from something external to it. This is what is behind Hegel’s claim that it takes 
its content from representation or empirical objects. 
 
Even if pre-critical metaphysics is to stumble upon the discovery of 
proper dialectical or speculative certainty, a discovery of the kind Hegel is 
interested in, it cannot retain it. For example, “Descartes’ sublimest thought, 
that God is that whose concept includes within itself its being [was] degraded into 
                                                        
77 See SL, p. 64. 
78 EL, §162*. 
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the defective form of the formal syllogism.”79 Similarly to that, as we know 
from the previous chapters, Wolff conceives all of his proofs in a syllogistic, 
deductive manner, regulated by the law of contradiction.80 A philosophy based 
on such a logic cannot ultimately reach the truth Hegel is after.  
 
It might be important to point out something that can often appear as 
‘known’ by people with little interest in Hegel’s philosophy, and that concerns 
Hegel’s treatment of the principles of classical logic such as syllogistic 
inference or the law of non-contradiction. Hegel’s treatment of the law of 
contradiction has raised many an eyebrow and more often than not consigned 
to his system a status of a mystical philosophy that revels in generating 
obscure contradictory propositions. And indeed, in Hegel’s works one can find 
statements such as the ones given above regarding syllogism or against the law 
of non-contradiction: “in the instinctive thinking of natural logic… [common 
sense] is in bondage to unclarified and therefore unfree thinking. The simple 
basic determination or common form of the collection [ ... ] is asserted as the 
law of identity, as A=A, and as the principle of contradiction.”81 While Hegel’s 
account of contradiction is more complicated than the space available here 
allows me to go into, by keeping in mind Hegel’s critique of past metaphysics 
according to the problems of the beginning, understanding, and dialectic, we 
can see what position Hegel actually takes with regards to contradiction. 
 
For Wolff, the law of contradiction serves as the cornerstone of his 
system. As discussed in the Wolff chapter, the law of contradiction serves as a 
basis of every derivation in his Ontologia and all the other principles, such as 
those of ground and excluded middle are supposed to be ultimately reducible 
                                                        
79 SL, p. 703. Similar fate has found Anselm’s proof for the existence of God – “The 
content of the proof is of the highest kind” but it has “the defect of being formulated 
in the mode of formal logic.” LoHP, v3, p. 44. 
80 See LoHP, v3, p. 158: “The strictness of [Wolff’s] method has certainly become in 
part very pedantic; the syllogism is the principal form, and it has often degenerated 
into an outlandish pedantry of unbearable verbosity. The customary examples from 
individual sciences are treated in the manner of geometrical exercises and solutions.” 
See also SL, p. 815. 
81 SL, p. 38. 
 222 
to the law of contradiction. But as such, this law is not derived, or proven by 
the system in the same way as the predicates of entities are supposed to be. 
The law of contradiction is not a predicate itself and as such it cannot be a 
result of a work investigating predicates. Since it is not a product of its system 
we can say that it is posited ‘externally’, or from the ‘outside’. But through this 
‘law’ or ‘principle’, all the predicates are supposed to be derived. It is posited in 
the system, but not as a hypothesis to be (dis-)proven or as a possibly fruitful 
model that could generate better testable predictions. It is, in fact, posited as 
something underpinning the system, as its logic, as something which regulates 
the system, but it is not demonstrable or refutable by it.  As such, it is 
something posited as not being posited, or a presupposition. 
 
To borrow the phrase Hegel intended for Kant, but which also seems 
pertinent here, this absolute ‘law’ legislating over thinking, if presupposed 
from the start, might in fact show itself to be the law of a ‘foreign court of 
justice’.82 Hegel does, in the Doctrine of Essence, establish the law of 
contradiction, and other ‘laws’ familiar from Wolff, such as of sufficient reason 
(or of ground), and even of excluded middle. In the Doctrine of Concept, he 
derives the form of syllogism and in the Encyclopaedia says that “Syllogism is 
what is rational, and it is everything that is rational.”83 But for Hegel, all these 
have to be, and are, derived by the system rather than employed from the 
beginning. After all, since the Aristotelian formulation of the law of 
contradiction it has been recognised that the law cannot be syllogistically 
derived or empirically proven. The solution was then to simply adopt it.84 This 
unproblematic adoption of something super-systemic as a principle of a 
fundamental philosophy system is what Hegel saw as endemic in pre-critical 
                                                        
82 See de Boer, 2012, p. 87. 
83 EL, §181. 
84 Aristotle claims to want a demonstration for the principle of non-contradiction is 
simply a sign of a lack of education, since an educated person knows when not to ask 
for a demonstration of what needs not to be demonstrated. In fact, a man who denies 
the principle is “no better than a mere plant.” See Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, 4.1006 a5-
15. 
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metaphysics. We can see this as Hegel’s critique of the law of contradiction 
regarding the problem of the beginning of a philosophical system. 
 
But there is also the critique of the principle of contradiction as this 
principle was conceived by the philosophy of understanding. Even though 
Hegel derives what he considers to be the true law of contradiction in the 
Logic, the historical ‘law’ was not necessarily formulated properly. In fact, it 
found itself trapped by the system of understanding, which in its formal 
emptiness was merciless in its exclusion of any possible contradiction: 
 
All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress is the 
recognition of the logical principle that the negative is just as 
much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not 
resolve itself into nullity, into abstract nothingness, but 
essentially only into the negation of its particular content. 
Such a negation is not all and every negation but the 
negation of a specific subject matter which resolves itself. 
Because the result, the negation, is a specific negation, it has a 
content. It is a fresh Notion but higher and richer than its 
predecessor.85 
 
What Hegel’s Logic does, however, is avoids prior ways of handling 
contradictions, for example the denial of one of the contradictory pairs (e.g. 
man is finite, rather than infinite), the relegation of contradictions to a higher 
unity within a shared genus (man is not a horse, and vice versa, but both are 
mammals), the relegation of the predication to a different time (Aristotle’s 
‘man is bent at t1, and straight at t2’), or the Kantian resolution of a 
contradiction by forbidding judgment over certain objects. Instead, the 
occurring contradictions of the Logic are sublated [aufgehoben], suggesting that 
they are both put aside and preserved, and as such reach a higher unity, or 
their truth. And this arising in higher truth through immanent contradiction 
constitutes the dialectical element.  
 
                                                        
85 SL, p. 54. 
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There are several other more specific ways in which Hegel criticises 
various aspects of Wolffian ontology. One could speak in more detail of his 
rejection of the use of mathematical or geometrical method in philosophy,86 
the employment of syllogistic, a priori derivation,87 etc. However, all of his 
more detailed criticisms of the general methods and principles of Wolffian 
ontology can be seen through one or more of the three interconnected 
problems of the beginning, of understanding, and of dialectic. What we can 
see from all what has been said so far is that Hegel’s replacement of ontology 
will not be formulated in the form of a new science of the entity qua entity that 
looks for predicates of possible entities guided by the laws of contradiction and 
sufficient reason. It will in fact be the science of pure thought-determinations 
on their own terms. And since the fundamental philosophy, formerly 
conceived as ontology, is no longer to be seen as an investigation into an entity 
qua entity, the objects of special metaphysics, which are the objects of reason, 
rather than of understanding, are not to be seen as certain entities of which the 
disciplines of special metaphysics are supposed to predicate properties. These 
objects will be conceived in a different way. They will find their place as 
reformulated within the system of Logic. When seen in this proper way the 
Logic “considers these forms [i.e. objects of special metaphysics] free from 
those substrata, from the subjects of figurate conception. It considers them in 
their own proper character.”88 Kant has already demonstrated the deficiency 
of considering these objects in the way they were considered in Wolffianism. 
However, Kant came short regarding his reconceptualization of these objects 
since his conception of what is supposed to replace general metaphysics is, 
according to Hegel, deficient. Be that as it may, it seems at this point that, for 
Hegel, ontology is impossible. 
 
                                                        
86 See SL, pp. 27, 72, 224, 814; LoHP, v3, p. 122 for the critique of Spinoza’s use of 
geometrical method, also applicable to Wolff; SL, p. 53 for the explicit critique of 
Spinoza and Wolff for applying mathematical method to metaphysics; also PoS, §§40-
8. 
87 SL, p. 787, EL §64*. 
88 SL, p. 64.  
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3. The Possibility of Ontology 
 
 In the first section of this chapter I have spoken of Hegel’s relation to 
Wolff’s ontology. From what has been said there, it seems that Hegel sees an 
affinity between his own project and the project of Wolff’s ontology, 
identifying ontology and logic at several instances, or at least seeing his logic as 
a replacement of Wolffian ontology. In the second section, we have seen that 
this replacement cannot be seen as a simple reinstatement or repetition of 
Wolff’s ontology, i.e. as a science of an entity qua entity in the manner in which 
that project was envisioned and undertaken by Wolff. Hegel criticises Wolff’s 
system from various sides, and I have categorised Hegel’s various criticisms 
into three kinds that I have called the problems of beginning, understanding, 
and dialectic. I have also spoken of the fact that Hegel credits Kant’s criticism 
of Wolff, specifically Kant’s discussion of the antinomies, with the downfall of 
that system. However, Hegel also claims that Kant’s criticism is limited for two 
main reasons. Firstly, although the problems that Kant raises in the 
antinomies, in which he introduces the dialectical element lacking in Wolff, 
are valid, his criticism is limited since it applies, according to Hegel, only to 
special metaphysics. It does not reach the dialectical level Hegel considers to 
be necessary since it sees reason’s necessary entanglement in contradiction as 
limited only to the sphere in which the understanding attempts to judge the 
unconditioned, rather than extended to thought in general. Secondly, Hegel 
sees the Kantian criticism of Wolffianism as insufficient since, as I have 
argued, he is not satisfied with Kant’s proposed replacement of Wolffianism, 
i.e. transcendental analytic, or transcendental idealism. 
 
 It is worth remembering that Kant was the first to attempt the 
substantial replacement of Wolffian ontology: “the proud name of ontology, 
which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general… 
must give way to the more modest title of a transcendental analytic.”89 Kant’s 
criticism is a familiar one, even if one is not familiar with Wolff’s philosophy. 
Metaphysics, if it aims to be a legitimate science, cannot be the science of 
‘things in general’, or entities qua entities. It has to concern itself with the 
                                                        
89 CoPR, A247/B304. 
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objects of possible experience, with phenomena, or appearances. But once the 
Copernican turn in metaphysics has been achieved, once beings are replaced 
with appearances, once God, Soul, and the World have become regulative 
concepts, Wolff’s philosophy comes back into picture. As Karin de Boer rightly 
points out: 
 
This passage is often cited to argue that Kant considered 
transcendental philosophy to be something completely 
different from ontology. However, one discipline can be said 
to replace another only if they share some common ground. 
Seen from Kant’s vantage point, his analytic of pure 
understanding and [Wolff’s] ontology both investigate our 
synthetic a priori cognitions, that is, the concepts and 
principles which allow us to turn something into an object of 
knowledge at all. Clearly, Kant does not share Wolff’s 
assumption that these concepts can be attributed to all 
things, whether material or immaterial, finite or infinite. Yet 
this does not imply that he opposes the modern, 
epistemological strand of Wolffian ontology.90 
 
If we think back to the Kant chapter we will remember that Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason does not constitute Kant’s metaphysics proper, but is a 
propaedeutic to his complete metaphysical system that was never finished. 
That system, containing ontology as its overarching discipline, is conceived as 
being very similar in both structure and procedure to Wolffian metaphysics. 
Unlike Wolffianism, it will be ‘oriented’ by the Critique, which will establish 
the domain of the legitimate employment of its concepts. In that sense, 
Kantian system proper would be seen as Wolffianism regarding objects of 
possible cognition, rather than entities. Yet one would still proceed by an a 
priori, deductive derivation of possible predicates, guided by the principles of 
thinking, for example the law of non-contradiction. Hegel, on the other hand 
                                                        
90 De Boer, 2011b, p. 56. 
 227 
“radically departed from the demonstrative method advocated by Wolff and 
Kant.”91 
 
 But I have so far treated Kant as the one who proclaims the 
impossibility of ontology while Hegel argues for its possibility. And yet, 
everything I have so far described seems to suggest that Hegel, unlike Kant, 
rejects every aspect of Wolffianism. But this is where the idea of ‘replacement’ 
becomes significant. While Kant’s transcendental analytic replaces what we 
can call the proud ‘spirit’ of ontology, i.e. the cognition of ‘things in general’, 
while retaining its method and structure for subsequent purposes, Hegel does 
the opposite. He rejects the structure and method of ontology in order to retain 
the spirit, at least in a certain shape. 
 
This can be seen from something Hegel says about the first Stellung of 
thought regarding objectivity that I have not discussed yet. The first Stellung of 
thought contains the element that is lacking in the second Stellung, and 
specifically in Kantianism. While Kantianism presents us with the idea of 
philosophical critique, i.e. the idea that we must investigate our a priori 
categories in themselves, and provides us with an idea of a dialectical element 
to thinking, it lacks, even negates, the speculative element in thinking. When 
talking about the first Stellung Hegel says the following: 
 
The first position is the naïve way of proceeding, which, 
being still unconscious of the antithesis of thinking within 
and against itself, contain the belief that truth is [re]cognized, 
and what the objects genuinely are is brought before 
consciousness, through thinking about them. In this belief, 
thinking goes straight to the ob-jects; it reproduces the 
content of sense-experience and intuition out of itself, as a 
content of thought, and is satisfied with this as the truth… 
 
Because it is unconscious of the antithesis, this thinking can 
equally well be authentic speculative philosophising… But it 
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can also dwell within finite thought-determinations. In its 
most determinate development this [finite] way of 
philosophising, this way of thinking, was the metaphysics of the 
recent past, the way it was constituted among us before the 
Kantian philosophy…  
 
This science [i.e. Wolffian metaphysics] regarded the 
thought-determinations as the fundamental determinations of 
things [die Grundbestimmungen der Dinge]. In virtue of this 
presupposition [Voraussetzung], that the cognition of things 
as they are in-themselves results from the thinking of what is 
[daß das, was ist, damit daß es gedacht wird, an sich erkannt 
werde], it stood at a higher level than the later critical 
philosophising… 
 
The presupposition of the older metaphysics was that of 
naïve belief that thinking grasps what things are in-themselves, 
that things only are what they genuinely are when they are 
[captured] in thought… The standpoint of the older 
[Wolffian] metaphysics is the opposite of the one that 
resulted from the Critical Philosophy.92 
 
 
 Several things have to be said about this. Firstly, the speculative 
element in Wolffianism, and all pre-critical metaphysics, shows itself in the 
shared belief that things are in themselves the way they are grasped in 
thought, that thought determinations are determinations of things, not merely 
of objects of possible cognition. This can be expressed through the often 
employed phrase ‘unity of thought and being’ or through what I have referred 
to as the double primacy of metaphysics. But even though the first Stellung 
possessed this speculative element, the conviction that things are the way they 
are thought to be, it possessed it naively or uncritically: 
 
                                                        
92 EL, §§26-8 ad. 
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Naïve thinking can be true, it can be speculative, but [in 
classical metaphysics from antiquity on] it has been so 
uncritically. It has had no consciousness of the thought forms 
which it has used and by which it has fallen into 
contradictions, so that it has since been remarked that this is 
not the way in which we reach the truth.93 
 
This thinking is deemed naïve and uncritical for two reasons we have 
already mentioned. Firstly, as demonstrated by Kant, it fell into contradiction 
when it attempted to apply its method and categories to the infinite. Secondly, 
it did not investigate the nature of its thought-determinations themselves and 
hence posited them as isolated, exclusory opposites.94 On the other hand, 
while Kant rightfully called for the investigation of these categories in 
themselves, and pointed towards the contradictions in which the application 
of categories of the understanding results in certain cases, he himself simply 
adopts the same set of categories of the understanding from the tradition 
without providing a proper investigation of them on their own account.95 
Moreover, Kant’s replacement of ontology presented in the transcendental 
analytic was insufficient. It remained the philosophy of the understanding, but 
one which could not reach beyond the appearances and hence descended into 
subjectivism: 
 
Kant’s conception of the antinomies is that they are ‘not 
sophisms but contradictions which reason must necessarily 
come up against’ and this is an important view. The Kantian 
solution through the so-called transcendental ideality of the 
world of perception has no other result than to make the so-
called conflict into something subjective, in which it remains 
unresolved, the same illusion.96 
                                                        
93 LoL, pp. 20-1. 
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95 See SL, pp. 594-5 & passim. 
96 SL, p. 191. See also SL, pp. 51, 237. Karin de Boer has convincingly argued at various 
points that subjectivism Hegel and some others accuse Kant of is not the most 
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 Strictly speaking, Wolffianism was never a speculative philosophy 
proper. As a mere philosophy of the understanding it could not be. 
“Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast 
contradiction and in it, its own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated 
by it as in ordinary thinking, where its determinations are resolved by 
contradiction only into other determinations or into nothing.”97 However, 
Wolffianism does belong to the first Stellung of thought, the one which is, in 
contrast with Kantianism, defined by the presence of speculative elements of 
thinking through its naïve assumption of the unity of thought and being. 
According to Hegel, these elements were most directly present in Ancient 
philosophers and appear, less and less, as the history of this metaphysics 
approaches Kant.98 As mentioned earlier, Hegel identifies more precise 
moments of speculative inspiration in Descartes (Cogito), Spinoza (God as 
causa sui), and others, but these moments are always prevented from receiving 
their proper speculative expression through the encroachment of the 
philosophy of the understanding and its aspects. In a sense it seems, that by 
the time we reach Wolff, nothing speculative is left in philosophy, except this 
naïve belief in the idea that thought describes things as they are, or the desire 
for truth in metaphysics:  
 
Metaphysics, even the metaphysics that restricted itself to 
fixed concepts of the understanding and did not rise to 
speculative thinking, to the nature of the Notion and of the 
Idea – had for its aim the cognition of truth, and investigated its 
objects to ascertain whether they were true things or not, 
substances or phenomena.  
 
The victory of the Kantian criticism over this metaphysics 
consists, on the contrary, in doing away with the investigation 
                                                                                                                                                      
accurate reading of Kant (See de Boer 2011a & 2011b). However, I am here primarily 
concerned with Hegel’s interpretation of Kant with all its flaws.  
97 SL, p. 440. Cf. EL 32 ad. 
98 SL, p. 45. 
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that has truth for its aim, and this aim itself. But to cling to 
phenomena and the mere conceptions given in everyday 
consciousness is to renounce the Notion and philosophy. 
Anything rising above this is stigmatized in the Kantian 
criticism as something high-flown to which reason is in no 
way entitled.99 
 
 This reading of the relation between Wolff, Kant, and Hegel allows us 
to understand Hegel’s description of Wolffianism as naïve in a not completely 
negative light. Let us remember that for Kant, Wolffian claims to metaphysical 
knowledge of things as they are were seen as proud or arrogant. To be naïve 
can be seen as more of a benevolent state than pride. As Hegel said, this naïve 
thinking can be true and speculative, but it will be so accidentally. Socrates 
might argue and prove that all humans essentially aim to do good, doing evil 
only out of ignorance. A child might not understand the proof of this 
argument, but still might naively believe in the fundamental goodness of 
humankind. This, it seems to me, is what Hegel aims to express when he says 
that pre-Kantian metaphysics naively believed that the thought of things 
expresses the way they are in their truth. However, philosophy cannot remain 
in its naïve state. It needs to transition from being the love of knowing to being 
the actual knowing,100 and it was Kantian critique that first posited the demand 
for us to lift ourselves out of this “self-imposed immaturity.”101 It demanded 
that the naïve use of the categories, which were supposed to describe things as 
they were in themselves through thinking about them, be justified and 
legitimised. The problem is that Kantian ‘modesty’ was not able to achieve this 
goal. 
 
                                                        
99 SL, pp. 779-80. Cf. also PoS §64 and LoHP v3, p. 139 where Hegel describes the 
method of Kant and Empiricism, both examples of the second Stellung, as 
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101 Kant, Was ist Aufklärung, p. 55. 
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What is the subject matter [Gegenstand] of our science? The 
simplest and most intelligible answer is truth. But there seems 
to be a lack of proportion between us men, limited as we are, 
and the truth as it is in and for itself and the question arises of 
the bridge between the finite and the infinite. There seems to 
be a contradiction between any such project and the virtues 
of humility and modesty. Humility of this sort is not worth 
very much…  
 
When Aristotle summons us to consider ourselves as worthy 
of conduct of this sort, then the worthiness that 
consciousness ascribes to itself consists precisely in the giving 
up of our particular opinions and beliefs and in allowing the 
matter [die Sache] [itself] to hold sway over us...  
 
In accordance with these determinations, thoughts can be 
called objective thoughts. Thus logic coincides with 
metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts that 
used to be taken to express the essentialities of the things.102   
 
 All of this suggests the way in which we can understand Hegel as 
someone arguing for the possibility of ontology after Kant. Even though Hegel 
rejects most of the structure and presuppositions of Wolffian ontology, he 
keeps the idea of the possibility of a science of things grasped in thoughts, 
rather than as science of appearances, or of objects of cognition only. In a 
sense, if Kant retains the epistemic elements of Wolff, i.e. he sees ontology as a 
science of a priori thought-determinations required to make anything into an 
object of knowledge, Hegel also attempts to retain the metaphysical elements, 
i.e. to find the thought-determinations constituting the way in which the 
things themselves are. But after Kant, an ambition of this kind cannot be 
merely adopted or attempted, as Hegel suggests in the previously quoted 
                                                        
102 EL, §16, ad 1. & §§23*-4. The rejection of “self-assurance” which replaced humility in 
the continuation of the first quoted paragraph refers to, I believe, Jacobi’s philosophy, 
seen as an inadequate response to Kantianism. 
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lament for ontology. In fact, due to Kant’s criticism, as I said in the beginning, 
no one would even dare to mention ontology and other metaphysical sciences 
any more. 
 
In that case, how will Hegel attempt to justify his ambition? One 
requirement is to show the deficiency of Kant’s critique of metaphysics. I have 
shown at various places how Hegel attempts to do this. Much more could be 
said about Hegel’s exact criticisms of Kant, whether they work, and whether 
his understanding of Kant is mistaken or not. However, since my project 
concerns Hegel’s relation to ontology, I had to suspend the question of whether 
Hegel succeeds in his project, in order to try to see what his project was 
supposed to be. And I think that I have managed to show so far that Hegel 
attempts to reject Kant’s replacement of ontology, as presented in the 
transcendental analytic. However, there also needs to be a positive aspect to 
Hegel’s replacement of Kant’s criticism of ontology. This will be undertaken 
by looking at all the deficiencies Hegel has identified in historical forms of 
philosophy and constructing a system that contains their strengths and avoids 
their weaknesses. As such, Hegel’s system would need to be the system that is 
not limited to the way of thinking of the understanding, a system that is 
speculative, dialectical, and starts from the proper starting place.  Hence the 
start cannot be anything overly determinate, as the Wolffian ens was, it cannot 
be a list of predicates standing in simple opposition, it cannot be an 
overarching principle of thinking such as the law of non-contradiction, it 
cannot be anything empirical, it cannot be an entity such as God, it cannot be 
the form of judgment or syllogism, it cannot be our thinking as subjectively 
ours. 
 
Hence the beginning cannot be made with anything concrete, 
anything containing a relation within itself. That which 
constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken 
as something unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled 
immediacy, and therefore as being, as the completely empty 
being.103 
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And thinking can start from such emptiness. Unlike classical formal 
logic, it does not require an external content, provided by representation or 
common sense, in order to derive further determinations. The thinking in this 
sphere of immediate simplicity will immanently give rise to contradictions. But 
since we have put aside the restrictions of understanding, Hegel can now see 
these contradictions as productive, as arising from the sphere of thought itself, 
from the realm of pure thought, and as determining the way in which things 
are and are to be known. 
4. Hegelianism and its Discontent 
 
So far I have argued that Hegel intends his philosophy to be a kind of 
rehabilitation of certain tenets of pre-Kantian metaphysics. If one would give a 
name to a reading of this kind it could be called a ‘metaphysical’ reading since 
I have argued that Hegel is attempting to formulate a scientifically valid way of 
developing the speculative element which was present in metaphysics before 
Kant, and which was, according to Hegel, abandoned by Kantianism. On the 
other hand, if we take into account that my reading focuses on interpreting 
Hegel’s project from the perspective of a particular manifestation of a system 
of pre-critical metaphysics, i.e. of Wolff’s ontology, and argues that both the 
Science of Logic and Ontologia are to be seen as foundational parts of a larger 
system of metaphysics that aims to describe the a priori structures of things as 
they are and as they are known, this reading could be called an ontological 
one. If we take into account the Wolffian meaning of the term ‘ontology’ then 
there is no great difference between an ontological and a metaphysical 
reading. As a science, ontology is a part of metaphysics, indeed it is its first or 
most general part, from which other parts are supposed to ‘borrow’ concepts 
and apply them to more determinate subject matter. However, if one is to look 
at the way in which the terms such as ‘ontological’ and ‘metaphysical’ reading 
are used in the Anglophone Hegel scholarship of today one can quickly see 
that the distinctions regarding the interpretation of the nature of Hegel’s text 
there made do not follow this historical taxonomy of thought. 
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There are various ways in which the kinds of interpretations of Hegel’s 
philosophy can be classified, but the one that seems to be employed the most 
in recent times is the one between metaphysical readings and non-
metaphysical readings or interpretations. Beiser, for example, distinguishes 
between three types of non-metaphysical readings and links them to the 
category theory of Klaus Hartmann (Hegel attempts to develop the most basic 
concepts by which we think about the world), Pippin’s reading (Hegel’s 
idealism is a Kantian theory about the necessary conditions of possible 
experience), and Brandom’s reading (Hegel as fundamentally a theorist about 
the normative dimension of life, experience, and discourse).104 One thing we 
can see here (or from reading these theories) is that the non-metaphysical 
schools of interpretation, and their opposed metaphysical ones, do not seem to 
be the classical or historical ways of interpretations of Hegel. They are not 
seen as a continuation or as a dialogue between current waves of 
interpretation and, for example, earlier Marxist or Feuerbachian readings, 
Kierkegaardian readings, British Idealist readings, or American 
Transcendentalist readings. In fact, the readings, as many commentators 
claim, seem to stem from the distinction between metaphysical and non-
metaphysical reading posited by Hartmann in 1972.105 
 
There are also different ways in which these readings are referred to. I 
have mentioned the distinction Beiser referred to, but there is also, for 
example, Kreines’ distinction between the two into “traditionalist” and “non-
traditionalist” readings. The former are supposed to read Hegel as a thinker 
who “attempts to revive and modify a form of pre-Kantian metaphysics”, 
which Kreines links to Charles Taylor, Horstmann, and Beiser. The latter are 
linked to Pippin, Brandom, and Pinkard, and are supposed to be reading 
Hegel’s philosophy as “a continuation or extension of Kant’s critical project, 
rather than a revival or modification of any form of precritical metaphysics.”106 
McCumber describes these two kinds of readings in a very similar way, linking 
                                                        
104 Beiser, 2008, p. 4. 
105 See Lumsden, 2008, p. 54; de Boer 2004, p. 788. 
106 Kreines 2006, p. 467. Emphasis mine. 
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them to mostly the same actors as Kreines, but somewhat confusingly calls 
them the “older and younger historical interpretation.”107 
 
So according to this, my reading should fall under the ‘metaphysical’, 
or ‘traditionalist’ reading since I am claiming that Hegel’s philosophy is a 
revival or modification of at least some form or aspects of pre-critical 
metaphysics, or minimally, that it would be wrong to see Hegel’s philosophy as 
not being a revival of “any form” of it, pace the non-traditionalist readings as 
characterised by Kreines. There is, however, a slight complication in the way 
this taxonomy of interpretations is used and that can be seen when we 
introduce the concept of ontology into this discussion. The problem arises 
since there are readings that pronounce Hegel’s work as being non-
metaphysical, while at the same time saying that it is ontological. In fact, they 
would say that it is non-metaphysical exactly because it is ontological. However, 
if we understand ontology in its Wolffian sense, i.e. as a part of a system of pre-
critical metaphysics, any reading called ‘ontological’ should also be 
‘traditionalist’ or ‘metaphysical’. But this is exactly what these readings claim 
Hegel’s thought not to be. So what we can say is that this taxonomy of non-
metaphysical and metaphysical, and of traditional and non-traditional focuses 
on two different approaches to questions about the nature of Hegel’s 
philosophy. The former distinction puts emphasis on what kind of claims 
Hegel is giving us, the second puts emphasis on which tradition Hegel is 
continuing. The two approaches are neither mutually exclusive, nor 
incompatible; however, they start ‘leaking’ when the term ‘ontology’ is 
introduced. And one reason for this is that the term ‘ontology’ is not 
understood in the same way by various thinkers who use it in connection with 
Hegel. 
 
For example, Stekeler-Weithofer, a pragmatist, hence one would 
assume a non-metaphysical reader of Hegel, identifies Kant’s critical 
metaphysics with ontology, but also identifies ontology with a discipline 
asking “what there is.”108 But this is, as de Boer correctly points out, not a 
                                                        
107 McCumber 2014, pp. 15-29. 
108 Stekeler-Weithofer, 2015, pp. 579, 570. 
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traditional or Wolffian conception of ontology, i.e. not the one with which 
Hegel would be familiar with, but is instead the Quineian one.109 On the other 
hand, for example, Houlgate uses the terms ontology and metaphysics 
interchangeably, however not in a Quinean sense. For Houlgate, Hegel’s 
system presents us with a logic because it provides us with an account of the 
basic structures of thought. It also provides us with an ontology (or 
metaphysics) as well, in the sense that it, on top of providing us with basic 
structures of thought, also provides us with a basic structure of being, or of 
things themselves.110 So unlike the case of the Quinean model, Houlgate does 
not see ontology as a science which is supposed to provide us with a 
comprehensive catalogue of existing entities, but simply as a science of Being 
[Sein]; not of Being understood only as a category necessary for our cognition 
of things, but of Being itself. This is closer to what we could call a (post-) 
Heideggerian conception of ontology, which would see Quinean approach as 
ontic, rather than the ontological, and which focuses more on ‘structures’ or 
‘ways of being’ rather than on looking for entities. 
 
So the point to be made here is that while there is a tradition of 
interpretation that sees ontology and metaphysics as being opposed this does 
not seem to be the case with all interpreters. The second point to make is that, 
as is visible from above, when talking about Hegel and ontology, the term 
‘ontology’ is not necessarily used in its Wolffian sense. In that case, where does 
this dichotomy between metaphysical and ontological reading come from, and 
what does it mean to be a (non-)metaphysical reader of Hegel? 
                                                        
109 De Boer, 2011a, p. 78. 
110 See Houlgate, 2006, pp. 115, 130, 130; 2008, p.118; 2011, p. 139. ‘Things themselves’ are 
here not to be as Kantian ‘things-in-themselves’ since the latter are to be understood 
as something that stands beyond thought and cannot be reached by thought. Hegel 
also cannot be seen as reviving pre-critical metaphysics in this sense since such an 
opposition between thought and reality is fundamentally anti-Hegelian and based on 
the position of the understanding and because not even pre-critical metaphysics saw 
itself as engaging with this Kantian chimera. See EL§26: “[Pre-Kantian metaphysics] 
being unconscious of the antithesis of thinking within [dialectics] and against itself 
[Kantianism/empricism] contain the belief that truth is [re]cognized, and what the 
objects genuinely are is brought before consciousness, through thinking about them.” 
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4.  1 .  Non-existing Metaphysicians 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the consensus in the literature seems to be that 
the idea of a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel comes from Hartmann’s 1972 
paper Hegel: A non-metaphysical view. In this paper, Hartmann proposes a 
distinction between metaphysical readings and his own ontological reading in 
response to Findlay’s language-oriented reading of Hegel, and Bradley’s 
‘spiritualist’ reading of Hegel. For Hartmann, a metaphysical reading, or 
metaphysical philosophy, is one in which one can find “existence claims” or 
which posits “a reductionism opting for certain existences to the detriment of 
others”.111 On the other hand, what he calls an ‘ontological view’ is devoid of 
the former claims and is seen as a “categorial theory”, or the “rational 
explanation of categories” required for our thinking.112  
 
 Hartmann, interestingly, points out that “what Hegel wishes to give is 
an account of the determinations of the real, or of what is.”113 However, this 
account seems to be more similar to the Kantian transcendental account, at 
least in the manner of its proceeding, than to the Wolffian a priori deduction of 
predicates of entities. It seems that Hartmann’s ‘ontology’ is more similar to 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy, than Wolff’s ontology. This is because it 
seems that for Hartmann Hegel’s Logic does not proceed a priori: 
 
How could a presupposionless beginning lead to anything; 
how could the absence of determination lead to richness? 
Thus there must be operative a contrary consideration, 
pointing from the ordered richness of granted content back 
to its antecedents. The linear progression cannot be 
deduction, it can only be reconstruction; what it is heading 
for is granted.114 
                                                        
111 Hartmann, 1972, p. 110.  
112 Ibid, p. 109. 
113 Ibid, p. 103. 
114 Ibid, p. 105. 
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 This suggests, as Houlgate puts it, that for Hartmann: “Hegel’s Logic 
does not prove by itself that anything exists but merely renders what is given 
intelligible. It simply describes the logical, categorial structure of the world 
that is given to us through ordinary experience; it tells us what that world is in 
truth.”115 In this sense, Hartmann’s reading of Hegel makes him more similar to 
Kant, in the sense that he investigates categories necessary for thinking reality 
as given to us, while remaining neutral on whether the world necessarily 
‘consists’ of these categories, i.e. whether they only describe the world as it has 
to be for us, or as it has to be in itself. This neutrality, if I understand it 
correctly, is what enables Hartmann to call his position a non-metaphysical 
ontology. It warrants this name by retaining the epistemic aspect of pre-
Kantian ontology, i.e. providing us with the categorial explanation of the 
world, while avoiding the Kantian requirement that any such enterprise can 
only give us an account of the objects of the world as appearances rather than 
as entities, or things themselves. It seems to make the last move by being 
metaphysically neutral, i.e. refusing to say anything about it. 
 
 Now there are various positions from which I could voice my 
disagreement with Hartmann. For example, if I understand him correctly, 
Hartmann argues that Hegel must start from what is given in ordinary 
experience and hence determine the end-point of the logic from the 
beginning. This, however, goes against certain characteristics of Hegel’s 
project that I have described earlier. For example, the idea that “the absence of 
determination cannot lead to richness” relates to what I have discussed 
regarding the deficiencies of non-dialectical systems of the understanding. 
The system of the understanding, as purely formal, does not have its native 
content. It either takes its content from Vorstellung, as Wolffianism did, or it 
takes it from pure reason. If it takes it from Vorstellung, then we end up with 
classical Wolffianism, i.e. the philosophy of abstract predicates in 
irreconcilable oppositions. If it takes it from pure reason then, as Kant has 
shown, it ties itself up into contradictions it cannot resolve. However, if we, as 
Hegel wants us to, do not consider thinking as mere understanding, as 
                                                        
115 Houlgate, 2006, p. 126. 
 240 
reducible to judgment and syllogistic deduction, then this problem is not 
supposed to arise. So in a sense, Hartmann is correct in saying that “The linear 
progression [of the categories of the Logic] cannot be deduction,” if by 
deduction we understand an inference through syllogism. But instead of 
saying that it hence needs to be a “reconstruction” I would say that for Hegel it 
can only be “sublation.” One of the key points Hegel is trying to make, by 
comparing Wolffianism and Kantianism, is that thinking does have its native 
content, that (with Kant) thinking must investigate its own structure, but (pace 
Wolff) that it cannot do so in the form of a mere understanding. So if I am 
correct in saying that one of the fundamental points Hegel wants to make is 
that the absence of determination, i.e. starting from a sheer immediate 
indeterminacy, can lead to richness, then this position requires more than a 
rhetorical question in order to be negated.  
 
 But what I am more interested in here, instead of the (lack of) merits of 
Hartmann’s interpretation, is his division of the kinds of readings into 
metaphysical and non-metaphysical/ontological. What I want to show is that 
this distinction should be abandoned, since the terms it uses introduce a level 
of anachronism which hinders any endeavour to read Hegel historically and 
results in little more than creating straw men that prevent engagement with 
different interpretations of Hegel, which in my view are more historically 
proximate to Hegel’s own intentions. To clarify, I do not disagree with 
Hartmann’s point that Hegel’s philosophy is not metaphysical in Hartmann’s 
sense. I agree with that. But I would like to point out that it is difficult to find 
any historical metaphysician who could be sufficiently characterised as such 
on the basis of Hartmannian characteristics. 
 
 For Hartmann, a metaphysical reading of Hegel is the one which in 
Hegel’s texts finds “existence claims” or posits “a reductionism opting for 
certain existences to the detriment of others.” The question I want to ask is not 
whether Hartmannian metaphysics is possible in general. What I am more 
interested in is the question of whether Hartmann’s characteristics are 
legitimate descriptions of what was historically considered metaphysics, 
especially regarding metaphysics that influenced Hegel. For example, the kind 
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of reductionism Hartmann posits seems to me to be something characteristic 
of only some philosophical systems or positions, and more often than not, 
contemporary ones. It seems that this could happily apply to physicalism, 
reductive materialism, maybe some forms of panpsychism, etc.116 This, 
however, is not something the ‘metaphysics’ of Hegel’s time, at least the one 
which I have shown to be relevant for this project, has concerned itself with. 
More specifically, while one can find a debate between, for example, Locke 
and Berkeley regarding the existence or scientific utility of matter, neither 
Wolff nor Kant seem to argue along these lines. While it is true that Descartes, 
for example, reduces everything to either thinking or extended substance, or 
that Spinoza talks about the infinity of attributes of which we can only know 
two, this is not what made their engagement metaphysical. What made a 
system metaphysical, especially according to Hegel, is that it believed that 
thought can describe reality as it is in itself, or describe what is universal in 
both nature and in the thinking of it, regardless of whether this procedure 
started from a priori thoughts or a posteriori intuitions: “Locke’s philosophy is, if 
you like, a metaphysics. In all its formality it deals with general characteristics or 
universal thoughts, and this universal aspect is to be derived from experience 
and observation.”117 One could now say that this is all very well, but that it is 
not how Hartmann uses the term metaphysics. To that I would reply, “so why 
use it in that way, then?” Unless I am mistaken, to understand something as 
metaphysical because it gives reductionist claims, e.g. says that minds do not 
exist while brains do, for example, is a much more recent phenomenon. To 
then distinguish one’s own reading of Hegel by saying that it is different from 
something that would on its own account be alien to Hegel’s writing seems like 
a red herring of interpretation. It positions itself as a ‘modest’ or ‘sensible’ 
interpretation against the reductionist account of its own imagination. 
 
 The second problem with Hartmann’s term ‘metaphysical’ regards its 
first characteristic, i.e. with understanding metaphysics as a philosophy that 
makes ‘existence claims’. My main problem with this interpretation is, as 
                                                        
116 Since reduction can include both sub-atomic particles and mental states. 
117 LoHP, v3, p. 139. Emphasis mine. 
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Hartmann seems to indirectly admit,118 that it describes special metaphysics 
rather than general metaphysics. In fact, it seems to describe only one branch 
of special metaphysics, and that is rational or natural theology. It was only in 
this part of special metaphysics that the existence of an entity was derived a 
priori.119 But whatever we think of God, if He was considered to be an entity at 
all He was always considered a special kind of entity. Traditionally, there was a 
requirement to describe God as the greatest of and the Creator of all other 
entities.120 There was no need to derive the existence of the objects of rational 
psychology and cosmology, since everyone ‘knew’ that there were souls and 
the world.121 The question regarding them was whether they were, 
respectively, simple or complex, finite or infinite. So if by metaphysics we 
exclusively understand an ‘a priori system providing existence claims’ I do not 
know who we are talking about, since this would refer only to the discipline of 
Rational Theology, while rational psychology and cosmology, as well as 
general metaphysics, would be non-metaphysical. This is especially significant 
when looking at Hegel’s philosophy since, according to Hegel, the Logic is 
supposed to be, first and foremost, a replacement of general rather than special 
metaphysics.  
 
 But maybe Hartmann has in mind any system for which an a priori 
existence claims are possible, rather than a system which provides such claims 
in every of its parts. That means that if a philosophical system does, for 
example, contain an ontological argument that a priori derives an existence of 
an entity, the whole system is considered metaphysical. It is contaminated by 
this one part, even if such derivation does not occur in any other part of it. 
After all, did I not argue for something similar occurring in Kant’s criticism of 
Wolff, when I argued that Kant uses the impossibility of the ontological 
                                                        
118 Hartmann, 1972, p. 118. 
119 I assume that Hartmann refers to a priori existence claims, since a posteriori 
existence claims do not seem to be specifically metaphysical phenomena. 
120 Although not necessarily in combination. Aquinas denies that God is an entity, 
while Spinoza denies God is a Creator, if that is understood at all in a volunaristic 
way. 
121 The former of which gained their exclusively theological status only later in history. 
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argument as a synecdoche for the impossibility of Wolffian ontology? 
Hartmann might have something like this in mind, but it is still problematic to 
claim that the ability to make any sort of existence claim a priori is necessary 
and sufficient for a system to be considered ‘metaphysical’. For example, 
except in the case of God, which is, once again, seen as a very exceptional 
entity, systems that have argued that it is possible to derive a priori the 
existence of particular entities, have usually argued that this is possible in 
principle, but not something which could actually be done. The second reason 
is that this ability is not something that was seen as constitutive of a system 
being metaphysical. Spinoza can be seen as a good example of both if we 
consider his following claim: 
 
[I]t would be impossible for human weakness to grasp the 
series of singular, changeable things, not only because there are 
innumerably many of them, but also because of the infinite 
circumstances in one and the same thing, any of which can be 
the cause of its existence or nonexistence. For their existence 
has no connection with their essence [as is the case with 
God], or (as we have already said) is not an eternal truth. But 
there is also no need for us to understand their series. The 
essences of singular, changeable things (…) [are] to be sought 
only from the fixed and eternal things, and at the same time 
from the laws inscribed in these things (…) according to which 
all singular things come to be, and are ordered.122 
 
Here we see that the system of Spinoza, which few would hesitate to 
describe as metaphysical, does in principle allow for the possibility of a priori 
derivation of existences, but also claims the practical impossibility of the same 
endeavour. Indeed, I would argue that what makes Spinoza metaphysical has 
nothing to do with this practice of derivation of existences, but with the idea 
that we can investigate and describe the nature of everyday particulars 
through a priori laws accessible to our thoughts. In fact, if we remember what 
we have said regarding the history of metaphysics from the perspective of 
                                                        
122 TdEI, II/36/21 – II/37/2, emphasis mine. 
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Aristotelian ambiguity, the idea that one can, or should, derive the existence of 
particular, simple entities was connected to theology, while the idea that what 
we are looking for are determinations of entities qua entities was called 
metaphysics. Attributing certain anachronistically grounded distinctions, such 
as between ‘metaphysics’ and ‘ontology’ conceived outside of a historical 
context appropriate to Hegel’s philosophy is more likely to lead to the 
misunderstanding of both Hegel’s philosophy and of what the science of 
metaphysics historically was.  
 
Furthermore, it seems to me that Hartmann’s own reading, which he 
calls ontological, should be called metaphysical. That is, it should be called 
metaphysical if we keep in mind what this term meant for Hegel. Firstly, 
Hartmann claims that what the Logic “is heading for is granted.” This is 
basically, if we remember what has been discussed earlier, similar to what 
Hegel criticises metaphysics and especially special metaphysics for. Wolffian 
metaphysics took its fundamental categories for granted, from representation, 
but also it took the objects of its science for granted, i.e. God, Soul, the World. 
Secondly, if we look at Hartmann’s ‘ontology’ as a discipline which positions 
itself against what he takes to be metaphysics, and if we note that it starts from 
what is given to us in everyday experience, and then proceeds to derive the 
categories necessary for its cognition, we can see that, according to Hegel, 
Hartmann’s ontology is itself metaphysical. More specifically, it is empiricism: 
 
Empiricism was the initial result of a double need: 1) need for a 
concrete content as opposed to the abstract theories of the 
understanding that cannot advance from its universal 
generalisations to particularisation and determination on its 
own; 2) need for a firm hold against the possibility of proving 
any claim at all in the field, and with the method, of the finite 
determinations. Instead of seeking what is true in thought 
itself, Empiricism proceeds to draw it from experience 
[Erfahrung], from what is outwardly or inwardly present…
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…Empiricism and metaphysics have a source in common – 
they both have representations, i.e. the content that comes 
originally from experience, as the guarantee for the 
authentication of its definitions (both of presuppositions and 
of more determinate content). But Empiricism elevates the 
content that belongs to perception, feeling, and intuition into 
the form of universal notions, principles, and laws, etc.123 
 
There is another worry regarding Hartmann’s interpretation and 
taxonomy that readers who do not share my fear of anachronism might find 
more relevant. The truth is that I share Hartmann’s idea, if I understand it, that 
Hegel is not metaphysical in Hartmann’s sense. I do not believe that Hegel 
engages in reductionism, or that he, strictly speaking, attempts to derive 
entities a priori. Hence according to my reading Hegel’s philosophy does not 
commit itself to ‘reductionist statements’ such as ‘the world is essentially 
matter’ or ‘the world is essentially mental states’, or ‘the mind is made of 
brainwaves and cheese’. However, unless I am mistaken, Hartmann’s claim 
that Hegel’s thought is metaphysically neutral suggests not only that Hegel is 
not making these statements, but also that he is not denying them. The 
consequence would be that Hegel’s philosophy cannot, or at least does not, say 
anything about such positions. However, it seems to me that Hegel does say 
something about them, and that is that they are misguided. This is because they 
depend on the logic of understanding and judgment. These kinds of 
reductivist statements are judgments that attach predicates to subjects as an 
in-itself, i.e. they are examples of the process of predication of finite categories 
of entities, or things as they are in themselves. If this is the kind of 
reductionism Hartmann has in mind then, pro Hartmann Hegel does not 
engage in it, but pace Hartmann, Hegel is not neutral towards it. This approach 
to philosophy is misguided because to say that “the world is mind, and not 
matter” is to posit a set of pre-given oppositions that are kept separate on pain 
of contradiction. This is the essence of a reductionist system, but also of the 
system of understanding that Hegel aims to go beyond. The point of Hegel’s 
                                                        
123 EL, §§37-8. 
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philosophy is to show that certain ways of engaging in, or conceiving of, 
metaphysics, for example those described by Hartmann, need to be overcome.  
 
That being the case there is a way in which Hegel can be seen as being 
‘metaphysical and ontological’ in one sense, while not being metaphysical, 
ontological, or non-metaphysical in Hartmann’s sense. Consider the following 
quotation:  
 
One approach sees Hegel as offering an account of what 
really or even absolutely exists; the other sees Hegel as 
concerned rather with something else – with categories, 
concepts, or conceptual schemes. Insofar as they see the 
debate in this way, they tend to describe nontraditionalism as 
a ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretation… What is controversial 
in these formulations is the suggestion about Hegel – namely 
that he is engaged in an analysis of categories, concepts or 
their justification which is designed to maintain ‘modest’ 
neutrality with respect to metaphysics.  
 
Granted, one might still try to reconstruct Hegel’s theoretical 
philosophy in non-metaphysical terms, setting aside those 
Hegelian aspirations which do not fit the mould. But why? 
Why prefer a metaphysically-neutral analysis of conceptual 
schemes to an account of what truly or really exists?124 
 
 If we adopt the reading of Hegel which is metaphysical and ontological 
in a Wolffian, rather than an anachronistic sense, we can posit a reading which 
does not see an opposition between an account of what really or absolutely is, 
and a concern with categories, concepts, or conceptual schemes. As was the 
case with Wolff, the reality itself will be described through categories that are 
logical and metaphysical. But, as was also the case with Wolff, these categories 
will not themselves be entities. This will not be a Platonic system, or a system 
that adopts realism regarding the universals. These systems have been 
                                                        
124 Kreines, 2006, p. 468. 
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overcome. But also, in line with Kant’s critique, it will not be a system that 
simply adopts the position that it is possible for reason to describe the things in 
themselves. Against Kant, however, it will try a) to immanently demonstrate 
that the categories of thought apply to the nature of reality, and b) it will not 
start by assuming a qualitative gulf between the way in which things are in 
themselves and the way in which things are for us. The Real is not rational 
because we are rational and need to (re-)construct it in this way. Instead, we 
are rational because the Real is rational. But this also is not to be seen as a 
reductive idealism of a Berkeleyian kind, or of a kind that is used as a 
philosophical boogieman in the teaching of undergraduates. To say that the 
real is rational, or that our thinking and the way the world is in itself are in 
unity does not require one to therefore adopt the idea that the world is made 
of mental states. This is because the Logic does not start from our thinking and 
attempt to show why it is valid as a tool for describing the world, but because it 
starts from thought itself, and then shows that its laws are the basic laws of the 
world. Secondly, this is so, since to posit an opposition between mental and 
non-mental content would manifest a reversion to the finite oppositions of the 
philosophy of understanding. 
 
 In that sense, reductionism and the positing of entities, both aspects of 
Hartmannian metaphysics, can be seen as non-applicable to Hegel. If this is 
what metaphysics is then Hegel is not a metaphysician. The matter or the idea 
of naïve materialism or idealism have been integrated into the system of logic 
as categories of thought. Also, the objects of special metaphysics have been 
subsumed in this system of general metaphysics as necessary categories of 
thinking. Whatever we can think of, be that finite or infinite, will be 
understandable through these categories, but not because we, in our finitude, 
are bound by them, or because this is the only way to think of them in order 
for us to remain properly scientific. It will be so because these categories 
describe the world as it is. However, these categories are merely those that are 
fundamental, to the being and the cognition of the world as such. Similarly to 
Wolffian categories, even though they are the basic ones applicable to 
anything, they do not exhaust all the possible categories in which the thought 
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can think at different levels of determinacy, or the ways in which things are at 
different levels of determinacy. 
 
There is nothing in heaven or earth which does not contain 
within itself both being and nothing. Of course, since we are 
speaking here of a particular actual something, those 
determinations are no longer present in it in the complete 
untruth in which they are as being and nothing.125 
 
The Logic is, therefore, Hegel’s ontology, or what is the same, his 
general metaphysics. The special metaphysics is to be found in the philosophy 
of Nature and of Spirit, and due to what we have learned from the Logic, even 
these parts will not be allowed to be reductionist or make a priori existence 
claims. 
5. The End of Ontology 
 
 Hegel’s Science of Logic marks the end of our story. In this chapter I have 
discussed Hegel’s relation to the name and to the conception of ontology. I 
have shown that Hegel understands ontology in its Wolffian sense and argued 
that, while rejecting almost every aspect of Wolffian ontology, its shape, 
method, formulation, he retains one important aspect. That is its speculative 
position, the idea that it is “the science of things grasped in thoughts.”126 In 
Hegel’s view, in order to go beyond Kant’s critique of previous metaphysics, it 
was necessary to investigate thinking itself, not merely to adopt the traditional 
categories and assume that their validity applies to thing as they are. But in 
order to do that properly, to investigate the pure thought itself, it was 
necessary to go beyond both dogmatism and Kantianism by integrating what 
was really philosophical in both of them, and letting go of what was deficient. 
“The earlier philosophical systems are contained sublated into later ones. The 
‘refuting’ of a philosophy only means that its restricting boundary has been 
overstepped and its determinate principle has been reduced to an ideal 
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moment.”127 While Kantianism rightfully showed us the boundaries of the 
previous systems, by pointing out that they cannot, on their own terms, speak 
of anything but finite categories of understanding, and that they have never 
properly investigated the categories of thought in themselves, it found itself 
limited by seeing our thinking, in Hegel’s view, as merely ours. As such, it lost 
an aspect which had been present in thinking since the ancient times: 
 
…the knowledge of things obtained through thinking is alone 
what is really true in them, that is, things not in their 
immediacy but as first raised into the form of thought, as 
things thought [als Gedachte]. Thus this metaphysics believed 
that thinking (and its determinations) is not anything alien to 
the object, but rather is its essential nature, or that things and 
the thinking of them (...) are explicitly in full agreement, 
thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature 
of things forming one and the same content.128 
 
 In this way, I have argued that Hegel intended to present us with a case 
for the possibility of ontology after the Kantian attack on it. Even though Kant 
preserves more of Wolffian ontology, structurally speaking, Hegel attempts to 
preserve what was essential to it, that categories of thought can describe the 
world as it is in itself. But as can be seen, not much remains of that ontology. 
Although their fundamental ambition remains the same the science will be 
radically altered, to the point that its name will be replaced. The better name 
for what ontology tried to do, according to Hegel, is Logic, since its beginning 
should be conceived as starting and dealing with determinations of thought, 
rather than entities. The old model of predication, of syllogism, and the law of 
non-contradiction, will all be transformed through this new structure. Due to 
this, the Wolffian conception of ontology historically ends with Hegel and the 
name waits to appear once again, describing something other than it once was. 
                                                        
127 EL, §86, ad 2. 
128 SL, p. 45. 
 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have investigated the early history of ontology and 
argued that Wolff’s formulation of the nature and structure of that science 
should be seen as place where the history of this discipline properly begins. I 
have also argued that Kant and Hegel shared the conception of ontology that 
was posited by Wolff and that the development of philosophy from Wolff, 
through Kant, to Hegel can be seen as a debate regarding the possibility of 
ontology so conceived. Finally, I have argued that if one is to read Hegel’s Logic 
by taking into account this history, a certain interpretation of the nature of 
Hegel’s philosophy, which can be referred to as ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical’, 
gains more plausibility than certain traditions of reading Hegel in a so-called 
non-metaphysical manner were willing to admit.  
 
This thesis, however, is not intended as the final word on these topics, 
but rather as an invitation to, and clearing of ground for, further research in 
the areas I have covered. For example, one could rightfully argue that I have 
not definitively proven that the Wolffian conception of ontology existed for 
exactly 101 years. Schelling, for example, who was Hegel’s contemporary, was 
likely to share the same conception of what ontology was and outlived Hegel 
for over 20 years. While I cannot confirm or deny whether Schelling shared 
Hegel’s and therefore Wolff’s conception of what ontology was, I do not see 
this as particularly problematic even if he was also a member of the German 
ontological tradition. Firstly, every investigation needs to limit the object it 
studies and my investigation has been limited to Wolff, Kant, Hegel, and 
several other figures. In order to show that the Wolffian conception of 
ontology spans these 101 years it was necessary to exclude some interesting 
and important thinkers. Secondly, even if the German ontological tradition 
survives Hegel through the philosophy of Schelling, or some other subsequent 
thinker, my thesis shows that while there might not have been only 101 years of 
ontology, there have been minimally 101 years of ontology. The century of 
ontology that I have posited does not need to be correct to the minute. I could, 
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for example, have limited it to the publication of the first edition of the Logic 
rather than the death of Hegel, but the exact duration until this Wolffian 
conception reached oblivion is not very significant for the purposes of this 
thesis.  
 
On the other hand, to see who else can be shown to belong within the 
German ontological tradition and to see when the Wolffian conception of 
ontology is definitively lost would be a very interesting further project. 
Interestingly, the name ontology re-appears in the early 20th century in the 
philosophy of German Neo-Kantianism. At that point, however, instead of 
being a science of an entity qua entity it is treated as a science that investigates 
the objects of various other, non-philosophical sciences. In this mode it is called 
‘regional ontology’ and it will investigate, for example, the difference between 
the object of physics and the object of mathematics. But besides this, 20th 
century Neo-Kantianism also concerns itself with ‘fundamental ontology’, 
which is not seen as an investigation into objects of various scientific 
disciplines, but as an investigation into what it means for something to be an 
object of cognition at all. This separation, between fundamental and regional 
ontology, reaches Husserl and is through him received by Heidegger, who 
interprets it in a way particular to his philosophy by understanding it through 
his conception of the ‘ontological difference’. To see how the name ontology, 
already not very widely used by the time of Hegel, reaches the Neo-
Kantianism of the 20th Century, and why they adopt this name for a kind of 
scientific discovery which it did not originally stand for, would be a very 
interesting project in its own right. Some interesting research on the 
peripheries of this question can already be found in Peter E. Gordon’s 2012 
monograph Continental Divide, but this part of the history of ontology is 
beyond the scope of the thesis here presented. 
 
Similarly, it would be interesting to see how the name ‘ontology’ and 
the practices it stands for enter the analytic tradition. In fact, I believe that in 
philosophy today we can identify two dominant strands of understanding 
what ontology is. These are the Heideggerian one and the Quinean one. 
Within the analytic tradition it is common to answer the question of what 
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ontology is by reference to Quine and his paper On What There Is. In that 
paper, however, Quine does not provide a definition or a history of ontology, 
but simply uses it as a term everyone is already familiar with. How ontology 
reached Quine and how it became the science of existing entities after him is 
another interesting question, and Blatti and Lapointe’s 2016 collection, 
Ontology after Carnap, might provide some illuminating answers.  
 
But I doubt that we can go very far in our discussions on what ontology 
is, or in our investigations of its history, if we do not also focus on Wolff’s 
contribution to this history. This being so, I hope to see more research on 
Wolff’s conception of ontology in the future. At this point, someone might 
rightfully question the emphasis I put on Wolff regarding the original 
conception of ontology. After all, it was Clauberg, rather than Wolff, who 
provided us with the first extant discussion of ontology. Why not focus on 
Clauberg? There are several reasons to consider Wolff as the founder of 
ontology rather than Clauberg. One concerns the history of the name. 
Although Clauberg’s texts on ontology predate those of Wolff one should 
remember that Clauberg prefers to call the discipline ontosophy rather than 
ontology. It is due to Wolff’s preference for the latter term that ontology is the 
name that survives to this day. Moreover, while it is easy to show that 
Clauberg influenced Wolff it is not easy to see whether the subsequent 
German tradition was interested in or aware of his writings. There are no 
references to Clauberg (or at least none that I was able to find) in either Kant 
or Hegel, and that is not the case with the philosophy of Wolff. Therefore, 
focusing specifically on Clauberg’s influence on the post-Wolffians might not 
be as productive as focusing on Wolff’s influence, which is itself far from being 
well understood. Finally, even though Wolff’s philosophy is not very widely 
researched today it is still the case that anyone who works on Kant or Hegel at 
least knows of Wolff and that there was some influence on the philosophy of 
Kant, if on no one else, stemming from Wolff’s philosophy. For all of these 
reasons, I believe it to be better to consider the science of ontology to begin 
with Wolff rather than Clauberg. 
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Speaking of the question of Wolff’s influence on Kant and Hegel, some 
might be disappointed that this thesis does not discuss more thinkers that 
were important and influential for the two. I have not spoken of, for example, 
Lambert, Crusius, or Leibniz. There is also a jump in the thesis from Kant to 
Hegel without discussing, for example, Fichte or Schelling. Regarding the 
interpretations of Kant and Hegel in our own time, some might be wondering 
about the absence of Pippin from this thesis. Unfortunately, the reason for 
these gaps was more often than not the lack of time and space. I would have 
liked to include more minor and major figures in this story of ontology, but 
since not everyone can be included I had to decide whom to exclude. The 
choices I have made resulted in the collection of thinkers that appear in this 
thesis. Regarding contemporary scholarship, specifically Pippin’s 
interpretation of Hegel, I must point out that this is not primarily a thesis on 
the nature of Hegel’s philosophy, but on the history of ontology and Hegel 
appears in relation to this history. Due to this, I did not find it necessary to 
engage with Pippin’s or other important interpretations of Hegel, since this 
could be a project in its own right. One specific difficulty regarding the 
inclusion of Pippin into my thesis is that Pippin seems to have distanced 
himself from the categorisation of his reading into the non-metaphysical camp 
of interpretation, where he is often placed. Since he claims never actually to 
have been where he is often considered to be, it would take too much time and 
space to give a fair account and response to his interpretation. Focusing on 
Hartmann seemed more important since his paper on the division between the 
metaphysical and ontological Hegel tends to be considered as a point from 
which different schools of Hegel interpretation present today have developed. 
As such, I found it important to see whether this thesis, which investigates 
what ontology was for Hegel, can provide us with new material in order to 
address some claims and arguments on which the tradition of the non-
metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy seems to ground itself. And 
I believe I was successful in showing that it can. 
 
  Taking everything written so far into account, the project of the history 
of ontology is far from over. There is a lot more to be discovered about its 
original 101 years, about the period beyond it in which the name survives but 
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the conception does not, and about the period before it, in which the Wolffian 
conception of ontology is announced but the name is yet to be developed. It is 
my hope that one day more will be written on this. 
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